“Erhard Busek als Wissenschaftsminister” von Friedrich Faulhammer

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Am 26. April findet die Präsentation des Buches ‘Einheit in Vielfalt – Erhard Buseks Welten’ statt, u.a. mit Beiträgen von unseren Vorstandsmitgliedern Lukas Mandl und Rudolf Schicker. Friedrich Faulhammer, der ebenfalls zu den Autor*innen gehört, wird einen Impulsvertrag halten. Weitere Informationen finden Sie in der Einladung.

Mit freundlicher Genehmigung der Herausgeber können Sie schon jetzt das Kapitel unseres Vorsitzenden “Erhard Busek als Wissenschaftsminister”, auf dem IDMBlog lesen. 

Erhard Busek als Wissenschaftsminister

Polens Präsident in Wien: Gegenpol oder Brückenbauer?  

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Anlässlich des heutigen Staatsbesuches des polnischen Präsidenten Andrzej Duda in Wien betrachtet unsere Kollegin Malwina Talik die politischen Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Länder. 

Auf der Landkarte sind Polen und Österreich nicht weit voneinander entfernt, außenpolitisch allerdings schon: Polen ist ein aktives NATO-Mitglied, das auf die enge Zusammenarbeit mit den USA setzt, Österreich hingegen ein militärisch neutrales Land; Polen führte seit Jahren eine (über)vorsichtige Politik gegenüber Russland, Österreich pflegte bis Februar 2022 eher freundschaftliche Beziehungen. Der heutige Staatsbesuch des polnischen Präsidenten Andrzej Duda in Wien bietet also genügend Anlass, sich die politischen Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Länder genauer anzusehen. Der polnische Präsident wird sich mit seinem Amtskollegen, dem österreichischen Bundespräsidenten Alexander Van der Bellen, und mit Bundeskanzler Karl Nehammer treffen. Dabei sollen vor allem die europäische Politik in Bezug auf den russischen Invasionskrieg in der Ukraine, bilaterale Beziehungen sowie Erinnerungspolitik um das KZ Mauthausen-Gusen und die Schlacht am Kahlenberg besprochen werden. 

 

Wer ist der polnische Präsident? 

Wenn es um das Vertrauen der polnischen Bevölkerung in ihre Politiker*innen geht, ist Andrzej Duda laut Umfragen auf Platz zwei – vor ihm der liberale Bürgermeister Warschaus Rafal Trzaskowski. Duda war bis zu seiner überraschenden Wahl zum Präsidenten 2015 Mitglied der konservativen Partei Recht und Gerechtigkeit (PiS). Sein Sieg gegen den amtierenden liberal-konservativen Präsidenten Bronislaw Komorowski war das erste Signal, dass die Präferenzen der Wähler*innen nach rechts rutschen. Auf den Erfolg des ausgebildeten Juristen folgte der nächste für PiS: Im selben Jahr kam die Partei unter der Parole „Guter Wandel“ an die Macht. Im Laufe seiner zwei Amtszeiten pflegte Duda gute Beziehungen zum US-Präsidenten Donald Trump. Insgesamt dreimal besuchte er ihn im Weißen Haus, einmal empfing er ihn in Polen. Aus Angst vor Russland und um die militärische Sicherheit durch die Präsenz der US-Armee in Polen zu verbessern, schlug er sogar vor, eine US-Militärbasis namens “Fort Trump” im Land zu gründen – dieses Vorhaben wurde schlussendlich aber nicht verwirklicht. 

 

Die alte Angst vor Russland 

Während für Österreich der unprovozierte Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine ein Schock war, stellte er für Polen eine nachvollziehbare Erfüllung der schlimmsten Albträume dar. Die Russland-Politik beider Länder bildet zwei Gegenpole, was insbesondere nach dem  Georgienkrieg 2008 spürbar wurde. „Es ist uns bewusst, dass heute Georgien, morgen die Ukraine, übermorgen die baltischen Staaten und später vielleicht mein Land, Polen, an der Reihe sind“, rief 2008 der mittlerweile verstorbene polnische Präsident Lech Kaczyński bei einer Kundgebung in der Hauptstadt Georgiens, nachdem russische Truppen das Land angriffen. Diese Worte spiegelten pointiert die Wahrnehmung der polnischen politischen Elite über den Kreml wider. Polen protestierte heftig gegen den Bau von Nord-Stream II, nach der Annexion der Krim durch Russland und dem Ausbruch des Konflikts in der Ostukraine 2014  reduzierte esschrittweise seine Energieabhängigkeit von Russland. Während 2014 noch 95% des Öls aus Russland importiert wurde, waren es am Vorabend des Krieges nur mehr 62%. Infolgedessen sind die Energiepreise nach der Invasion zwar auch in Polen gestiegen, aber nicht so stark wie in Österreich. 

 

Enger Verbündete der Ukraine 

Polen gilt als starker Befürworter der Ukraine in der EU, erst letzte Woche hat Andrzej Duda den ukrainischen Präsidenten Wolodymyr Selenskyj in Warschau empfangen. Als Nachbarland der Ukraine hat Polen den Krieg ante portas – vor der eigenen Haustür – und beherbergt die größte Anzahl an Geflüchteten. Da zu den Nachbarländern auch Lukaschenkas Belarus und die russische Exklave Kaliningrad zählen, spielt die eigene Sicherheit eine größere Rolle als je. Das Gefühl, dass die Ukraine „für uns kämpft“ ist sehr präsent. Das ist einer der Gründe, warum Polen, auf eigene Aufrüstung setzt und für weitere militärische Hilfe für die Ukraine plädiert. Neutralität hin oder her, Polen hofft auf Engagement seitens Österreichs: „Wir sind uns bewusst, dass Österreich ein neutrales Land ist, aber es kann politische und humanitäre Unterstützung leisten“ steht es in der Pressemitteilung der Präsidentschaftskanzlei. 

Was Polen und Österreich weiters unterscheidet ist ihre Position zu der Anwesenheit der von der sanktionierten russischen Spitzpolitiker*innen an internationalen Treffen und Konferenzen. Polen verweigerte Russlands Außenminister Sergei Lawrow eine Einreise zum OSZE-Außenminister-Treffen in Lodz. Diese Entscheidung kritisierte der österreichische Außenminister Alexander Schallenberg. Dies lies Andrzej Duda nicht ohne Kommentar: „Es tut mir leid, solche Stimmen zu hören. Wenn wir berücksichtigen, dass dies von einem europäischen Politiker eines Landes gesagt wird, das der Europäischen Union angehört, zerbricht für mich zweifellos die europäische Einheit.“ Die russische Delegation, in der auch sanktionierte Diplomat*innen waren, konnte im Februar 2023 nach Österreich einreisen – trotz internationaler Kritik. Diese Meinungsunterschiede sind zweifellos ein weiterer Grund, warum sich Polen für einen hochrangigen Besuch in Wien entschied. 

 

Brückenbauer? 

In Polen ist das Image von Österreich als Brückenbauer kaum bekannt. Das Land versucht aber eine ähnliche Rolle einzunehmen, z.B. mit von polnischen Regierungen initiierten Formaten wie der Östlichen Partnerschaft oder der Three Seas Initiative (3SI), die vorwiegend ehemalige kommunistische Länder miteinbezieht. Interessanterweise ist Österreich das einzige „westliche“ Land in der 3SI.  

Beim Thema Migration vertreten beide Länder hingegen wieder ähnliche Meinungen: Während Polen illegale Pushbacks ausübt und Zäune und Mauern an der Grenze zu Belarus baut, setzt Österreich auf immer strengere Abschiebungspolitik. “Illegale” Migration wurde auch als ein Grund zitiert, um Rumänien und Bulgarien den Schengenbeitritt zu verweigern, weil laut Österreich die beiden Länder unzureichend ihre Grenzen schützten. 

Trotz Unterschieden gibt es also auch viele Gemeinsamkeiten in der Politik beider Länder. Die Frage besteht, ob diese als positive Entwicklungen betrachtet werden sollten. Die jüngsten Reden des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers zeigen, dass die konservativen Parteien in den Regierungen Polens und Österreichs sich in vielen Bereichen annähern statt sich wie Gegenpole abzustoßen. 

Only the EU can help Georgia

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Is the EU Georgia’s only hope? Our colleague Jack Gill (IDM) looks beyond the recent attempts of Georgian ruling party to introduce a bill that would muzzle NGOs and analyses both internal and external factors that have been undermining the democratisation process in Georgia.  

The recent attempt by a number of members of the ruling party in Georgia – Georgian Dream – to introduce a Russian-style law against “foreign agents” was seen by many as a push in an authoritarian direction by the Georgian government. The draft law, which was quashed soon after going public, sought to crack down on civil society organisations that are critical of the government, as well as other sources of power in Georgia, such as the Georgian Orthodox Church. It would do this by requiring “non-government organisations (NGOs) that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register with Georgia’s Justice Ministry as an “agent of foreign influence”. (“Georgia’s parliament drops ‘foreign agents’ bill”)

Georgian Dream 

Georgian Dream, which billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili founded in 2011, came to power in 2012 on the basis, among other things, of pursuing more pragmatic relations with the Russian Federation after the hostility between the two countries during the presidency of pro-western politician Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2013). Ivanishvili became prime minister in October 2012, and though he stepped down from this role just 13 months later, it is widely believed that he has been the de facto ruler ever since.  

Since coming to power, Georgian Dream has nominally continued the pro-western foreign policy of its predecessor, Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM), signing the Association Agreement with the European Union in 2014, while also warming relations with the Kremlin. After the UNM’s trade and travel embargo on Russia, Georgian Dream reopened trade and travel between the two counties.  

But since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine last February, Georgia’s leadership has had to tread carefully internationally. The country did not join international sanctions against Russia, leading many in Georgia to question the extent of the party’s closeness to the Kremlin. Of course, Georgia’s hesitancy is somewhat understandable given its position and history; the country felt the sting of a Russian invasion in 2008 and it does not fall under the NATO security umbrella. All this is in addition to being a small country of 3.7 million with a physical border with, and territories occupied by, the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Georgia’s society has demonstrated itself to be one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, and many Georgian soldiers have left to fight alongside their Ukrainian counterparts.  

But after 10 years of Georgian Dream rule, the country’s pro-western direction has to certain a degree stagnated and moves toward a more authoritarian ruling style are becoming increasingly prevalent. The draft law on “foreign agents” and the subsequent public backlash shows that in spite of the backsliding, Georgia’s pro-western path is so ingrained in society that any deviation or steps toward pro-Russianness are met with immediate and effective societal mobilisation.   

Further indicative of Georgian Dream’s democratic backsliding has been its imprisonment of former president Saakashvili, who in a defiant move against his political opponents flew back to Tbilisi from his exile in other parts of Europe, only to be seized by police upon his arrival in October 2021. He was sentenced to 6 years in jail, which he and others criticise as politically motivated. His ongoing sickness and the refusal of the authorities to allow him proper treatment, like Russia’s treatment of opposition politician Alexei Navalny, epitomises Georgia’s ongoing struggle with democratisation under the current Georgian Dream government.  

European Failures 

This is not only the fault of the Georgian government. The European Union, for its part, excluded Georgia when it granted Ukraine and Moldova – who together with Georgia form the so-called Association Trio – EU candidate status last year. Instead, the EU granted Georgia “the perspective to become a member of the European Union.” As I argued in a previous article on this decision last year, this was a grave mistake on the EU’s part. Accepting the Trio together would have had a far greater symbolic effect and offered an immense push for Georgia’s government and society to meet the reforms required for EU membership. The rejection is jeopardising Georgia’s hard-won achievements in democratisation and westernisation by frustrating the hopes of the pro-democracy elements in Georgian society and strengthening the hostility to these processes. The recent draft law is a symptom of this; Georgia’s ruling class is testing to see what measures to undermine democracy it can get away with. Thankfully, this time they failed thanks to the bravery and organisation of the pro-democracy protesters, who defiantly held up the EU flag against police water cannons, but next time they may not be so lucky.  

What further undermines Georgia’s reforms is that on 14 March the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission announced that it would refuse to support Georgia’s draft law on de-oligarchisation, which is modelled very closely on similar legislation in Ukraine that faced equal criticism. The law would seek “to identify so-called “oligarchs” through specific criteria, such as wealth and media ownership, to publicly label them as “oligarchs” and to subject them to series of blanket limitations that include exclusion from the financing of political parties or activities, exclusion from privatisations of public property, etc.” (Georgian draft law on de-oligarchisation: Supporting the goal of limiting excessive influence of oligarchs, Venice Commission calls for systemic reforms) More effectively, it would make it compulsory for politicians to make public their meetings and dealings with designated oligarchs. But though the criticism from the Venice Commission is valid from a West European perspective, namely the concerns that the law could lead to “high risks of human rights violations and arbitrary application, potentially harming political pluralism”, this fails to consider the severity and acuteness of oligarchic influence and control in these post-Soviet states. Serious and radical reform is necessary if these countries are to “de-oligarchise”, and applying such standards now could lead to these reforms failing to get off the ground.  

Why Georgia Matters 

People often underestimate the importance of what Georgia has achieved in the last 20 years. Most post-Soviet states, with the notable exception of the Baltic States, remain authoritarian and corrupt, relying on the exploitation and expropriation of their public resources. Despite the post-Soviet legacy and extractive political and economic institutions, Georgia has made the most remarkable progress in developing. When Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003, Georgia was practically a failed state, riddled with corruption. His seismic reforms, implemented after the pro-democratic Rose Revolution, led to massive reductions in corruption and increases in state power and foreign investment, as well as the improvement of public services. Through his painful but necessary reforms, Saakashvili and his government made the fundamental changes that put Georgia on the path to becoming a successful, prosperous European nation.  

Now he is wasting away in a Georgian prison, a victim of his political opponents and their growing authoritarian aims to abolish political opposition. Unless the EU offers the Georgian people the motivation they need to carry on reforming, by granting them EU candidate status, the country risks being consumed by its post-Soviet legacy.  

 

Jack Gill is a research associate at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) in Vienna. His expertise lies in the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, especially the South Caucasus, as well as geopolitics, security and national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. 

A new beginning for Montenegro

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Montenegro will have a new president whose victory brought the era of the longest serving politician in Europe to an end. Darija Benić explains the significance of this watershed election in her commentary for the IDM Blog.

The second round of presidential elections was held in Montenegro on April 2. The presidential candidate of the centrist, anti-corruption and pro-European political movement Europe Now Jakov Milatović, who received more than 60 percent of the votes, was elected as the new president, while Milo Đukanović (a populist political party Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS) got about 40 percent of the votes. This is the fourth presidential election since the restoration of Montenegrin independence in 2006 and the seventh since the introduction of the multiparty system. 

The Europe Now was formed nine months ago, and in addition to winning presidential elections, it showed great success in the October local elections. The victory of Jakov Milatović was expected and the decline of the Democratic Party of Socialists is only more visible. The DPS was completely disempowered after the party’s three-decade regime was replaced in the parliamentary elections in August 2020. In the meantime, the DPS also lost power in most of the municipalities where it ruled for years. 

Even though Montenegro is entering a phase of uncertainty, there are great expectations from the new president and it is optimistically pointed out that this is the beginning of a new era in the political life of Montenegro. Perhaps one of the key issues is the future of Serbian-Montenegrin relations, which have been far from expected in recent years. The influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church on political life in Montenegro could continue to grow because the parties that will come to power in June, after parliamentary sources, might be open to such influence.  

The victory of Milatović raises hopes for the democratization of Montenegro and easing of tensions in the country. Judging by previous statements, the new president of Montenegro seems to be trying to distance himself from the major political and geopolitical topics, and to focus on the economy and economic cooperation of the region. 

The spokesperson of the head of European diplomacy, Peter Stano, said at a press conference for Brussels correspondents that the European Union looks forward to joint cooperation with the new president as well as all political actors in Montenegro in order to help it stay on the path to the EU and build a consensus on the key priorities that need to be fulfilled during the European integration process. 

The next step will be the extraordinary parliamentary elections which will be held on June 11. They were announced because of the institutional crisis that stopped the integration of Montenegro into the European Union. 

 

Darija Benić– a student in the Master’s program in Planning and Management of Tourist and Cultural Systems at the University of Bari Aldo Boro (Italy) and a former trainee at the IDM ( July to December 2022). She holds a BA degree in Languages and Cultures for Tourism and International Mediation from the same university. 


You might be also interested in: 

IDM Short insights 23: Presidential elections in Montenegro

Montenegro at the crossroads to the EU 

IDM Short Insights 23: Presidential elections in Montenegro

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The current President of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović, and the candidate of the Europe Now Movement, Jakov Milatović, will meet in the second round of the presidential elections on April 2. Although in the Montenegrin system the function of the president is significantly weaker than that of the prime minister, these elections are seen as significant, as they could be a prelude to extraordinary parliamentary elections and a new division of power on the rather complicated Montenegrin political scene.

Our former trainee Darija Benić talks about the current situation regarding the presidential elections in Montenegro in the newest Short Insight.

This might be of inerest to you:  

Montenegro at the crossroads to the EU


Transcript of the Short Insight: 

On March 19 in the first round of presidential elections in Montenegro, the president of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) Milo Đukanović, won 35.3 percent of the votes and Jakov Milatović, whose movement Europe Now has no parliamentary status, won 29.2 percent of the vote.

The candidates were diverse – an influencer without a day of political experience Jovan Radulović, the current president with 30 years in power in his biography, several of  his opponents (besides Milatovic- Andrija Mandić from For the Future of Montenegro,  Goran Danilović from United Montenegro, Aleksa Bečić from Democratic Montenegro) and one female candidate Draginja Vuksanović Stanković (Social Democratic Party of Montenegro). This indeed briefly describes the starting position for the President of Montenegro.

The second round is scheduled on April 2. Both rounds of presidential elections are held in a time of institutional and political crisis. The current government lost confidence in the parliament seven months ago. Several attempts to form a new one failed, which is why Đukanović announced early parliamentary elections for June 11. The results of the second round of presidential elections, in which Milo Đukanović and Jakov Milatović will be present, will have an impact on the upcoming parliamentary elections, which could lead to overcomposition on the political scene of Montenegro.

A City Powered by Generators. Winter in Odesa

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In her contribution for the IDM blog our former Ukraine-Fellow Olga Kyrychenko writes about the hardships of winter in her hometown Odesa at the Black Sea. 

Winter in Odesa is special – we rarely see snow, but both children and adults are always sincerely happy about it. Thanks to our maritime climate, we often have cold and piercing winds, and the cold is felt even more deeply than it actually is. But how nice it is to come back to a warm house from the cold, and warm yourself with hot tea!  It has always been this way for me, for as long as I can remember… but on February 24, 2022 everything changed.  

That morning all Ukraine woke up to the sounds of explosions… “the war has begun”… such terrible scary words… but you truly feel all the horror of this word and what is actually happening only when you personally feel it by yourself.  I would never wish for anyone to know what war is… it changes absolutely everything. Our perception of summer, spring, autumn, winter has also changed. Many Ukrainians still say “we didn’t have spring, summer, autumn… the whole year we have February 24th”. Our lives seem to be frozen in this day. Rockets take the lives of Ukrainians, destroy houses, and also our infrastructure, including energy facilities.  

In Odesa, like in many other Ukrainian cities, many residents depend on electricity for heating. No light – no heating. And winters in Odesa are very cold; when the thermometer shows sub-zero temperatures, the cold is immediately felt more strongly, especially at night, when the frost becomes thicker. Our family is lucky – in our apartment there is heating from a gas stove, and we do not depend on electricity. Many Odesans have city heating, which depends on the operation of urban boiler houses that supply hot water to batteries. But there are many people whose heating comes from electricity, in other words, many have electric stoves. And even if you have heating, you cannot cook without the light. Now imagine, you are a mother of a small child. A rocket has destroyed an energy facility, and you, your family, your child are left without electricity. There is no way to heat water, there is no way to cook food. Often immediately after the rockets hit, many citizens of Odesa do not even have water (no water – no city heating). Fortunately, the power engineers quickly repair and supply water to the houses of Odesa residents. Under such circumstances, many Odesa citizens lived almost the entire winter without light, without heating, sometimes even without water. Have we ever wanted such a life for ourselves or our children?  But Russian rockets decided that for us. Someone decided that our children do not need heating, do not need to eat warm, freshly cooked food, do not need to warm up after frosty air in a warm heated room.  But Odesans did not break! We began to think about how to survive in the conditions in which we found ourselves. Some managed to make fires indoors to warm themselves. Food was also cooked on fires, some people managed to make a fire on the balcony and fry fish or meat on the grill… (never repeat these dangerous actions at your balconies and apartments!). But, nevertheless, the majority of citizens approached the issue of survival rationally: they stocked up on water and food, which is storable for a long time and does not need to be cooked (cookies, biscuits, canned food, etc.). Those who had the opportunity bought portable gas stoves on gas cylinders to be able to cook. With heating, everything is much more serious. Those who depend on electricity have no choice but to wait until the power lines are repaired and the power is turned on. Our electricians try very hard to do all the repair work as soon as possible, but not always does everything only depend on them. Repair work is not so fast, especially when it is cold outside, and there are also accidents after rocket attacks and repair attempts. Many Odesa citizens were left without electricity for several days (up to five or even more). Did you know that Odesa is one of the regions of Ukraine with the most frequent power outages? More often than not, we had no light. Almost all winter, if we did have power, then it was for no more than 4-6 hours a day. How do people warm up? A few layers of clothes, a few blankets. Does it help? Not much. 

I also want to note the educational process, which also suffered in Odesa. In connection with the hostilities, schools and universities have transferred to online education. But due to the catastrophic situation with the power, the process was disrupted and very often lessons were cancelled, as there was no opportunity to conduct them. As a PhD student I felt it on myself, for several weeks in a row our lessons were cancelled. Sometimes there was not only no internet, but also no mobile connection to contact the lecturer. But, for those who are drawn to knowledge, blackouts are no hindrance. 

All Ukrainians and our souls are warmed by something more than heating – it is a hope and faith in a speedy peace and our victory. And once again all Ukrainians will have spring, summer, autumn and winter! In a peaceful, rebuilt Ukraine! 

In conclusion, I would like to say the following. Do you know what our Odesa looked like almost all of this winter? Especially its historical centre, which is now under UNESCO protection? It looks like a huge hive, only instead of bees, generators buzzed and instead of fresh frosty air we breathe in a smog from the generators. But there is nothing we cannot handle! Our city has been equipped many points where, in the absence of light, you can warm up, drink hot tea, and charge your gadgets. Now power engineers are doing everything possible and impossible to return light to the houses of Odesa citizens! And most important of all – Odessans are always ready to help each other. This is our strength! And, of course, our unity and fortitude! We will definitely have both our light and heating back! There will be spring, summer, autumn and beautiful winter for us and our children! But the most important thing is that it will be our victory and there will be peace in our land! And we believe it will happen very soon.  

Balkan, Ukraine und Moldau nach Europa – sofort!

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“„Gschichtn“ von Fußball, Freiheit und Zukunft” 

In seinem Kommentar fordert IDM-Geschäftsführer Sebastian Schäffer eine dringende Reform des EU-Beitrittsprozesses und erklärt seine Beweggründe für die Entstehung der “Gschichtn” über die Länder des (West-)Balkans, Ukraine und Republik Moldau. 

Eine dringende Reform des EU-Beitrittsprozesses  

Die EU-Erweiterung ist und bleibt das wichtigste Instrument zur Transformation auf dem europäischen Kontinent. In Artikel 49 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union heißt es wie folgt: 

 „Jeder europäische Staat, der die in Artikel 2 genannten Werte achtet und sich für ihre Förderung einsetzt, kann beantragen, Mitglied der Union zu werden.“ Konkret heißt das: „Die Werte, auf die sich die Union gründet, sind die Achtung der Menschenwürde, Freiheit, Demokratie, Gleichheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und die Wahrung der Menschenrechte einschließlich der Rechte der Personen, die Minderheiten angehören. Diese Werte sind allen Mitgliedstaaten in einer Gesellschaft gemeinsam, die sich durch Pluralismus, Nichtdiskriminierung, Toleranz, Gerechtigkeit, Solidarität und die Gleichheit von Frauen und Männern auszeichnet.“  

Leider ist der Beitrittsprozess in den vergangenen Jahren immer technischer und langwieriger geworden. Einzelne Mitgliedstaaten nutzten ihre Möglichkeit, Fortschritte  auch ohne gerechtfertigte Gründe zu blockieren. Das geschah zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten des Prozesses, etwabevor ein Land den Kandidatenstatus erhielt, bevor die Verhandlungen eröffnet wurden, bevor diese abgeschlossen wurden und dann auch noch vor der endgültigen Aufnahme. Das hat natürlich Auswirkungen auf die Transformationskraft der EU. Der Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs hatte ebenfallsEinfluss darauf. Ich bin nach wie vor davon überzeugt, dass eine EU-Mitgliedschaft weiterhin für die betroffenen Länder attraktiv ist und die europäische Integration eines der wichtigsten politischen Projekte darstellt. Doch der Prozess muss dringend reformiert werden. Vorschläge dazu gibt es genug, doch es braucht mehr Mut, um die Aufgabe anzugehen. Der Sorge vor einer langen und schwierigen Vertragsrevision möchte ich entgegenhalten: Vom Vertrag von Nizza zum Vertrag von Lissabon – inklusive gescheitertem Verfassungsvertrag und zunächst negativen Volksentscheid in Irland – vergingen etwas mehr als sechs Jahre. Hätten wir direkt nach dem Brexit-Referendum den Mut gehabt, die Verträge und damit auch den Erweiterungsprozess zu reformieren, könnten wir dies bereits jetzt anwenden! 

“Balkan nach Europa – sofort!” 

Im Sommer 2020 fragte mich Erhard Busek, ob wir gemeinsam ein Buch zum Westbalkan schreiben wollen. Ich war sofort begeistert und habe recherchiert, was darüber von wem in den letzten Jahren publiziert wurde Gemeinsam mit einer Kollegin am IDM erstellten wir eine umfangreiche Liste von Titeln in mehreren Sprachen und kamen zu der Erkenntnis, dass es nicht unbedingt Bedarf für weitere umfassende Publikationen gibt. Zudem wurde das Projekt immer größer und es drohte langwierig zu werden. Erhard und mir verband eine gewisse Ungeduld im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung von Aktivitäten für unsere Region, was sicherlich für die Beteiligten nicht immer einfach ist. Die Plattform story.one bietet dieser  Möglichkeit relativ rasch ein Buch zu veröffentlichen und sich aufgrund der maximalen Zeichenanzahl einer Geschichte von 2500 Zeichen(es können höchstens 17 Geschichten in ein Buch) auf das Wesentliche zu beschränken. Somit hatten wir den geeigneten Rahmen für unser Projekt gefunden. Die „Gschichtn“ über Grenzen, Glauben und Grausamkeiten, über Fabeln, Frieden und Fußball verknüpften wir mit unserem Plädoyer  über die sofortige Aufnahme aller Westbalkanstaaten in die EU. 

Ein Frühjahr, das alles veränderte… 

Der 24. Februar 2022 war für uns alle ein Schock. Als dann die Ukraine und später auch die Republik Moldau sowie Georgien einen Beitrittsantrag zur EU stellten, haben wir begonnen zu überlegen, ob wir nicht eine Art Nachfolgepublikation schreiben sollten. Leider ist Erhard dann plötzlich am 13. März 2022 verstorben. Dieser neue Schock hat erneut unsere Prioritäten verschoben und das Projekt geriet in den Hintergrund. Als dann nach den Weihnachtsfeiertagen etwas Ruhe eingekehrt ist, holte ich die Idee wieder hervor und begann auszuprobieren, wie es sich anfühlt, das Buch alleine zu schreiben. Mir wurde rasch klar, dass es funktioniert. 

„Ukraine & Moldau nach Europa – sofort!“ 

„Ukraine & Moldau nach Europa – sofort!“ ist zunächst eine Verneigung vor Erhard Busek. Es ist auch eine Verbeugung vor den Menschen, die in der Ukraine für unsere Werte kämpfen. Ich versuche – ähnlich wie bei „Balkan nach Europa – sofort!“ – durch „Gschichtn“ von Fußball, Freiheit und Zukunft Zusammenhänge aufzuzeigen, Zugehörigkeit herzustellen, Zusammengehörigkeit zu veranschaulichen, Zusammenhalt zu vermitteln und damit hoffentlich dazu beitragen, dass die Zeitenwende, wie der 24. Februar 2022 weithin inzwischen bezeichnet wird, am Ende positive Assoziationen hervorruft. Anders als in der ersten Publikation ist aber hier kein konkretes Plädoyer für eine sofortige EU-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine und/oder Moldau enthalten, weil es nicht mit den gleichen Vorschlägen, die wir im Hinblick auf die Westbalkanstaaten gemacht haben, umsetzbar ist. Ich wollte dennoch durch den Titel bewusst eine Kontinuität in der Arbeit des IDM darstellen.    

Ukrainian-Hungarian relations are complicated, and not only because of the war 

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In her article for the IDM Blog Daniela Apaydin explains the context and the reasons behind the rhetoric skirmishes between Kyiv and Budapest.

 

In January the mayor of the Ukrainian city of Dnipro Boris Filatov, called Viktor Orbán a bitch-face. Before that statement hit the headlines of Hungarian media, the prime minister was quoted by reporters saying that Ukraine was a no man’s land comparable to Afghanistan. As a result, the Hungarian ambassador was summoned to Kyiv and diplomatic relations between the two neighbouring countries have sunk to a new low.  

 

What is going on between Kyiv and Budapest? Do we even need to bother about Hungary’s position in the war at all? 

First, let us not get focused on the clash of words between two alpha males and interpret it with the effects of toxic masculinity on politics. I suggest looking at the stories behind this dispute to learn about what is going on in Budapest. 

 

One of these stories starts with the question: Why does Orbán provoke Ukraine and its political leadership while he pretends to be neutral? The simple answer is that Orbán’s position in this war is not neutral at all (Read the author’s analysis of Russia’s role in the Hungarian elections in 2022). 

 

The context of Orbán’s statements always matter. In this case, he met mainly conservative reporters in a closed-door meeting. One of them was Rod Dreher from the US, an Orthodox Christian and author of books such as “The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation”. Dreher spent last summer in Budapest as a visiting fellow at the Danube Institute, a right-wing think tank with close ties to Fidesz. After the meeting, Dreher wrote a comprehensive report for “The American Conservative” in which he praised the intellectual skills of Orbán, saying “the man is deep. He thinks hard about this stuff, at the level of grand strategies and principles”.  

 

In his article, Dreher repeats the statements by Orbán about the war in Ukraine. Content-wise this was nothing new to observers, yet the clarity of the message is intriguing. According to them, Ukraine has lost the war anyway. Russia is too strong and influential. Let us not waste any further energy on this war and let us exploit current tensions for capitalizing nationalist politics. Calling Ukraine a no-man’s land echoes well among right-wing conservative circles with little knowledge of the region and its history. It also fits to Orbán’s image in these circles as a courageous statesman and pragmatic politician who knows what is best for his nation and acts accordingly. Similar reactions came from Austria, where the controversial platform “exxpress” covered the meeting with Orbán in Budapest. In times when old alliances (such as Poland) have been frozen due to opposing positions on the war, Orbán regularly reaches out to his transatlantic allies.  

 

If you followed Orbán’s annual State of the Nation speech on February 18, you heard a slightly different tone from the prime minister. Russia’s military power would not be ready to attack a NATO member in the near future, Orbán stated. His assessment of Russia’s power in a closed-door meeting with US reporters differs from his State of the Nation speech. However, the consequence of holding on to the “Hungary first” approach, remains the same: “This is not our war”, said the prime minister once again. “It would not be morally right to put the interests of Ukraine before those of Hungary.” 

 

Central European entanglements 

The second story behind this dispute between Ukraine and Hungary traces its roots back into Central European history. Dnipro’s mayor argued that “it takes a special talent to be hated everywhere from Romania and Slovakia to Serbia and Ukraine. The Treaty of Trianon is, after all, a punishment for your historical meanness.” Filatov’s choice of words is apparently due to an emotional, exceptional situation during war. The reference to Trianon, however, sheds light on an unresolved Central European issue between Hungary and Ukraine that stems from a long time before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The role of minorities in the region is often neglected by western observers when analyzing current conflicts. Yet the threats of the war experienced by the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathian region poses a real challenge to Orbán’s narrative of staying out for the sake of Hungarians. In his State of the Nation speech the prime minister only shortly addressed the Hungarians in Ukraine by emphasizing their heroic sacrifices on the frontline.  

 

Hungary first, yes, but in corruption 

Finally, the recent rhetorical clashes should be seen in the media’s tendency to focus on outrage while missing the actual scandals: in February, Hungary was ranked further down by Transparency International and is seen as the most corrupt country in the EU. Inflation in Hungary is at an historic peak and severely threatens economic stability. Furthermore, the fight between the Commission and EU treaties and the government in Budapest has once more picked up speed as millions in Erasmus funds have been frozen – with tremendous risks not only for students and academia, but also for the stability of the government’s tribalist system of distributing (EU) money among its allies in business. 

 

Summing up, for some the recent clash of alpha males might be an entertaining headline. Others prefer focusing on the stories behind rhetorical escalations. Orbán’s ongoing balancing act of Hungary’s foreign policy – between the fact that the country is a member of the EU and NATO and its reluctance to stop spreading Kremlin propaganda and keeping strong economic ties with Russia – will drive the country even further away from those who demand a clear stand on the war. Orbán is convinced that he is representing the interest of the nation, yet it is questionable if he honestly considers Hungarians in Ukraine as actually part of this nation. It is certainly not in their interest if their home country becomes a no-man’s land.  

 

The prime minister’s arrangement with Putin puts the country into the position of the Kremlin’s puppet within the EU. Connoisseurs of history know that such loyalties are fragile and that the stronger partner can easily cut ties once they are no longer useful to him. In the case of Hungary, sooner or later the country might have to come back for support from Brussels, Warsaw, or Bratislava. Perhaps then, Orbán’s EU bashing and lack of solidarity towards his neighbors could easily backfire. Ultimately, future crises demand strong alliances in the region, by which time nationalists in the US might have long since forgotten their praised statesman in Budapest. 

 

Changes in Ukrainian foreign policy since February 2022 and perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe

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One year on from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war still rages. The recent decision taken by Germany, the United States and other NATO member states to send tanks to Ukraine indicates that we are entering a new phase in the conflict. 

With this in mind, the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) hosted a roundtable of experts on Ukraine to discuss the role of Ukraine in the region and changes in the foreign policy of Ukraine since the invasion. 

The roundtable was also a chance to reflect on February’s Ukraine-EU summit as well as to mark the publication of the book “Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe: Kyiv’s Foreign Affairs and the International Relations of the Post-Communist Region”. In attendance were some of the book’s contributors, who offered their insights into Ukraine’s role in Central and Eastern Europe.  

PROGRAMME 

Welcome address  

Alisa Muzergues, Program Coordinator, Eastern Europe and Central Asia – International Development Law Organization 

Harald Stranzl, Ambassador/National Coordinator EUSDR, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria and member of the IDM board 

Panel Discussion UKRAINE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 

Federica Mangiameli, Stream Manager for Defense and Security, GLOBSEC  

Sebastian Schäffer, Managing Director, IDM  

Andreas Umland, Analyst, Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS)  

Moderation: Melanie Jaindl, Research Associate, IDM

You can watch the discussion here:

 

IDM Short Insights 22: Controversies over the sanctioned Russian delegates visiting Vienna

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It has been nearly a year since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine inflicting immense suffering to the civilian population, violating international law and challenging international security architecture. Despite sanctions and a visa ban, the Russian delegation will attend the  Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on 23 and 24 February in Vienna. Sebastian Schäffer, IDM’s Managing Director, sums up the controversy around it in the newest Short Insight. 

 

This might be of inerest to you:  

Four Challenges Facing a Ukrainian-Russian Truce. Part I: The Constitutional Impasse, by Andreas Umland

Opinion: Burning bridges? by Sebastian Schäffer


Transcript of the Short Insight: 

One year ago, the world watched in horror as the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, causing a trail of destruction and countless lives lost. The invasion was a clear violation of international law and an affront to the principles of peace and sovereignty. The war has also taken a toll on the wider global community, heightening tensions and threatening international security.  

Peace in Europe is something that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should provide, yet has failed to do so. It is a very unfortunate coincidence that the winter conference of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is taking place on 23rd and 24th February and that the delegation from Moscow will be able to travel to Vienna despite the visa ban issued against the Russian parliamentarians. However, also in past years this conference was organized around these dates and there is an obligation to allow participation, as Vienna is the official seat of the OSCE. Otherwise, Austria would be violating international law, and this might have further ramifications, since the capital is home to other international organisations.   

Also, dialogue is a good thing, right? Well certainly, but already before the unjustified attack on Ukraine and all the heinous atrocities committed by the Russian regime, at the OSCE there was merely the statement of the different points of views rather than trying to work on common ground. It is also unclear how a negotiation between Kyiv and the Kremlin would look like given that the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine not only violates international law, but also creates a constitutional deadlock, as neither party could cease claims on these territories.

Therefore, the decision of the Ukrainian delegation to not participate in the meeting is understandable. What is incomprehensible, though, is the alleged invitation of the Russian delegation to attend a ball, something forbidden by their very limited visas, as Austrian authorities have stated. Clearly, some people are still willing to bow before a president who has not only destroyed the security architecture in Europe, but numerous lives on delusional claims.