Undoing the Illiberal Damage:

Understanding Democratic Backsliding in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia.  Searching for Strategies of Reversal

Malwina Talik ; Dr. Péter Techet, Phd

Globally, the rise of illiberal governments and the weakening of liberal democracy has been an ongoing trend, affecting Central and Eastern Europe as well. Although democratic backsliding exhibits common patterns, its depth and impact are shaped by structural and contextual factors, including the strength of institutions, the composition and cohesion of parliamentary majorities, the mobilization capacity of civil society, and the effectiveness of external pressure in countering violations of legal norms. Undoing illiberal damage is an arduous process with no single solution, as its success depends heavily on the condition of the ‘patient’.

This study takes a closer look at the degree of backsliding in three countries: Hungary since 2010, Poland between 2015 and 2023, and Slovakia since 2023. Along with comparing changes in traditionally scrutinized areas such as the rule of law and media, the study also analyzes the illiberal impact on identity politics and corruption. These developments are reflected in numerous international rankings and indices, which are cited throughout this study. While the authors recognize the methodological limitations of these rankings, they provide valuable insights into trends and trajectories over time. 

The focus is on Poland and Hungary due to the longer duration of illiberal reforms, while Slovakia has had a shorter – and much less institutionalized – experience with illiberalism.  The findings are based on the authors’ desk research  and discussions during a workshop with regional experts in Vienna in November 2025. Given the limited research period, this report serves as a preliminary overview and a starting point for further analysis and debate.

Main findings 

1. Despite sharing many similar patterns of democratic backsliding, the extent and impact vary across Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. These differences stem from factors such as the duration and intensity of illiberal rule, the type of parliamentary majority, institutional resilience, civil society’s response, and the intensity of international pressure (e.g. EU, US, international organizations). 

2. Beside the extent and complexity of institutional ‘illiberal damage’, the effectiveness of democratic revival depends largely on the new government holding a dominant parliamentary majority and securing civil society support for reforms. 

3. The restoration of democratic institutions should not only involve their de-politicization or the removal of illiberal symptoms but also implement far-reaching reforms to create bodies that are independent, structurally resilient and capable of preserving impartiality and upholding the rule of law despite changes in political power. 

4. Whereas institutional renewal is crucial, lasting engagement from civil society is essential for a whole-of-society approach to democratic restoration. This requires structured consultations, involving civil society in drafting reforms, and systematically integrating their expertise into policymaking. 

5. A sustainable return to liberal democracy relies on rebuilding broad societal consensus that moves beyond antagonistic, populist ‘us versus them’ dynamics. Strengthening civic education is one important way of supporting this shift.

This publication is part of a project funded by the Wacław Felczak Institute. This publication reflects only the views of the authors and cannot be interpreted as representing the official position of the Wacław Felczak Institute.