Undoing the Illiberal Damage: Lessons from Poland for Hungary

Malwina Talik ; Dr. Péter Techet, Phd

Poland’s current government has begun efforts to reverse its predecessor’s illiberal changes, though the process has been arduous and not without controversy. The experience of transition is relevant for Hungary, where systemic obstacles shape political competition. With the 2026 elections ahead and a possible power change after 16 years, this paper examines what Hungary can learn from the Polish government’s successes and mistakes to guide its democratic renewal.

1. Prioritize concrete policies with clear implementation plans. Restoring liberal democracy without a constitutional majority and with captured institutions is a long-term process. To maintain credibility, governments should focus on actionable and decisive policies prepared before elections and deliver early on key promises as symbolic victories have a high public impact. Identify reforms achievable through ordinary legislation, previous procedural flaws that can be quickly annulled or by exerting legal pressure mechanisms. Undoing illiberal damage should not overshadow effective governance in areas like healthcare, education and social equality. Otherwise, the government risks appearing vengeful or disconnected from citizens’ everyday needs.

2. Build social consensus and public support. Reversing illiberal reforms is not solely an institutional challenge; it also requires broad social consensus and sustained public support. This involves clearly communicating the rationale behind reform efforts, which may often be controversial, ensuring that a well-prepared communication strategy and credible spokesperson are in place. Involving civil society actors and conducting structured consultations can significantly contribute to drafting effective solutions and legislation. When stakeholders feel ownership over the process, public backing is more likely to be maintained, reducing resistance and enhancing the legitimacy of reforms.

3. Expand cooperation with the EU in areas crucial for rule of law. Collaborate with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, OLAF and other EU monitoring bodies to build trust and prevent misuse of EU funds in the future. On the one hand, this would be a step towards unlocking the frozen funds; on the other, it would help avoid corrupt use of EU funding. At the same time, EU law also provides a legal basis for constitutional changes, over EU law.

4. Enhance checks and balances. Returning to liberal democracy should not only mean a change of power or securing the new majority (which is difficult in a system where constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority), but also the (re-)introduction of effective and impartial institutions and mechanisms that check any majority and protect the minority, supporting media independence and civil society watchdogs. Combined, this will strengthen democratic resilience in a long-term perspective.

This publication is part of a project funded by the Wacław Felczak Institute. This publication reflects only the views of the authors and cannot be interpreted as representing the official position of the Wacław Felczak Institute.