In an interview for Eurasia Diary English, Malwina Talik (IDM) explained why she finds opening of a new front in Poland unrealistic under current circumstances and how Poland perceives incidents at the border to Belarus.
After months of political turmoil, the Slovaks will decide on a new parliament in the upcoming early elections in September. The new government could align Slovakia with the Russia-friendly states in Central Europe. Daniel Martínek analyses the election scenarios and their implications in the region.
It is hard to imagine a more challenging time to govern than what former Slovak Prime Minister Igor Matovič experienced. The Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the related migration, as well as inflation and energy crises have certainly contributed significantly to the downfall of his governing coalition, which was formed after the 2020 parliamentary elections. However, the main cause of instability and the potential collapse of the government stemmed not only from all these crises but also from a series of personal hostilities between the leaders of the coalition parties. The vote of no confidence and the gradual withdrawal of coalition partners and their ministers eventually culminated in the establishment of an expert government in June of this year. It is intended to lead the country until the early elections scheduled for 30 September.
Four opposition parties, amidst three years of internal and inter-party conflicts, have pledged to establish a stable government. According to current opinion polls, Slovak citizens are inclined to believe in this commitment, especially as all the former governing parties are grappling to surpass the five per cent electoral threshold. Robert Fico, the former long-serving prime minister and leader of the left-wing nationalist party SMER-SSD, currently holds the highest approval rating (20 per cent as per July polls). His party promises experience and order, with a particular focus on countering the liberal “Progressive Slovakia” party led by Michal Šimečka, which, according to current polls, might secure second place with around 16 per cent of the vote.
Rise of political defectors
Behind them in third place (at 11 per cent) are the defectors from the SMER-SSD party, who have been organising themselves under the leadership of Petr Pellegrini, the successor to Fico as prime minister (2018-2020), within the party “HLAS – Social Democracy” (HLAS-SD) since 2020. Although party members attempted to distance themselves from the corrupt and mafia-associated SMER party in response to the lost elections three years ago, many Slovaks still view them as partly responsible for the decline of the rule of law and the erosion of democratic institutions during the years of the SMER government.
Since 2021, former members of the “People’s Party Our Slovakia” have also joined the “Republic” movement. According to current election forecasts, the national-conservative party led by Milan Uhrík can expect to secure around 10 per cent of the vote, which means that seats in the parliament – whether within the governing coalition or the opposition – are guaranteed for them. Although the four party leaders swiftly ruled out cooperation with one or another party upon media inquiry, various post-election scenarios for collaboration are conceivable at this point. However, one thing is certain: the majorities in the new parliament will significantly hinge on which small parties surpass the five per cent threshold and thereby become the “kingmakers” after the election.
Scenarios: Return of old suspects and their controversial mafia-like politics?
If the “Bulgarian” scenario – meaning the impossibility of coalition formation and recurring snap elections – does not occur, and the victorious parties reach an agreement, two directions of post-election development can be anticipated. The future government could form from a coalition of the parties “HLAS-SD” and “Progressive Slovakia”, alongside the participation of smaller parties such as “KDH” (Christian Democratic Movement), “SaS” (Freedom and Solidarity), and “Sme Rodina” (We Are a Family). A clear pro-European and pro-Atlantic foreign policy direction, coupled with continued efforts to combat corruption, enhance judicial independence, and build trust in governmental institutions, would be expected in such a case for the upcoming electoral cycle.
Another post-election scenario might not appear as promising to proponents of the EU project and transatlantic cooperation. This year’s election could mean the return of experienced Prime Minister Robert Fico and his party SMER-SSD, which, despite its willingness to form a coalition with its social-democratic offshoot party HLAS-SD, possesses limited coalition potential. This could compel Fico’s party not only to partner with the HLAS-SD party but also to join forces with the nationalist “Republic” party, labelled as radical and extremist by some experts. By forming a coalition alongside the SNS party (Slovak National Party), these four parties could even secure an absolute majority in the parliament. The revival of the SMER-SSD party is viewed by many as a resurgence of party members associated with corruption and controversial political practices. After a three-year hiatus, a revival of a mafia-like political culture could be on the horizon. The end of this culture was the hope of many protesters during the mass demonstrations triggered by the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in 2018, which rallied against the government.
Pro-Western liberals versus pro-Russian conservatives
Dissatisfaction with current Slovak domestic and foreign policy, deteriorating living conditions due to ongoing crises and the war in Ukraine, as well as frustration with the conflict-ridden government of the past three years are leading significant portions of the Slovak population to support parties that offer simple – often populist and radical – solutions. This explains the current high popularity of the SMER-SSD party as a symbol of corruption, as well as the extremist, strongly nationalist Republic party.
Such a government coalition would not only deal a heavy blow to the development of liberal democracy in the country, but with the involvement of the Republic party, Slovakia could follow the ideological path of the Hungarian Fidesz party or the Polish PiS party. Equally important, however, is that these elections are also of fundamental importance at the regional and European level. In the event of Fico’s return as prime minister, which will depend on the support of the Republic movement led by Uhrík, in addition to a strongly EU-sceptic and anti-Western foreign policy, an end to Slovak military support for Ukraine is to be expected. This development would be supplemented by a clear rejection of EU sanctions against Russia and the restoration of friendly relations with the Russian Federation. Both party leaders do not hide their support for Orbán’s style of neutrality and have even become some of the biggest disseminators of pro-Russian propaganda in the country, as evidenced by Uhrík’s speeches and Fico’s social media activities.
Decreasing support for Ukraine?
These increasing pro-Russian narratives and sympathies are not unique to Slovakia. They can be observed across nearly all European countries, as evidenced by the growing support for parties like the FPÖ in Austria or the AfD in certain German states. While the Republic party, unlike the SMER-SSD party, consistently questions Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO, the country will likely remain firmly anchored in Euro-Atlantic structures even after the election.
However, an entirely different dynamic could emerge in Central Europe following the elections, where Slovakia, by discontinuing its military support for Ukraine, might align with the ranks of so-called neutral states, like Hungary or Austria. Ultimately, this could also signify a realignment of forces within the currently geopolitically inactive Visegrád Group. As a result, two camps would emerge: those actively providing military and humanitarian support to Ukraine (Czech Republic, Poland) and those refusing to provide arms to the beleaguered state while aiming to maintain close relations with Moscow (Hungary, Slovakia). Such a development could contribute to even greater dysfunctionality within this once-significant Central European cooperation format.
The original version of the article (in German) has been published at Eastblog of the University of Vienna and in the daily newspaper DerStandard.
Sebastian Schäffer
Milan Radin: Der Tormann, Leykam (2021)
For this summer, I recommend a lighter reading, which combines two of my favourite things: The Danube Region and football. The story follows Helmut Duckadam, a Romanian goalkeeper, who saved four penalties in the European Cup Final 1986 against FC Barcelona, ensuring the victory of Steaua București. It taught me a lot about Banat Swabians, Arad County, Romanian football and the country in general. Erhard Busek gave me the book and it had sat on my shelf for far too long. I’m glad I finally read it. The mixed narrative style of Milan Radin might be an acquired taste, however, for me it made it easier to put down and pick up again. Despite knowing how the career of Duckadam would develop, I felt myself rooting for him while reading, which made it quite engaging for me.
Daniela Apaydin
Summer in Odessa; Irina Kilimnik (2023)
When bombs fall, dreams collapse along with buildings. Before the war, that meant feather-light summer evenings by the sea in Odessa, love-filled glances between friends, family conflicts, and everyday problems. “Summer in Odessa” tells the story of a city where all of this was possible because the war had not yet torn craters through the cities and hearts of the country and its people. In the summer of 2014, it was evident that the country was in turmoil. However, Olga, a medical student, commutes without much interest in politics, somewhat aimlessly navigating between her family’s expectations, her imposed studies, and a few complicated relationships. Gradually, the personal and political developments in Olga’s life intersect, leading her to make a momentous decision. Irina Kilimnik’s fluidly narrated family saga is an endearing love letter to a city where, hopefully, dreaming will once again be pleasant.
Sophia Beiter
Picnic on Ice (original Russian title “Smert’ postronnego”); Andrej Kurkow
“Picnic on Ice” tells the story of Viktor, a loner who writes obituaries for the living and gets entangled in the workings of the Ukrainian mafia. His roommate is a depressed penguin who lives in the bathtub. Unpretentiously, satirically, and melancholically, Andrej Kurkow takes us into the world of a failed writer in post-communist Kyiv of the nineties.
Darija Benic
Trilogy “Brda od pelina” (“Wormwood hills”), which consists of the books: “S one bande moje gore” (“On the other side of my mountain”), “S ove bande moje gore” (On this side of my mountain”) and “Kastigulja”; Jasenka Lalović (only in Montenegrin)
The trilogy “Brda od pelina” is an emotional story about the role of women in Montenegrin society – a kind of tribute to women who stoically bore the burden of the times they lived in, and who were unfairly pushed aside. From book to book, the story shows how their destinies come together with all the customary, linguistic and cultural diversity in the period from the end of the 19th century to the capitulation of Italy in the Second World War.
Did you know that Readers of Europe 2023 at the EU Library this year is focusing on books by female authors? The permanent representations are recommending the best women writers from their countries. Learn more here.
Kinga Brudzińska
Brussels Alphabet; Maciej Popowski (in Polish only, 2015)
Despite its title and format suggesting otherwise, this book is not a comprehensive guide to the European Union. Rather, it takes on a half-joking, half-serious approach, offering a subjective and literary portrayal of the Brussels microcosm in its various aspects: local and international, historical and political, moral and cultural. Through its pages, one gains insights into the workings of the European Union, office life, prominent figures in the Brussels theatre, and most importantly, the experience of Central Europeans living in Brussels.
Lucas Décorne
The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter; Shannon K. O’Neil (2022)
For this summer, dive into this book, which opens a fresh perspective on globalisation, revealing that the real story of the global economy over the past four decades is not just about traditional notions of globalisation. Instead, the book explores the significance of regionalisation and its potential implications for economic competitiveness and prosperity, offering valuable insights for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of the modern global marketplace. 
Jack Gill
The Culture Map; Erin Meyer (2014)
In areas of great cultural and linguistic diversity, like the Danube Region, cross-border exchange and cooperation between peoples can often be challenging. Moreover, even learning about other cultures can leave you ill-prepared for encounters with people from other countries. I chose this book because the author, Erin Meyer, offers ways to measure the “distance” between cultures using a number of metrics that measure specific traits common to all cultures. For instance, in some cultures, decisions are reached through consensus in flatter hierarchies, where the boss is just another team player, while in other cultures strict hierarchies ensure top-down decision-making and that people know their place in relation to their superiors and subordinates. To learn where your own culture sits in relation to others, and how to engage with people from other cultures, I recommend this book.
Daniel Martínek
Cities of the World; Georg Braun and Franz Hogenberg (1572-1617)
For many, summer is a symbol of travelling and discovering new places. This collection of more than 350 historical engravings of important cities around the world is sure to inspire you as you plan your next adventures. Looking at this or that plan of a city from the time of the Renaissance makes you want to visit places across Europe, many of them also in the Danube Region. As a trained historian, I was particularly pleased when I was gifted the book last Christmas. 
Malwina Talik
How to Feed a Dictator; Witold Szabłowski (2019)
Reportage is to Poland what crime stories are to Scandinavia. Polish non-fiction writing has gained international recognition thanks to authors like Ryszard Kapuscinski, who paved the way for others to follow, such as Justyna Kopinska, Wojciech Jagielski, Wojciech Tochman, and the author of the book I recommend this summer – Witold Szabłowski.
“How to Feed a Dictator” was presented to the IDM by the Polish Institute during one of the IDM Melanges. I selected this book because, through its witty style and personal stories of chefs, it provides a sobering reminder of how authoritarians and dictators can gain and maintain power for decades in any place around the world when the circumstances are conducive. The book offers insights into how people may succumb to the charm of dictators, even when they are aware of their crimes (“but he always took care of his family,” “he was generous/modest,” “he had such a difficult life,” “others were even worse”), or adapt to survive in unpredictable and often cruel environments.
This is an excellent summer read as it is engaging and easy to follow, while also delving into profound questions about how societies and political systems operate (you may even discover some interesting recipes, though dining like a dictator might not be your preference).
The book is available in Polish, English and German.
Péter Techet
The Life and Death of States. Central Europe and the Transformation of Modern Sovereignty; Natasha Wheatley (2023)
Habsburg Central Europe is considered a “laboratory” for historical research, as Habsburg Studies must develop new concepts to describe the multiethnic, multireligious, and legal complexity of the former Danube Monarchy. Transnationality, national indifference, multiple identities, cross-border cultures – Habsburg Studies offers fresh perspectives to historians from diverse regions and time periods. In her new book, the Australian (not Austrian!) historian Natasha Wheatley delves into the legal ideas that emerged in the Habsburg Monarchy, foreshadowing postmodern, post-national approaches. The title of Wheatley’s book not only describes the disappearance of old states and the emergence of new ones after 1918 but also traces how Central European legal ideas envisioned transnational concepts beyond statehood during the interwar period. For those seeking to understand present-day debates on the European Union or transnational cooperation from a “longue durée” perspective, especially in the context of (post-)Habsburg Central Europe, this book is a fascinating read. Moreover, it is written in a manner that is understandable even for non-historians and non-lawyers.
In an interview for Eurasia Dairy, Sebastian Schäffer, IDM Director, put the losses of European companies in the Russian Federation into perspective and emphasized that we should not forget the price people in Ukraine are paying in this war. Read the whole interview in English here.
Also available in Azerbaijani.
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What’s your personal Danube story? Share it with us in up to 3500 characters and win an invitation to our anniversary celebration in Vienna!
On the occasion of the IDM’s 70th anniversary, we are looking back at the eventful history of this region, the river and its people. This special occasion calls for special awards! What’s in for you?
Write My Danube Story with us!
Imagine we are in the Europe of 1953, the founding year of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM). Scarred by the Second World War, the continent finds itself at the brink of the Cold War between East and West. Over the past 70 years, the Danube Region has seen the rise and fall of fences and walls and the shaping of new borders. Meanwhile, the Danube continued to flow unimpressed. On the occasion of the IDM’s 70th anniversary, we are looking back at the eventful history of this region, the river and its people. And we would love to hear your personal story! #MyDanubeStory Share your personal experiences of how the fluctuations of history in the Danube Region have touched your life. Which stories have left an ineradicable mark on you, your family, and your surroundings? What are the stories we should remember? What lessons can we learn from the past? And where exactly does the future begin? Tell us your #MyDanubeStory by 1 October 2023. The best stories selected by the IDM team will be published in a book and presented at the anniversary celebration on 5 December 2023 at Palais Niederösterreich in Vienna. All selected authors will receive a copy of the book. The three stories with the most likes until the end of the challenge will be invited to attend the anniversary celebration and the IDM will cover up to 300 Euro for travel and accommodation per person. The story with the most views until the end of the challenge will receive a free IDM membership for one year. Wir akzeptieren auch Einsendungen auf Deutsch!
Deadline: 1/10/2023
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“Albania-Kosovo meeting cancelled”, “Albanian – Kosovo joint meeting cancelled” “Government: It is the first time that a meeting of two governments has been unilaterally cancelled”, “Rama confirms the cancellation of the meeting of governments” On 13th June, a day before the ninth joint meeting between the Albanian and Kosovan governments that was to take place in Gjakova, those headlines spread rapidly in Kosovan, Albanian and international media. The prime minister of Albania, Edi Rama, announced in the last minutes that he would cancel the meeting. During the press conference, Rama claimed that the meeting could not be held “in the circumstances of Kosovo’s aggravated relations with the entire Euro-Atlantic community”, referring to international criticism of Kosovo’s handling of developments in its northern Serb-majority municipalities. During the governments’ joint meeting, ten agreements should have been signed. One of the most important was the mutual recognition of lawyers and mediators in resolving disputes.
The same day, Kosovo’s prime minister Albin Kurti refused Rama’s draft charter for the creation of the Association of Municipalities with a Serb majority in the north of Kosovo. According to Rama, this plan would de-escalate the situation and normalise Kosovo’s relationship with the international community. However, he never introduced the document to the public, keeping it confidential.
Kurti reminded Rama about Albania’s constitutional duty to deal with national unity and the citizens of Kosovo. Kurti added: “Rama should hand over that draft to Aleksandar Vučić [President of Serbia] for the Albanians living in Serbia”. The relationship between Kosovo and Albania has thus turned into a personal fight: Edi Rama vs Albin Kurti.
The Consequences of Partisan Media
In Albania, there are currently hundreds of talk shows, news editions and opinion leaders trying to explain why Kurti refused Rama’s plan or find out who really cancelled the joint meeting, Kurti or Rama. Who is at fault in this situation? The manner in which the media handled the issue was and continues to be like the third season of a soap opera. What is sure is that this is a manifestation of political polarisation. According to a study by Pew Research, people give more weight to statements that support their own views – be it on the left or right spectrum of politics. Frequently, some media outlets in Albania known for supporting Rama`s government criticized Kurti. Albanian and Kosovan media supporting Kurti campaigned against Rama’s policies and his political rhetoric about the Kosovo case. The media has thus played an important role in creating a split: Nationalists who support Kurti`s political rhetoric, and the Rama supporters who idealise or adore him as a Western Balkan leader, who is able to solve the problems between Western Balkan countries.
The Personal Fight: Rama vs Kurti
Across the world, societies polarise politically. The tone of political debate has hardened in recent years, and the political left and right increasingly seem to perceive each other as enemies instead of opponents.1 On the one hand, Rama is trying to be the referee in the conflict in the north of Kosovo. On the other hand, Kurti’s belief that his approach in dealing with Serbia is better than Rama`s hazards the consequences of the European Union’s sanctions towards Kosovo. A central aspect of political polarisation is a strong belief in the moral superiority of one’s own ideological beliefs, which easily prompts the assumption that alternative ideological beliefs are morally inferior. In this context, the confidence of both prime ministers in their own correctness had caused political polarisation, which may lead to overconfidence in decision-making. For instance, on his Western Balkan tour Rama could not have a meeting with his Kosovan counterpart, but only with Kosovo’s president, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, and the chairman of the parliament, Glauk Konjufca. The overconfidence of Kurti and Rama in their ideas is damaging the two countries. They are still not able to sit together to discuss what is going wrong in Kosovan or Albanian government policies. Rama accused Kurti of raising tensions with the persistence he showed by returning four mayors to their municipality offices. From the nationalist idea of a “Greater Albania” to diplomatic meetings, and now using Kosovo politically for their own battles, it is clear Kosovo-Albania relations are regressing day by day. The leaders’ overconfidence is weakening Albania and Kosovo-Albanians because the government is playing a neutral role instead of supporting the integrity of the Republic of Kosovo. When the war started, Albania became one of the main destinations for refugees from Kosovo. Albania sheltered thousands of refugees during that period. In the war, the Albanian army also helped with weapons. Since Kosovo’s independence in 2008, both countries had good relations which were always preceded by national priorities, but there is also ongoing political and economic cooperation. In the political-diplomatic sphere, the state of Albania and its diplomacy have been quite active in the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. It is clear that the relationship between the two countries is now damaged. On the one hand, the opposition in Kosovo is blaming Kurti, while on the other hand, the Albanian opposition is blaming Rama.
Post-Truth Symptoms in Media
Further, “alternative facts”, a term coined by the previous US administration under President Donald Trump (basically meaning false statements), have helped to fuel polarisation. Regularly, the Albanian public was exposed to “alternative facts” when Serbian police forces arrested three Kosovo police officers. In the beginning, the media reported the kidnapping of three police officers, which it then labelled as arrests. There are two different versions of the same events on 14 June: in North Kosovo; Belgrade Says Arrest Took Place On its Territory. As the journalist Matthew D`Ancona writes in the book Post-Truth, “Nowadays it is more important the intensity of the drama than accuracy. The reality and entertainment have taken on the same meaning for the public”.2
The political polarisation was already visible before, in the last days of May, when the situation escalated in the north of Kosovo. Soldiers from a NATO-led peacekeeping force were injured in clashes with Serb protesters while defending three town halls with Kosovo-Albanian mayors. The Serbian president put the army on the highest level of combat alert. Serbia continues not to recognise Kosovo as an independent country and still believes that Kosovo is part of Serbia based on the infamous project “Nacertania” of 1844, which aimed to oppose the idea of the Albanian State establishment and the displacement of Albanians from their ethnic land. This rhetoric from Belgrade strongly contributes to ethnic polarisation, which is dangerous. Its impact was also shown in the violent protests by Serbs in Mitrovica.
Another micro-level symptom of polarisation was the protest organised by Albanians in front of the government building in support of Kosovo after the tensions in its north and the cancellation of the joint meeting between Rama and Kurti. Citizens displayed Albanian, Kosovan and UÇK flags with the slogan: “We Want National Unity (Greater Albania)”.
With all the hot issues to be solved in the Western Balkans, the question remains whether the political polarization between Albania and Kosovo can at least be again alleviated.
Media Framing in Kosovo and Albania
We cannot predict the future, but if Kosovo and Serbia continue the conflict under the generally difficult geopolitical situation, society will suffer the consequences of creating enemies. Media has been framing Albanians and Kosovans as brothers for a long time. Things have changed because in some media in Albania and Kosovo, Rama is now framed as a friend of Vučić who is selling out the national interest and Kosovo for his own interest. In the partisan Albanian-Kosovan media, there is a framing convergence on Rama. Not only has the traditional media helped to build this framing, but social media has had a huge impact too. Also, the leader of the opposition in Albania, Sali Berisha, used Facebook to strengthen the framing of Rama as a friend of the Serbian president. Media has an impact on people`s opinions about Albania-Kosovo relations. The political polarisation caused violence in the parliament of Kosovo when Albin Kurti was attacked physically by the opposition parliament members. The question is if this polarisation will raise tensions and damage the Kosovan reputation in front of Europe and the USA?
Reducing both ethnic and political polarisation in Kosovo, Albania and Serbia will require efforts to promote dialogue and understanding between different groups, as well as accountability in the political system. The biggest challenge is to have media freedom and to promote objective reporting to reduce polarisation and promote democratic values.
Gëzim Hilaj is a journalist, who has a Bachelor Degree in Journalism at the University of Tirana. Currently working as a journalist at the Albanian Public Television, RTSH and writer of many articles in media outlets in his country. Also he is the winner of the third fact checking award in Albania and selected as one of the 15th best young journalists in the world by the Thomson Foundation.
In the latest article on the IDM blog, our trainee Lucas Décorne explores the weaponization of agricultural goods in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and examines how the tensions surrounding the Black Sea Grain Initiative could impact global food security.
Food (In)security in Times of War
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has deteriorated food security worldwide. The destruction and disruption of food systems during armed conflicts result in strongly adverse and irreversible short- and long-term effects which may alter the lives of future generations. Besides the lack of food availability, the global agricultural markets have observed an unprecedented rising in food prices, affecting both developed and developing countries. Developing countries suffer the worst effects of the global food crisis because of their significant reliance on exports from Ukraine transported on the Black Sea. Hence, the need for an agreement, in this case multilateral, to safeguard the world’s food security while reducing the time of humanitarian assistance to those in crucial need.
A Required Multilateral Achievement
In February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine halted maritime grain shipments from Ukraine completely, whilst Russia and Ukraine accounted for one-third of global wheat trade, 17% of global maize trade and almost 75% of global sunflower oil trade before the war. Grain could not be exported in required quantities using alternative routes through Poland or Romania because the Danube River and railway infrastructures do not have the capacity to meet global demand. Therefore, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement with Turkey and the UN in order to allow grain exports from three key Ukrainian ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny/Pivdennyi) on 22 July 2022. In April 2022, Turkey hosted the discussions since the nation controls the Black Sea maritime routes where the cargo ships would navigate through. The full name of the agreement is the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukraine Ports, but it is commonly referred to as the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
The Initiative allowed procedures to safely export commercial food and fertilizer for 120 days. Ukrainian vessels would guide cargo ships into international waters of the Black Sea to avoid mined areas. Then, cargos went on towards Istanbul along an agreed maritime humanitarian corridor where, when reaching Istanbul, they were inspected by a joint coordination and inspection centre, composed of Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian and UN inspectors. António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, said this agreement and the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports amidst the ongoing war is “a beacon of hope” in a world that desperately needs it. Additionally, another deal was signed to reduce the impact of sanctions on the export of Russian food and fertilizer. Both deals were subject to four- and then two-monthly reviews.
The Initiative’s Influence on Food Security
For almost a year, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) has allowed nearly 33 million tons of foodstuffs to leave Ukrainian ports safely, driving down global food prices. Among these exported grains, less than a ton of wheat was bought and shipped to countries facing critical famine situations, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Yemen, by the World Food Programme. Although wealthy countries acquired most supplies, it has lowered the overall price paid by all countries.
Despite difficulties in the renewal of the Initiative, it was eventually renewed for another 120 days by all parties in November 2022 and later in March and May 2023 for a 60-day extension. The Russian Federation was reluctant to extend the agreement for a longer term as it considers it a losing proposition, although it benefited from the agreement since its exports were higher than last year, in addition to an increase in production of almost 17 million tons. Russian officials often expressed that they would not lengthen the deal because, according to them, the second part of the deal, about fertilizers, did not comply with the initial agreement. Not only that, but they complained that sanctions on Russian goods exports had not been lifted and called for those on the main agricultural bank to be lifted. As a result, Russia was unable to offer insurers the required legal assurance necessary to safeguard Russian food-carrying vessels. Therefore, Russia started to dwindle inspections month after month, slowly decreasing food exports. The Initiative witnessed a 66% decrease in May 2023 compared to March 2023, eventually, Russia terminated the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
The Other Part of the Initiative
Fertilizer exports, including ammonia, are decisive for food security and agricultural production. Even though they were included in the Initiative, they weren’t exported. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia used to be a major ammonia exporter, with 4,4 million tons a year. One of the main pipelines, from Togliatti in Russia to the Ukrainian port of Yuzhny/Pivdennyi, was developed to export 2,5 million tons annually, but it has been damaged on 5 June 2023 – the current status is unknown. Russia expects the resumption of the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline, as one of its demands for a return to the agreement.
Before the conflict, Ukraine was a leading grain exporter on the global market. Its production was essential for supplying markets and keeping prices down. A lack of food supplies has unprecedented effects on the world’s food security and can impair the lives of millions of people, especially the poorest. The Black Sea Grain Initiative has facilitated the partial restoration of vital food supplies in the market. While the Initiative was recently terminated by the Russian Federation, the world may be facing another food crisis with spiking prices. Another maritime blockade of Ukrainian grain would have extensive implications beyond Europe and prove disastrous for those facing dire circumstances.
Despite negotiating one of the few diplomatic achievements since the war began and trying to keep the Initiative running, Russia is aware of the political influence its agricultural exports offer and the leverage it has to meet its demands. It has continually blamed Western sanctions for the ongoing global food crisis while it weaponizes food to tilt the war to its side.
Termination of the Initiative & The Future of Food Security
The question remains whether Russia would be willing to join again the agreement or not. Putin implied he is prepared to renege on the deal if his demands are met. However, the recent bombings on the port of Odesa as well as other civilian infrastructure and also harbours at the Danube, where some 60,000 tons of grain have already been destroyed, seem to suggest the opposite. Grain prices have already risen on the global market before Russia terminated the grain deal, due to a slowing down of checked vessels to be cleared for export.
Following the initiative’s termination, certain EU countries bordering Ukraine express concern over the potential for alternative routes. This apprehension stems from the likelihood of increased exports to these nations, potentially hampering their capacity to stock the anticipated surplus of harvests expected this year. If excess quantities of grain reach their domestic markets, then, prices will fall, undermining their farmers. The ministers of Agriculture from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have therefore called for a prolongation of the preventive measures on imports of wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seeds originating in Ukraine until the end of 2023.
The recent interview of Sebastian Schäffer, IDM Director, for Asharq News, discusses the challenges and alternative routes for the future of grain exports amidst this war.
Lucas Décorne – a student in the Master’s program in Intercultural Relations and International Cooperation at the University of Lille (France) and currently a trainee at the IDM (April to August 2023). He holds a BA degree in Foreign Languages Applied to Business from the same university.
IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer spoke with Asharq News about the termination of the Grain Deal, the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine-Council on 26 July 2023, the heinous attacks by the Russian Federation on Ukrainian ports and the destruction caused in Odesa as well as the Danube as an alternative export route.
You can watch the interview (in Arabic) here.
Der Text wurde in der Ausgabe 2/2023 von Info Europa veröffentlicht. Die vollständige Ausgabe ist hier zu lesen.
»Bagger kommen jeden Tag näher an unsere Häuser und die negativen Auswirkungen des Tagebaus werden immer schlimmer.« Das schreibt der Nachbarschaftsverein Uhelná in einem offenen Brief an die tschechische Regierung im Mai 2021. Die gleichnamige nordböhmische Gemeinde ist eine von vielen, die von den Umweltbelastungen des polnischen Kohlekraftwerks Turów betroffen ist. Im selben Monat ordnete der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) die Einstellung des Tagebaus an, der Kohle zum Kraftwerk fördert. Im Urteil heißt es, dass »drohende Schäden für die Gesundheit der tschechischen Bevölkerung und die Umwelt unumkehrbar sind, während es sich auf polnischer Seite um kompensierbare finanzielle Schäden handelt«. Sollte die Kohleförderung nicht umgehend eingestellt werden, falle eine Strafe an die EU-Kommission von einer halben Million Euro pro weiterem Betriebstag an.
Die Entscheidung des EuGH war ein Schock für Polen und spaltete die Gesellschaft. Die einen warfen der polnischen Regierung Ignoranz vor, die anderen meinten, die tschechische Regierung übertreibe mit der Klage und nutze das Thema für die anstehenden Parlamentswahlen aus. Polen setzte die Arbeiten im Tagebau ungeachtet des EuGH-Urteils fort. Zwar kamen Polen und Tschechien kurz darauf zu einer Einigung, vorerst merken die Einwohner*innen von Uhelná aber nichts davon. Polen zahlte Tschechien 45 Millionen Euro Entschädigung für den Rückzug der Klage. Perspektivisch werden Schritte eingeleitet, um die Grundwasserabsenkung auf tschechischer Seite sowie die Lärmbelästigung zu verringern. Bis diese Maßnahmen wirken, werden aber wohl noch Jahre vergehen und die Probleme für Anrainer*innen bleiben bestehen.
Die EU-Nachbarländer waren stets enge Partner in der Visegrád-Gruppe. Doch Turów ließ die Beziehungen deutlich abkühlen. Da für den Kohlegewinn der Boden entwässert wird, und das bis in mehrere hundert Meter Tiefe, sank der Grundwasserspiegel rund um den polnischen Tagebau bis zu 60m ab – auch auf tschechischer Seite.
Vom Freund zum Feind
»Sollen wir heute den Geschirrspüler oder die Waschmaschine einschalten?« Das ist eine Frage, die sich die tschechische Familie Kronus oft stellt. Ihr Brunnen reicht für den Wasserverbrauch der ganzen Familie nicht mehr aus. Michael Martin aus dem Nachbardorf Václavice muss zu seinem Nachbarn, um Trinkwasser für seine Familie zu besorgen. Es sind nur einzelne Geschichten, die die lokale grenzübergreifende Organisation Stop Turów sammelte. Doch in Zukunft kommen wohl noch weitere Geschichten dazu: Denn der Tagebau soll nach Plan des Eigentümers Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) weiter ausgebaut und künftig auf weniger als 100m zur tschechischen Grenze erweitert werden. Stop Turów zufolge könnte dadurch 30.000 tschechischen Einwohner*innen das Trinkwasser entzogen werden, aber auch das gesamte lokale Ökosystem steht vor beträchtlichen existenziellen Herausforderungen.
Die polnische Seite der Grenze gleicht einer Wüstenlandschaft: Das Gebiet des Tagebaus Turów verschlingt jedes bisschen Grün. Neben ihm liegt das fünftgrößte Kraftwerk Polens, wesentlich für die Energieversorgung der Region. Doch warum stören sich die Pol*innen nicht an den Umweltbelastungen des Tagebaus? Vorerst hat dies wirtschaftliche Gründe. PGE ist der größte Stromproduzent im Land und gleichzeitig der größte Arbeitgeber in der Umgebung, rund 5000 Menschen sind bei PGE und der dazugehörigen Industrie beschäftigt. Laut polnischen Behörden käme eine sofortige Einstellung des Kraftwerks einer Katastrophe gleich: steigende Arbeitslosigkeit, eingeschränkter Zugang zu Strom, Heizung und paradoxerweise auch zu Wasser. Das Kraftwerk reinigt nämlich die Abwässer aus der Stromproduktion und liefert das Wasser an benachbarte polnische Städte wie Bogatynia. 72% des dortigen Wasserbedarfs werden vom Kraftwerk gedeckt. Aus diesen Gründen sind die Gegenstimmen auf polnischer Seite leiser als auf der tschechischen, wo die lokale Bevölkerung kaum wirtschaftlich profitiert und gleichzeitig unter der fremdverursachten Wasserarmut leidet.
Dicke Luft im Dreiländereck
Der im Dreiländereck Deutschland-Polen-Tschechien gelegene Tagebau existiert bereits seit 1904. Dass er ausgerechnet jetzt zum internationalen Streitfall wird, liegt daran, dass Polen die ursprünglich in 2020 auslaufende Konzession ungeachtet der Einwände Deutschlands und Tschechiens bis 2044 verlängerte – und das zu einer Zeit, in der zunehmende Trockenheit die Wasserknappheit in der Region ohnehin schon verschlimmert und der Trend hin zu erneuerbaren Alternativen geht. Prag konnte die Bedenken der Tschech*innen nicht länger ignorieren und wandte sich 2021 an den EuGH. 2022 klagte auch die deutsche Gemeinde Zittau, allerdings vor einem polnischen Gericht. Die Rechtswege verschlechterten die Beziehungen zwischen den zwei Visegrád-Ländern immens. Dass die polnische Botschaft in Prag seit 2020 unbesetzt war, trug nicht zur Verbesserung der Situation bei. Nachdem der Botschafter im November 2021 endlich antrat, wurde er im Jänner 2022 von der polnischen Regierung wieder abberufen, weil er sich kritisch über die Vorgehensweise im Fall Turów äußerte. »Es mangelte an Empathie, Verständnis und Dialogbereitschaft – vor allem auf polnischer Seite«, sagte er in einem Interview mit Deutsche Welle. Verwerfungen gab es allerdings nicht nur auf Regierungsebene, auch die lokale Bevölkerung reproduzierte den Konflikt. Es kam sogar zu einem Zwischenfall, in dem ein Restaurant in Bogatynia Tschech*innen die Bedienung verwehrte – so hieß es zumindest auf einem Schild an dessen Eingangstür. Der EuGH wählte auch einen ungünstigen Zeitpunkt für sein Urteil. Zweimal binnen dieser Woche kam das größte Kraftwerk Polens, Bełchatów, wegen Pannen für mehrere Stunden zum fast kompletten Erliegen. In diesem Zusammenhang schien es für Polen außer Frage Turów sofort abzuschalten.
Kein Platz für Energie-Nationalismus
Mit der neuen tschechischen Regierung von Petr Fiala zog Prag die Klage gegen Warschau 2022 beim EuGH zurück und beide Länder schlossen ein Abkommen. Neben der Entschädigungssumme sollte dieses auch die Auswirkungen des Tagebaus auf die Umwelt eindämmen. Ein Erdwall soll gegen die Lärmbelästigung errichtet werden und eine unterirdische Dichtwand soll eine weitere Absenkung des Grundwasserspiegels verhindern. Die Dichtwand ist bereits seit Juni 2022 in Betrieb und bisherige Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich der Rückgang des Grundwassers auf dem tschechischen Gebiet verlangsamt.
Der Abschluss des Abkommens und die Beruhigung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen sind sicherlich auch auf die politisch-ideologische Nähe der polnischen Partei PiS und der tschechischen ODS zurückzuführen, die mehr als eine kritische Meinung zu den Transformationsbestrebungen der EU teilen, wie zum Beispiel zum Benzin- und Dieselfahrverbot oder zu den Emissionszertifikaten für Wohnen und Verkehr.
Dennoch sind die im Abkommen geplanten Maßnahmen sowohl im Hinblick auf das strategische Gesamtkonzept der sozial-ökologischen Transformation der Region als auch auf die EU-weite grüne Kohäsionspolitik völlig unzureichend. Laut Stop Turów bestätigen Energie-Expert*innen, auch aus Polen, dass das polnische Stromnetz nach 2030 auf Turów verzichten könne. Die Nutzung erneuerbarer Energiequellen wie Wind und Sonne könnte in Zukunft den Strom des Kohlekraftwerks Turów ersetzen. Ihrer Meinung nach ist das Festhalten der polnischen Regierung an Kohlekraftwerken eine klare Manifestation des sogenannten Energie-Nationalismus. So wird von vielen Vertreter*innen der PiS-Partei die Dekarbonisierung als ein von Deutschland inszenierter EU-Plan zur Zerstörung des polnischen Kohlesektors dargestellt.
Die hohe Schädlichkeit von Tagebauen für Grundwasserspiegel ist kein Geheimnis. Obwohl Turów zweifellos das berüchtigtste Kraftwerk im Dreiländereck ist, ist es keinesfalls das einzige in diesen Ländern. Bewohner*innen mehrerer tschechischen Regionen, wie zum Beispiel um die Kraftwerke Počerady oder Ledvice in Nordböhmen, sowie Karviná und Ostrava-Třebovice in der mährisch-schlesischen Region, leiden ebenso unter den negativen Folgen des Kohlebergbaus. In Deutschland schaffen es Protestaktionen von Umweltschützer*innen immer wieder in die internationalen Schlagzeilen. Und sowohl Polen als auch Tschechien stehen vor einer Wasserkrise – beide Länder haben die geringsten erneuerbaren Wasserressourcen pro Kopf im EU-Vergleich.
Grüne Evolution statt Revolution
Wie Polen steht daher auch Tschechien auf dem Transformationspfad zu einer technologisch modernen, klimasicheren und nachhaltigen Energieerzeugung vor vielen Herausforderungen. So müssen beide Länder noch Teile der Bevölkerung von der Notwendigkeit dieser Transformation überzeugen. Nationalkonservative Tendenzen sind dafür der falsche Weg. Fälle wie Turów stoßen allerdings Umdenkprozesse an. Tschechien plant bis 2038 alle Kohlekraftwerke vom Netz zu nehmen und sie durch Wind-, Solar- oder Kernkraftwerke zu ersetzen. Letztere wurden von der EU-Kommission zuletzt als grün eingestuft, nicht alle Expert*innen teilen diese Ansicht. Der schleppende Prozess bedeutet für Anrainer*innen von Kohlekraftwerken dennoch mindestens 15 weitere unsichere Jahre.
Polen zählt zu den zehn größten Kohleproduzenten der Welt. Ein Ausstieg aus der Industrie wird wirtschaftlich nicht einfach, die Anzahl der Beschäftigten in diesem Bereich sinkt aber allmählich. Die Mehrheit der Pol*innen betrachtet den Klimawandel als Gefahr und befürwortet die grüne Transformation. Mit steigendem Wohlstand kommt ein Bedürfnis nach einer sauberen Umwelt. Seit Jahren leidet das Land unter Luftverschmutzung, im Winter ist der Smog oft so schädlich, dass die Einwohner*innen betroffener Regionen eine Warn-SMS bekommen, das Haus nicht zu verlassen, wenn es nicht notwendig ist. Umweltkatastrophen wie das Fischsterben und die Vergiftung des Flusses Betschwa in Mähren 2020 und der Oder in Polen 2022 veranschaulichen den Tschech*innen und Pol*innen, was passiert, wenn Klimawandel auf Verschmutzung trifft. Die Stimmen nach nachhaltiger Veränderung werden also lauter.
Malwina Talik ist Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am IDM sowie freiberufliche Forscherin und Übersetzerin. Davor war sie als Expertin für wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit bei der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften/Wien und Referentin für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bei der Polnischen Botschaft in Wien tätig.
Daniel Martínek M.A. ist Doktorand an der Westböhmischen Universität in Pilsen, Tschechien, und arbeitet als Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am IDM.
