„Begrenzte Selbstbestimmung muss auf dem Radar von uns allen sein“

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Die Grundlagen der Europäischen Union sind Menschenwürde, Freiheit, Demokratie, Gleichheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und die Achtung der Menschenrechte, einschließlich der Rechte von Minderheiten. Obwohl die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union kein ausdrückliches Recht auf Selbstbestimmung beinhaltet, hat sie konkrete Maßnahmen zum Schutz und zur Förderung bestimmter Grundrechte bewirkt, die mit Selbstbestimmung zusammenhängen – etwa im Bereich der Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung. 

Seit 2019 hat die Europäische Kommission eine Reihe von Gleichstellungsstrategien vorgelegt. Die EU-Strategie für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter (2020-2025) stellt politische und legislative Maßnahmen für ein geschlechtergerechtes Europa vor. Unser Ziel ist eine Union, in der Frauen und Männer, Mädchen und Jungen in all ihrer Vielfalt die gleichen Chancen zur Entfaltung haben. Gleichberechtigt sollen sie an unserer europäischen Gesellschaft teilhaben und sie in die Zukunft führen. Im Rahmen der Strategie zur Gleichstellung von LGBTIQ (2020-2025) will die Kommission die gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz von LGBTIQ-Personen erhöhen und rechtliche Hindernisse für ihre Gleichstellung beseitigen. Das geschieht u.a. durch die Förderung des Austauschs bewährter Praktiken zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich der rechtlichen Anerkennung des Geschlechts. Die EU-Strategie für die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen (2021-2030) enthält Maßnahmen, die sicherstellen sollen, dass Menschen mit Behinderungen gleichberechtigt an der Gesellschaft teilhaben können, und zwar unter angemessenen Standards, die es ihnen ermöglichen, selbständig zu sein. 

Während sich Europa aufgrund der russischen Aggression in der Ukraine in einem schwierigen geopolitischen Kontext auf die nächsten EU-Wahlen im Juni 2024 vorbereitet, müssen wir erkennen, dass unsere Grundrechte nicht selbstverständlich sind. Darüber hinaus kann eine Demokratie ohne den Zugang zu zuverlässigen Informationen von unabhängigen Medien nicht existieren. Medienfreiheit und -pluralismus gewährleisten einen aktiven Kampf gegen die Manipulation demokratischer Debatten. Heutzutage wird die Fähigkeit der Medienunternehmen, sich selbst zu kontrollieren und ihr Recht auf Selbstbestimmung auszuüben, leider zunehmend durch politischen Druck und ungerechtfertigte Überwachung von Journalist*innen und ihren Quellen bedroht. Um die Unabhängigkeit und die stabile Finanzierung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien zu sichern und das Risiko unzulässiger Eingriffe in die redaktionelle Freiheit zu mindern, haben wir den European Media Freedom Act vorgeschlagen.   

Begrenzte Selbstbestimmung aufgrund von Diskriminierung, Marginalisierung gefährdeter Gruppen und Bedrohungen des demokratischen Prozesses, einschließlich Desinformation, Hassverbrechen und Hassreden, muss auf dem Radar von uns allen sein. Es besteht dringender Bedarf an einem starken und erneuerten Engagement der verantwortlichen Akteur*innen, damit die Menschen ihre Grundrechte tatsächlich wahrnehmen können, auch online. Ich möchte den Autor*innen dieses Magazins für ihren Beitrag zu diesem gemeinsamen Unterfangen danken, indem sie sich anlässlich des 70-jährigen Bestehens des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM) mit diesen wichtigen Themen befassen. 

 

Věra Jourová – Vizepräsidentin der Europäischen Kommission

Maintaining a Conflict: Putin’s Shadow Hand in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Crisis

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On 4 March 2022, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg warned that Georgia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia) are the next countries vulnerable to Russia’s malign actions, following the war in Ukraine. Why Bosnia? What are Russia’s interests in Bosnia?  

Bosnia was the first country in Europe to undergo genocide genocide since the Second World War, which is why the slightest crises in the country bring back memories of bloody conflict. In addition, the perpetrators of the genocide are portrayed as heroes heroes or publicly endorsed. Most of Bosnia’s unresolved problems are not caused by Russia, but are exploited by Russia for geopolitical interests in the Balkans and beyond.  

Bosnia’s political architecture is extremely complex. All three main entities have uncompromising political desires: the Serbians are looking for independence, the Bosniaks are seeking a further centralization, and the Croats want to create a third entity. While the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 ended the bloody civil war that caused over 100,000 casualties, it left the country ungovernable and dysfunctional, frequently described as an ethnocracy. With two entities, three presidents in rotation (one Croat-Catholic, one Serbian-Orthodox and one Bosniak Muslim), 14 governments, 165 ministers, and dozens of hundreds of local authorities, there are too many conflicting interests to form a coherent political framework.  

Russia’s staunchest ally in Bosnia and Europe is the president of Republika Srpska, hardline nationalist Milorad Dodik. In his opinion, Bosnia is an artificial state. Since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine in February 2022, Dodik is one of the few European leaders to have visited Moscow for a private audience with the Russian president Vladimir Putin, and to have endorsed Russia’s sham referendums in occupied parts of Ukraine. In January 2023, Dodik awarded Putin with the highest medal of honour. Due to his destabilizing actions, Dodik and the entire leadership of Republika Srpska were subject to sanctions and put on a blacklist by the USA.  

Dodik shares many of the same ideologies as Putin: they both oppose NATO-expansion and what they call “West degenerative ideology” such as liberalism and LGBTQ rights, while favouring extreme nationalism and an autocratic style of governing. Putin is not the only authoritarian ally of Dodik, he has also built up good relations with Hungary’s Viktor Orban .  

Because of Dodik’s veto, Bosnia is the only European country other than neighbouring Serbia not to have placed sanctions on Russia. To Putin, Bosnia is irrelevant, merely a playground to undermine NATO and the EU and to create further trouble and disruption for them. Russia was one of the Dayton signatories and even deployed troops on peacekeeping missions to Bosnia in the mid-1990s, but since Putin became president, Russian relations with the West have deteriorated. One of their favourite channels for expanding Russian influence is the UN’s veto power. The EU and the USA have played their card with have played their card with the High Representative for Bosnia, currently held by the former German Minister of Agriculture, Christian Schmidt, who has the final word on all matters. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of Putin’s famous speech in Munich in 2007, Russia supported Republika Srpska’s secession agenda, questioned Bosnia’s sovereignty, regarded the Hague Tribunal as illegitimate and vetoed the recognition of Srebrenica as genocide. At the UN Security Council on 11 May 2022, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya referred to Schmidt as an illegal High Representative, thereby playing the Dodik card.  

Although Russia is the main spoiler in the Bosnian crisis, it has hardly exerted any economic or financial leverage. The EU is Bosnia’s main trading partner, Russia accounted for only 0.3% of exports and 1.6% of imports in 2022. For direct investment, Moscow ranked 9th out of the top 10 investors in Bosnia, accounting for less than 3% of total investment. Moscow’s ability to play a role in a country with virtually no economic tools is remarkable. Yet this is due to Moscow’s willingness to work with anyone without trying to change its actions or ideology. More recently, Russia has employed entities such as the Night Wolves, who were involved in the 2014 Crimea secession, and were reported to be present in Bosnia. In 2018, it was reported that Russian mercenaries were training paramilitary forces in Bosnia on behalf of Dodik, and in 2022 it was suspected that the Wagner Group had established a recruiting office in Balkan.  

With the USA debacle in Iraq and Afghanistan, and EU attention diverted by multiple internal crises, Dodik seized the moment in December 2021 to take a further step towards his desire to secede from Bosnia by unilaterally withdrawing Republika Srpska from the tax, defence, health and judicial systems. Every action of secession that Dodik takes is vetoed by the High Representative, the only person able to stop Dodik’s path to secession.   

Lacking the funds to back the secession of Banja Luka, Russia has exploited every alternative to maintain the crisis in Bosnia at no cost, and it appears to be continuing this trend. Russia has managed to maintain a dysfunctional state in the middle of Europe with minimal capital investment. In holding Bosnia in a permanent crisis, Putin’s main aim is to demonstrate the weakness and unreliability of the USA and the EU in preserving peace and stability in its own backyard. Putin is trying to position Russia as rule-maker rather than rule-follower and sees opportunity whenever a crisis occurs; in the case of Bosnia, he is a rule-breaker. Nonetheless, it was not Putin who triggered the dysfunction, corruption or democratic backsliding in the first place.  

The Russian aggression in Ukraine, along with Russia’s malicious actions of interfering in the local and national elections of Western democracy, as well as using the internet for a misinformation campaign to provoke further division, have made the US and the EU better understand Russian agendas and tactics. If the EU pays more attention to the Bosnian crisis, it could close the Russian channels of interference. However, this depends entirely on the general outcome of the war in Ukraine and further enlargement of the EU in the so-called Western Balkans. Although Russia is far from challenging the EU directly, it is pursuing a realistic and opportunistic scheme to undermine the EU via the weakest members or, in the Bosnian case, via the accession candidates. One of the ways to stop Russia meddling in Bosnian affairs is further integration into the EU, as well as a clear path towards full membership.  

  

Rigels Lenja is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Eastern and Southeastern European History at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. 

Special Round Table: Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) after 70 years

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A special Round Table in the framework of  

The annivaersary event series “70 Years of the IDM – Locating the Future” 

and the Annual Conference of the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies:

“20 Months After the Russian Invasion in Ukraine.  What Has Been Done, What Needs to Be Done. Where Is the End?”

(9-11 November 2023, Bucharest) 

 

Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe  

(Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa – IDM Vienna)  

after 70 years. 

 

Chair: Sebastian Schäffer  

Discussants: Prof. Dr. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, Dr. Anatoliy Kruglashov, Prof. Dr. Aleksander Etkind (online), Dr. Iver B. Neumann, Dr. Armand Goșu, Prof. Dr. Radu Carp. 

Main topics: the EU enlargement and integration, conditions for a good neighbourhood relationship, and the development of democracy and multilateralism, all of them within the broader context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine.  

Further Information:  

Bucharest Conference Program pdf

IDM Short Insights 29: EU Elections 2024: Which path will Europe choose?

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In 2024 the citizens of the EU will vote in the European Parliament Elections. At the moment, polls still indicate a majority for the traditional centre-right, centre-left coalition of EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe. In the newest IDM Short Insight Sophia Beiter explains how right-wing and Eurosceptic parties are expected to gain votes at the expense of centre parties. They are profiting from the worries and concerns in the population caused by the war in Ukraine, the Covid pandemic, inflation, the energy crisis and migration.

Transcript:

In 2024 the EU will vote. Behind me you can see the building of the European Parliament in Brussels. And from 6th to 9th June a new European Parliament will be elected. Since the last European elections in 2019, Europe has had to face lots of crises. Especially the covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which have deeply affected the whole of Europe. The energy crises and the inflation are causing concerns in the population, and are leading to distrust in national governments and the EU. A special Flash Eurobarometer survey from autumn 2023 shows that a majority of EU citizens are discontent with the overall course of the European Union. 39% of EU citizens think that things are going in the wrong direction in the EU currently, while only 26% think that things are going in the right direction. In some Central European countries these rather negative attitudes towards the EU are even more evident. In Austria 50% of the population are not satisfied with the situation of the EU. And in its neighbours, Slovakia and Hungary, this proportion rises to just over 50%. Far-right parties are using these sentiments, the economic uncertainty and the topic of migration for themselves. In the future they are expected to secure votes not only in national governments in Europe but also on EU level. For now, the polls still indicate a majority voting intention going towards a traditional centre-right, centre-left coalition of the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and Renew Europe. However, polls also show that right-wing parties are making up ground at the expense of centre parties. The outcomes of the 2024 European Parliament elections will shape the political scene in the EU for the next 5 years. Therefore, already now these elections are greatly awaited not only here in Brussels, but in all member states. 

Beyond Elections: Youth Civic Engagement and the Future of Democracy

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Beyond Elections: Youth Civic Engagement and the Future of Democracy 

“70 Years of IDM – Locating the Future” series 

 

Venue: Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies (CoD), Aleje Ujazdowskie 41, Warsaw 

Youth engagement in public life is vital to building stable and resilient democracies and inclusive societies. Yet young people across the globe often feel detached from political processes and have the impression that they are not considered important enough to be represented and their voice considered. Paradoxically, many young people see themselves as actively engaged citizens, though they stress that voting in elections is the main channel through which they practice this activism.  

  • What are the perceptions of young people with respect to democracy, democratic forms of participation, and citizen activism in the EU and beyond? 
  • What tools do the governments have to engage more impactfully and consistently young people?  
  • What can the international community do to advance impactful channels for citizens’ participation and activism? 

This event was organised within the framework of „70 Years IDM – Locating the Future”, an event series organised in the IDM’s target countries on the occasion of its 70th anniversary.

Programme

10.30

Welcome coffee

11.00

Welcome

CoD Secretary General Thomas E. Garrett

70YearsIDM: The Institute and its Mission in Central and Eastern Europe and the Danube Region,
Malwina Talik, research associate, IDM

 

Presentation of reports

CoD report: Youth Recommendations to Increase Engagement in Democracy 

Daryna Onyshko, CoD youth network coordinator 

GLOBSEC/IDM (EUact2 project): “Young Minds, democratic horizons. Paving the Way for the EU’s Promising Future. Attitudes of Young People from Austria, Greece, Ireland and Slovakia”

Lukáš Dravecký, project coordinator, GLOBSEC

Comments/response

Prof. Irena Lipowicz, former Polish Ombudsman for Citizen Rights

Bartosz Kubiak, CoD YouthLead, Poland

 

Q&A

 

Conclusions & closing remarks

 

Moderation: Malwina Talik, IDM

 

IDM Short Insights 28: March of a Million Hearts

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Hundreds of thousands of Poles marched through the streets of Poland’s capital in a ‚March of a Million Hearts‘ on 1 October 2023. The event was initiated by Donald Tusk, currently the leader of the largest opposition party Civiv Platform, to mobilise opposition voters ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, not all opposition parties joined. In the newest Short Insight, Malwina Talik (IDM), who observed it in Warsaw, explains the magnitude and role of this mass gathering in the ongoing election campaign and analyzes what impact it may have on the election results on 15 October 2023.

Transcript:

I am in Warsaw in Poland where hundreds of thousands of people from all across the country, not only from the capital, came today to join the “March of a Million hearts”. This is already the second rally of this type. The first one took place in June and back then it was meant as a protest against the so-called “Lex Tusk”. It was a proposal made by the Law and Justice party, which, if implemented, would have hindered Donal Tusk from running in the parliamentary elections. The outrage was huge and up to half a million people came to Warsaw back then to show that they disagree with such policies. The number (of demonstrators) was so huge that it surpassed the expectations of the organisers and they decided to use this mobilisation and organise another march and that’s the one that is taking place today. But what it is all about today? Donald Tusk, when asked in an interview, what are the rules of this march, this rally, said that the rules are simple, if you love Poland, come and join us in Warsaw. He indirectly referred to the fact that Poles who oppose the Law and Justice party are labelled as “fake Poles”, “Poles of the worst sort”, so this rally is very much about demonstrating that these Poles also have Poland in their hearts. This is also a new slogan of the Civic Platform, Civic Coalition, a coalition led by Donald Tusk. But this rally goes also beyond reclaiming the public space, public discourse on patriotism. The goal is actually to mobilise voters, especially those undecided voters, two weeks before parliamentary elections. You may ask yourself if a rally can change the results of the elections, of this campaign. Some say that not necessarily, that it can actually disadvantage smaller parties, smaller opposition parties because their voters would turn to the Civic Coalition and some of the smaller parties will be even at risk of not joining the Sejm. However, if we consider how many undecided voters are still there and if they decide to cast a vote, most of them are women, most of them oppose the Law and Justice party, this could still change the electoral result.
And this is who the fight is now about. In two weeks we will know if this rally has borne fruits and made a change or if Law and Justice wins the unprecedented third term.

IDM Short Insights 27: Russian attacks on Ukrainian Danube ports

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The Danube Region is facing increased Russian missile strikes, posing a threat to the area’s stability, especially near the Romanian border. NATO has been briefed on the situation but found no evidence of deliberate Russian aggression against allied territories. Romania can invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty for consultations. Romania’s Ministry of Defense is prepared to respond to an attack on its soil, but invoking Article 5 is not automatic. Rather than blaming Romania for its proximity to targets, the focus should be on condemning Russia’s attacks and understanding their broader implications, including the weaponization of food.

Transcript:

The Danube Region has come under direct attack. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal, Russian missile strikes targeting Ukrainian ports along the Danube River have significantly increased over the past weeks. The Kremlin is once again threatening the civilian population and risking the region’s safety and stability, as the attacks are happening close to the Romanian border, an EU and NATO member state.   

Dylan White, the acting spokesperson for NATO, disclosed this week that Romania’s ambassador has briefed the alliance about the drone fragments that have been found. He emphasized that there is no evidence suggesting any deliberate aggression by Russia against allied territories. However, Romania retains the option to invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which calls for collective consultations among member states to safeguard political independence, territorial integrity, and overall security. 

The Ministry of Defense of Romania has asserted that should an attack occur on Romanian soil, the country’s armed forces are fully prepared to respond appropriately. This doesn’t necessarily mean further escalation, as some observers are suggesting. Invoking Article 5, the core of the alliance’s collective defense, is no automatism. Following an attack, the NATO state first has to decide whether or not to ask for support and the response taken is then determined by all members.  

Rather than fearing an Article 5 scenario – so effectively blaming Romania for their border being too close to militarily irrelevant targets – we should ultimately be much more concerned about the Russian Federation’s continued heinous attacks, deliberately causing civilian casualties. We need to understand that Putin is taking all of these factors into account, including the further weaponizing of food against the weakest parts of global society.   

Buchempfehlungen

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Sebastian Schäffer

Milan Radin: Der Tormann, Leykam 2021

Für diesen Sommer empfehle ich eine leichtere Lektüre, die zwei meiner Lieblingsthemen kombiniert: Die Donauregion und Fußball. Die Geschichte folgt Helmut Duckadam, einem rumänischen Torwart, der im Europapokal-Finale 1986 gegen den FC Barcelona vier Elfmeter hielt und so den Sieg von Steaua Bukarest sicherstellte. Das Buch hat mir viel über die Banater Schwaben, den Kreis Arad, den rumänischen Fußball und das Land im Allgemeinen gelehrt. Erhard Busek hat mir das Buch gegeben, und es hat viel zu lange in meinem Regal gestanden. Ich bin froh, dass ich es endlich gelesen habe. Der gemischte Erzählstil von Milan Radin mag Geschmackssache sein, aber für mich hat er es leicht gemacht, das Buch immer wieder zur Hand zu nehmen. Obwohl ich wusste, wie die Karriere von Duckadam verlaufen würde, habe ich beim Lesen mit ihm mitgefiebert, was es für mich sehr spannend gemacht hat. 

 

Daniela Apaydin 

Sommer in Odessa von Irina Kilimnik, erschienen bei Kein & Aber 2023

Wenn Bomben fallen, stürzen mit den Gebäuden auch die Träume ein. Vor dem Krieg, das hieß etwa in Odessa federleichte Sommerabende am Meer, verliebte Blicke zwischen Freunden, Familienzwist und alltägliche Probleme. „Sommer in Odessa“ erzählt von einer Stadt, in der all das möglich war, weil der Krieg noch keine Krater durch die Städte und Herzen des Landes und seiner Menschen gerissen hat. Im Sommer 2014 war zwar klar, dass sich das Land im Aufruhr befand. Doch die Medizinstudentin Olga pendelt ohne großes Interesse an der Politik etwas planlos zwischen den Erwartungen ihrer Familie, ihrem aufgezwungenen Studium und einigen komplizierten Beziehungen hin und her. Bis sich nach und nach die privaten und politischen Entwicklungen im Leben Olgas überlappen und sie eine folgenreiche Entscheidung trifft. Irina Kilimniks flüssig erzählte Familiensaga ist eine sympathische Liebeserklärung an eine Stadt, in der es sich hoffentlich bald wieder gut träumen lässt. 

Sophia Beiter 

Picknick auf dem Eis” (russ. Original “Smert’ postronnego”) von Andrej Kurkow

“Picknick auf dem Eis” erzählt die Geschichte von Einzelgänger Viktor, der Nekrologe für noch Lebende schreibt und so in die Machenschaften der ukrainischen Mafia gerät. Sein Mitbewohner ist ein depressiver Pinguin, der in der Badewanne lebt. Unaufgeregt, satirisch und melancholisch entführt Andrej Kurkow in die Welt eines gescheiterten Schriftstellers im postkommunistischen Kyjiw der Neunziger. 

 

Darija Benic

Trilogie „Brda od pelina“, bestehend aus den Büchern: „S one bande moje gore“, „S ove bande moje gore“ und „Kastigulja“. Autor: Jasenka Lalović 

Die Trilogie „Brda od pelina“ ist eine emotionale Geschichte über die Rolle der Frauen in der montenegrinischen Gesellschaft – eine Art Hommage an Frauen, die stoisch die Last der Zeit trugen, in der sie lebten, und die unfair beiseite gedrängt wurden. Von Buch zu Buch entfaltet sich die Erzählung ihrer bewegenden Schicksale mit all der gewohnten sprachlichen und kulturellen Vielfalt in der Zeit vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kapitulation Italiens im Zweiten Weltkrieg.  

 

Haben Sie gewusst, dass Readers of Europe 2023 in der EU-Bibliothek in diesem Jahr den Schwerpunkt auf Bücher von Autorinnen legt? Die ständigen Vertretungen empfehlen die besten Schriftstellerinnen aus ihren Ländern. Mehr erfahren Sie hier.

 

Kinga Brudzińska 

Brüssel Alphabet (nur auf Polnisch) von Maciej Popowski

Trotz seines Titels und Formats ist dieses Buch keine umfassende Anleitung zur Europäischen Union. Vielmehr nimmt es einen halb scherzhaften, halb ernsthaften Ansatz an und bietet eine subjektive und literarische Darstellung des Brüsseler Mikrokosmos in seinen verschiedenen Aspekten: lokal und international, historisch und politisch, moralisch und kulturell. Durch seine Seiten erhält man Einblicke in die Funktionsweise der Europäischen Union, das Büroleben, prominente Persönlichkeiten im Brüsseler Theater und vor allem die Erfahrungen eines Mitteleuropäers, der in Brüssel lebt. 

Lucas Décorne 

The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter; Shannon K. O’Neil (2022)

Für diesen Sommer tauche in dieses Buch ein, das einen frischen Blick auf die Globalisierung wirft und offenbart, dass die eigentliche Geschichte der globalen Wirtschaft in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten nicht nur traditionelle Vorstellungen von Globalisierung umfasst. Stattdessen erforscht das Buch die Bedeutung der Regionalisierung und ihre potenziellen Auswirkungen auf wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Wohlstand und bietet wertvolle Einblicke für alle, die die Dynamik des modernen globalen Marktes verstehen möchten. 

 

Jack Gill 

The Culture Map; Erin Meyer (2014)

In Gebieten mit großer kultureller und sprachlicher Vielfalt, wie der Donauregion, können grenzüberschreitender Austausch und Zusammenarbeit zwischen Menschen oft eine Herausforderung sein. Selbst das Lernen über andere Kulturen kann einen hoffnungslos unvorbereitet auf Begegnungen mit Menschen aus anderen Ländern lassen. Ich habe dieses Buch ausgewählt, weil die Autorin, Erin Meyer, Möglichkeiten bietet, die „Distanz“ zwischen Kulturen anhand mehrerer Maßstäbe zu messen, die spezifische Eigenschaften umfassen, die allen Kulturen gemeinsam sind. Zum Beispiel werden in einigen Kulturen Entscheidungen durch Konsens in flacheren Hierarchien getroffen, in denen der Chef nur ein weiteres Teammitglied ist, während in anderen Kulturen strenge Hierarchien eine von oben nach unten getroffene Entscheidungsfindung sicherstellen und dafür sorgen, dass die Menschen ihren Platz in Bezug auf Vorgesetzte und Untergebene kennen. Um herauszufinden, wo Ihre eigene Kultur im Verhältnis zu anderen steht, und um zu erfahren, wie man mit Menschen aus anderen Kulturen interagieren kann, empfehle ich dieses Buch. 

Daniel Martínek 

Cities of the World 1572-1617; Georg Braun and Franz Hogenberg

Für viele ist der Sommer ein Symbol für Reisen und das Entdecken neuer Orte. Diese Sammlung von über 350 historischen Gravuren wichtiger Städte aus der ganzen Welt wird Sie sicher inspirieren, während Sie Ihre nächsten Abenteuer planen. Beim Betrachten dieser oder jener Stadtplanung aus der Renaissance bekommt man Lust, Orte in ganz Europa zu besuchen, viele davon auch in der Donauregion. Als ausgebildeter Historiker habe ich mich besonders gefreut, als mir das Buch letzte Weihnachten geschenkt wurde. 

 

Malwina Talik 

„Wie man einen Diktator ernährt“ von Witold Szablowski

Reportage ist für Polen das, was Krimigeschichten für Skandinavien sind. Polnische Sachbuchautoren haben internationale Anerkennung erlangt, dank Autoren wie Ryszard Kapuscinski, die den Weg für andere geebnet haben, wie Justyna Kopinska, Wojciech Jagielski, Wojciech Tochman und den Autor des Buches, das ich diesen Sommer empfehle – Witold Szabłowski. „Wie man einen Diktator ernährt“ wurde während einer der IDM-Melanges vom Polnischen Institut vorgestellt. Ich habe dieses Buch ausgewählt, weil es durch seinen witzigen Stil und die persönlichen Geschichten von Köchen eine ernüchternde Erinnerung daran bietet, warum Autoritäre und Diktatoren in jedem Ort auf der Welt an die Macht kommen und diese halten können, wenn die Umstände günstig sind. Das Buch bietet Einblicke, wie Menschen dem Charme von Diktatoren erliegen können, selbst wenn sie sich ihrer Verbrechen bewusst sind („aber er hat immer für seine Familie gesorgt“, „er war großzügig/bescheiden“, „er hatte ein so schwieriges Leben“, „andere waren noch schlimmer“) oder sich anpassen, um in unvorhersehbaren und oft grausamen Umgebungen zu überleben. Dies ist eine ausgezeichnete Sommerlektüre, da sie fesselnd und leicht zu verfolgen ist und gleichzeitig tiefgreifende Fragen darüber stellt, wie Gesellschaften und politische Systeme funktionieren (und Sie könnten sogar einige interessante Rezepte entdecken, obwohl es vielleicht nicht Ihre Vorliebe ist wie ein Diktator zu speisen). Das Buch ist auf Polnisch, Englisch und Deutsch erhältlich. 

Péter Techet 

The Life and Death of States. Central Europe and the Transformation of Modern Sovereignty; Natasha Wheatley (2023).

Habsburgisches Mitteleuropa wird als „Labor“ für historische Forschung betrachtet, da die Habsburg-Studien neue Konzepte entwickeln müssen, um die multiethnische, multireligiöse und rechtliche Komplexität der ehemaligen Donaumonarchie zu beschreiben. Transnationalität, nationale Gleichgültigkeit, multiple Identitäten, grenzüberschreitende Kulturen – die Habsburg-Studien bieten Historikern aus verschiedenen Regionen und Zeiträumen neue Perspektiven. In ihrem neuen Buch taucht die australische (nicht österreichische!) Historikerin Natasha Wheatley in die rechtlichen Ideen ein, die in der Habsburger Monarchie entstanden sind und postmoderne, postnationale Ansätze vorwegnehmen. Der Titel von Wheatleys Buch beschreibt nicht nur das Verschwinden alter Staaten und die Entstehung neuer nach 1918, sondern verfolgt auch, wie mitteleuropäische Rechtsvorstellungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit transnationale Konzepte jenseits von Staatlichkeit vorstellten. Für diejenigen, die aktuelle Debatten über die Europäische Union oder grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit aus einer „longue durée“-Perspektive verstehen möchten, insbesondere im Kontext des (nach)habsburgischen Mitteleuropas, ist dieses Buch eine faszinierende Lektüre. Darüber hinaus ist es verständlich geschrieben, selbst für Nicht-Historiker und Nicht-Juristen.

How Kosovo Albanian-Serb Conflict raised the Political Polarization between Albania and Kosovo?

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“Albania-Kosovo meeting cancelled”, “Albanian – Kosovo joint meeting cancelled” “Government: It is the first time that a meeting of two governments has been unilaterally cancelled”, “Rama confirms the cancellation of the meeting of governments”. On 13th June, a day before the ninth joint meeting between the Albanian and Kosovan governments that was to take place in Gjakova, those headlines spread rapidly in Kosovan, Albanian and international media. The prime minister of Albania, Edi Rama, announced in the last minutes that he would cancel the meeting. During the press conference, Rama claimed that the meeting could not be held “in the circumstances of Kosovo’s aggravated relations with the entire Euro-Atlantic community”, referring to international criticism of Kosovo’s handling of developments in its northern Serb-majority municipalities. During the governments joint meeting, ten agreements should have been signed. One of the most important was the mutual recognition of lawyers and mediators in resolving disputes. 

The same day, Kosovo’s prime minister Albin Kurti refused Rama’s draft charter for the creation of the Association of Municipalities with a Serb majority in the north of Kosovo. According to Rama, this plan would de-escalate the situation and normalise Kosovo’s relationship with the international community. However, he never introduced the document to the public, considering it as confidential.  

Kurti reminded Rama about Albania’s constitutional duty of dealing with national unity and the citizens of Kosovo. Kurti added: “Rama should hand over that draft to Aleksandar Vučić [President of Serbia] for the Albanians living in Serbia”. Basically, the relationship between Kosovo and Albania turned into a personal fight: Edi Rama vs Albin Kurti. 

 

The Consequences of Partisan Media 

In Albania there are currently hundreds of talk shows, news editions and opinion leaders trying to explain why Kurti refused Rama’s plan or find out who really cancelled the joint meeting, Kurti or Rama. Who is at fault in this situation? The manner in which the media handled the issue was and continues to be like the third season of a soap opera. What is sure is that this is a manifestation of political polarisation. According to a study by Pew Research, people give more weight to statements that support their own views – be it on the left or right spectrum of politics. Frequently, some media outlets in Albania known for supporting Rama`s government criticized Kurti. Albanian and Kosovan media supporting Kurti campaigned against Rama’s policies and his political rhetoric about the Kosovo case. The media has thus played an important role in creating a split: Nationalists, supporting Kurti`s political rhetoric, and the Rama supporters, who idealise or adore him as a Western Balkan leader, who is able to solve the problems between Western Balkan countries. 

 

The Personal Fight Rama vs Kurti 

Across the world, societies polarise politically. The tone of political debate has hardened in recent years, and the political left and right increasingly seem to perceive each other as enemies instead of opponents.1 On the one hand, Rama is trying to be the referee in the conflict in the north of Kosovo. On the other hand, Kurti’s believing that his approach in dealing with Serbia is better than Rama`s and hazards the consequences of the European Union’s sanctions towards Kosovo. A central aspect of political polarisation is a strong belief in the moral superiority of one’s own ideological beliefs, which easily prompts the assumption that alternative ideological beliefs are morally inferior. In this context, the confidence of both prime ministers in their own correctness had caused political polarisation, which may lead to overconfidence in decision-making. For instance, on his Western Balkan tour Rama could not have a meeting with his Kosovan counterpart, but only with Kosovo’s  president, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, and the chairman of the parliament, Glauk Konjufca. The overconfidence of Kurti and Rama in their ideas is damaging the two countries. They are still not able to sit together to discuss what is going wrong in Kosovan or Albanian government policies. Rama was accusing Kurti of raising tensions with the persistence he showed by returning four  mayors to the municipality offices. From the nationalist idea of the Greater Albania to diplomatic meetings , and now using Kosovo politically for their own battles: it is clear Kosovo-Albania relations are regressing day by day. The leaders’ overconfidence is weakening Albania and Kosovo-Albanians because the government is playing a neutral role instead of supporting the integrity of the Republic of Kosovo. When the war started, Albania became one of the main destinations for refugees from Kosovo. Albania sheltered hundreds and thousands of refugees during that period. In the war, the Albanian army also helped with weapons. Since Kosovo’s independence in 2008, both countries had good relations which were always preceded by national priorities, but there is also ongoing political and economic cooperation. At the political-diplomatic sphere, the state of Albania and its diplomacy have been quite active in the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. It is obvious that the relationship between two countries is now damaged. On one hand the opposition in Kosovo is blaming Kurti, on the other hand the Albanian opposition blaming Rama.  

 

Post Truth Symptoms in Media  

Further, “alternative facts”, a term coined by the previous US administration under president Donald Trump (basically meaning false statements), have helped to fuel polarisation. Regularly, the Albanian public was exposed to “alternative facts” when Serbian police forces arrested three Kosovo police officers. At the beginning the media reported the kidnapping of three  police officers, then  labelled it as arrest. There are  two different versions of the same events on 14 June: Pristina Says Serbia ‚Kidnaps‘ Three Police Officers in North Kosovo; Belgrade Says Arrest Took Place On its Territory. As the journalist Matthew D`Ancona writes in the book Post-Truth, “nowadays it is more important the intensity of the drama than accuracy. The reality and entertainment have taken on the same meaning for the public”.2  

The political polarisation was already visible before, in the last days of May, when the situation escalated in north of Kosovo. Soldiers from a NATO-led peacekeeping force were injured in clashes with Serb protesters while defending three town halls with Kosovo-Albanian mayors. The Serbian president put the army on the highest level of combat alert. Serbia continues not to recognise Kosovo as an independent country and still believes that Kosovo is part of Serbia based in the infamous project “Nacertiana” of 1844, that aimed to oppose the idea of the Albanian State establishment and the displacement of Albanians from their ethnic land.  This rhetoric from Belgrade strongly contributes to the ethnic polarisation, which is dangerous. Its impact was also shown in the violent protests by Serbs in Mitrovica. 

Another micro-level symptom of polarisation was the protest organised by Albanians in front of the government building in support of Kosovo after the tensions in its north and the cancellation of the joint meeting between Rama and Kurti. Citizens displayed Albanian, Kosovan and UÇK flags with the slogan: “We Want National Unity (Greater Albania)” 

With all the hot issues to be solved in the Western Balkans, the question remains if at least the political polarization between Albania and Kosovo can be again alleviated?  

 

Media framing in Kosovo and Albania  

We cannot predict the future, but if Kosovo and Serbia continue the conflict under the generally difficult geopolitical situation, society will suffer the consequences of creating enemies. Media has been framing Albanians and Kosovans as brothers for a long time. Things have changed, because in some media in Albania and Kosovo Rama is now framed as a friend of Vučić selling out the national interest and Kosovo for his own interest.  In the partisan Albanian-Kosovan medias there is a framing convergence to Rama. Not only the traditional media help to build this frame, but a huge impact has social media.  Also, the leader of opposition in Albania, Sali Berisha used Facebook to strengthen the framing of Rama as a friend of the Serbian president. Media has an impact to affect the people`s opinion about the Albanian-Kosovo relations. The political polarisation caused violence in the parliament of Kosovo, when Albin Kurti was attacked physically by the opposition parliament members. The question is if the polarisation will raise the tensions and damage the Kosovan reputation in front of Europe and USA? 

Reducing both ethnic and political polarisation in Kosovo, Albania and Serbia will require efforts to promote dialogue and understanding between different groups, as well as accountability in the political system. The biggest challenge is to have media freedom and promoting objective reporting to reduce polarisation and promote democratic values. 

 

Gëzim Hilaj is a journalist, who has a Bachelor Degree in Journalism at the University of Tirana. Currently working as a journalist at the Albanian Public Television, RTSH and writer of many articles in media outlets in his country. Also he is the winner of the third fact checking award in Albania and selected as one of the 15th best young journalists in the world by the Thomson Foundation.

Terminating a Multilateral Agreement Amidst War: The End of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Russia’s Attempt to Weaponize Food

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In the latest article on the IDM blog, our trainee Lucas Décorne explores the weaponization of agricultural goods in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and examines how the tensions surrounding the Black Sea Grain Initiative could impact global food security. 

Food (In)security in Times of War 

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has deteriorated food security worldwide. The destruction and disruption of food systems during armed conflicts result in strongly adverse and irreversible short- and long-term effects which may alter the lives of future generations. Besides the lack of food availability, the global agricultural markets have observed an unprecedented rising in food prices, affecting both developed and developing countries. Developing countries suffer the worst effects of the global food crisis because of their significant reliance on exports from Ukraine transported on the Black Sea. Hence, the need for an agreement, in this case multilateral, to safeguard the world’s food security while reducing the time of humanitarian assistance to those in crucial need. 

A Required Multilateral Achievement 

In February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine halted maritime grain shipments from Ukraine completely, whilst Russia and Ukraine accounted for one-third of global wheat trade, 17% of global maize trade and almost 75% of global sunflower oil trade before the war. Grain could not be exported in required quantities using alternative routes through Poland or Romania because the Danube River and railway infrastructures do not have the capacity to meet global demand. Therefore, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement with Turkey and the UN in order to allow grain exports from three key Ukrainian ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi) on 22 July 2022. In April 2022, Turkey hosted the discussions since the nation controls the Black Sea maritime routes where the cargo ships would navigate through. The full name of the agreement is the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukraine Ports, but it is commonly referred to as the Black Sea Grain Initiative.  

The Initiative allowed procedures to safely export commercial food and fertilizer for 120 days. Ukrainian vessels would guide cargo ships into international waters of the Black Sea to avoid mined areas. Then, cargos went on towards Istanbul along an agreed maritime humanitarian corridor where, when reaching Istanbul, they were inspected by a joint coordination and inspection centre, composed of Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian and UN inspectors. António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, said this agreement and the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports amidst the ongoing war is “a beacon of hope” in a world that desperately needs it. Additionally, another deal was signed to reduce the impact of sanctions on the export of Russian food and fertilizer. Both deals were subject to four- and then two-monthly reviews. 

The Initiative’s Influence on Food Security 

For almost a year, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) has allowed nearly 33 million tons of foodstuffs to leave Ukrainian ports safely, driving down global food prices. Among these exported grains, less than a ton of wheat was bought and shipped to countries facing critical famine situations, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Yemen, by the World Food Programme. Although wealthy countries acquired most supplies, it has lowered the overall price paid by all countries. 

Despite difficulties in the renewal of the Initiative, it was eventually renewed for another 120 days by all parties in November 2022 and later in March and May 2023 for a 60-day extension. The Russian Federation was reluctant to extend the agreement for a longer term as it considers it a losing proposition, although it benefited from the agreement since its exports were higher than last year, in addition to an increase in production of almost 17 million tons. Russian officials often expressed that they would not lengthen the deal because, according to them, the second part of the deal, about fertilizers, did not comply with the initial agreement. Not only that, but they complained that sanctions on Russian goods exports had not been lifted and called for those on the main agricultural bank to be lifted. As a result, Russia was unable to offer insurers the required legal assurance necessary to safeguard Russian food-carrying vessels. Therefore, Russia started to dwindle inspections month after month, slowly decreasing food exports. The Initiative witnessed a 66% decrease in May 2023 compared to March 2023, eventually, Russia terminated the Black Sea Grain Initiative. 

The Other Part of the Initiative 

Fertilizer exports, including ammonia, are decisive for food security and agricultural production. Even though they were included in the Initiative, they weren’t exported. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia used to be a major ammonia exporter, with 4,4 million tons a year. One of the main pipelines, from Togliatti in Russia to the Ukrainian port of Yuzhny/Pivdennyi, was developed to export 2,5 million tons annually, but it has been damaged on 5 June 2023 – the current status is unknown. Russia expects the resumption of the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline, as one of its demands for a return to the agreement. 

Before the conflict, Ukraine was a leading grain exporter on the global market. Its production was essential for supplying markets and keeping prices down. A lack of food supplies has unprecedented effects on the world’s food security and can impair the lives of millions of people, especially the poorest. The Black Sea Grain Initiative has facilitated the partial restoration of vital food supplies in the market. While the Initiative was recently terminated by the Russian Federation, the world may be facing another food crisis with spiking prices. Another maritime blockade of Ukrainian grain would have extensive implications beyond Europe and prove disastrous for those facing dire circumstances. 

Despite negotiating one of the few diplomatic achievements since the war began and trying to keep the Initiative running, Russia is aware of the political influence its agricultural exports offer and the leverage it has to meet its demands. It has continually blamed Western sanctions for the ongoing global food crisis while it weaponizes food to tilt the war to its side.  

Termination of the Initiative & The Future of Food Security 

The question remains whether Russia would be willing to join again the agreement or not. Putin implied he is prepared to renege on the deal if his demands are met. However, the recent bombings on the port of Odesa as well as other civilian infrastructure and also harbours at the Danube, where some 60,000 tons of grain have already been destroyed, seem to suggest the opposite. Grain prices have already risen on the global market before Russia terminated the grain deal, due to a slowing down of checked vessels to be cleared for export.  

Following the initiative’s termination, certain EU countries bordering Ukraine express concern over the potential for alternative routes. This apprehension stems from the likelihood of increased exports to these nations, potentially hampering their capacity to stock the anticipated surplus of harvests expected this year. If excess quantities of grain reach their domestic markets, then, prices will fall, undermining their farmers. The ministers of Agriculture from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have therefore called for a prolongation of the preventive measures on imports of wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seeds originating in Ukraine until the end of 2023.  

The recent interview of Sebastian Schäffer, IDM Director, for Asharq News, discusses the challenges and alternative routes for the future of grain exports amidst this war. 

 

Lucas Décorne – a student in the Master’s program in Intercultural Relations and International Cooperation at the University of Lille (France) and currently a trainee at the IDM (April to August 2023). He holds a BA degree in Foreign Languages Applied to Business from the same university.