Mutual Distrust in EU–Serbia Relations: Can Public Opinion Be Reversed? 

Filip Ilanković

Public support for EU integration in Serbia has been steadily declining in the past two decades, turning public opinion into a structural obstacle to further enlargement. While enlargement fatigue plays a role, negative perceptions are also shaped by political rhetoric, inconsistent EU requirements while coercively insisting on concessions, together with the growing influence of alternative external actors. This policy paper analyses the drivers of negative public opinion trends in EU–Serbia relations and offers concrete recommendations to rebuild trust and restore credibility in the enlargement process. 

Recommendations

1. Positive communication through media.Public opinion is shaped by the media; therefore, rhetoric must be in line with the interests of EU integration on both sides. Utilizing traditional media as a main messenger of positivity and of the benefits that EU membership can bring to both sides, while exploiting opportunities social media provides, would be a perfect recipe to boost public opinion. However, in order to achieve that, negative information campaigns, most notably from Serbia’s side, need to be stopped. It could be done only if the following recommendation is adopted. 
2. Improvement in the enlargement process.Enlargement process has stalled since 2021 when the last chapters were opened. It is necessary to reignite process to show some goodwill for a continuation of the process. Process reignition would need to begin with small steps, like providing political will among member states in the Council and reaching consensus to fully open Cluster 3. The European Commission provided an assessment that Serbia is technically ready to open Cluster 3 back in 2021. The Council aligning with the Commission’s proposal would send a clear political signal that the EU still considers Serbia’s accession as a matter of strategic importance, which would require more engagement from Belgrade to continue its strategic goal of joining the EU. Consequently, it could lead to the pre-COVID period where the integration process was at its peak. 
3. Invest more in regional presence. Serbia, being a developing country, needs foreign capital and investments in order to economically thrive and prosper. However, it is obvious that in the past decade, many non-EU actors are competing to invest in Serbia’s market, most notably being China, Russia, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates. The EU has left a huge gap for investments, which was filled by other global and regional powers. This trend needs to be reversed by providing not only grants and loans like in the Growth Plan but also providing incentives for companies from the EU to invest in the Serbian market and make the country more connected economically with the EU. Some studies suggest that every euro invested by European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI) attracts an additional 1.1 euros in private investments. Focusing on this aspect could better economically integrate Serbia into the EU, and reverse the trend of growing external actors’ investments. With the improvement of economic engagement, EU will provide signals of regional integration importance. 

This policy paper is part of the project ‘Central Europe and Future EU Enlargement’. The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund.