IDM Director at breakfast debate in Prague on Austrian parliamentary elections
An article about the event has been published by Deník N (in Czech).
A controversial election campaign in the Czech Republic risks further polarising society. The Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) is facing criminal allegations after using overtly racist and biased posters as part of its election campaign. In the latest IDM Short Insight, Research Assistant Kamila Bogdanova explains why the Prague police and the Czech Constitutional Court are investigating the case.
Transcript:
The Prague police have initiated criminal proceedings against the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) for using a controversial poster ahead of the regional council elections. The suspected crime is the incitement of hatred towards a specific group of people. Due to the severity of the case, the Czech Constitutional Court will also investigate the election campaign.
The poster features a dark-skinned man with a bloody knife and a bloodied shirt, accompanied by the text, “Deficiencies in health care can’t be solved by importing ‘surgeons’. ‘Stop the EU Migration Pact!’.” These posters are overtly racist and biased, attempting to gain political support by instilling fear and driving a wedge between different groups of the population. After critical reactions, the leader of the opposition party SPD, Tomio Okamura, responded that he was merely reacting to the government’s actions, which, according to him, will lead to more migrants arriving in the Czech Republic. He also referred to the newly approved EU Migration Pact.
Furthermore, another poster depicts two Roma boys smoking a cigarette. The image was created by artificial intelligence. The accompanying text reads: “They say we should go to school, but our folks couldn’t care less…” and “Welfare just for families whose children attend school!” The Roma community strongly condemned the SPD’s election posters. They have decided to file a report of a crime against the party.
The Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) is known for its anti-immigration and anti-Islamist policies, advocating for direct rather than representative democracy, and is critical of the EU. Due to its ideology, which is dominated by nationalism and Euroscepticism, the party is often described as radical or extreme right-wing. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the movement ran as a candidate in the SPD and Tricolor coalition, which entered the European Parliament with one mandate, having received 5.73% of the vote.
Additionally, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic has stated that the SPD party uses disinformation and conspiracy theories as part of its policies, thereby inciting hatred and fear in society. This strategy effectively targets a part of the population that does not verify the information presented. The SPD’s unsuccessful result in the 2024 EU elections served as an impulse to launch this controversial electoral campaign. The regional council elections in September this year will reveal how effective this campaign has been.
How can Central Europe cooperate most effectively on the energy transition? Michael Stellwag and Rebecca Thorne put the spotlight on CES7 (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).
In the lead up to the European elections, the continent witnessed a backlash against green policies. The European Green Deal, which was introduced four years ago and outlines the continent’s path to climate neutrality by 2050, came under particular scrutiny. Integral to the Green Deal is the energy transition, including issues such as where the energy resources come from, how power is generated and who can access the final products.
While the Greens did indeed lose influence in Germany, France and Belgium, they retained their seats in Austria and even gained their first seats in Croatia and Slovenia. Indeed, the seven Central European states of the EU – Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (CES7) – are faced with the tangible effects of climate change, geopolitical instability and economic challenges, which necessarily provokes discussion about the decarbonisation of the energy sectors in the region along with questions of security and affordability. Effective cross-border cooperation is key to solving this conundrum.
In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the knock-on effects on the prices and supply of energy across Europe, it may appear worthwhile pursuing the goal of self-sufficiency at national level to reduce dependency and the corresponding risk of vulnerability. However, not every country has the capacity to meet all their energy needs through domestic power generation. While some countries possess an abundance of natural energy resources such as wind, water and sun, others run the risk of continuing the detrimental resource exploitation of coal mining. Power generation from coal still dominates the energy landscape of countries with a history of mining, accounting for 44% of the total electricity generation in Czechia and 70% in Poland. Instead of maintaining or even exacerbating this trend, regional cooperation provides alternatives, some of which remain controversial, while others offer clear benefits.
Diversification and bridge technologies: different approaches
First of all, cooperation should not come at the cost of security. The region’s historical energy partnership with Russia has highlighted its vulnerability: reducing this dependence is crucial. The EU attempted to enforce immediate diversification by introducing an oil embargo against Russia in 2022. However, the Central European states without a sea border – Austria, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia – pushed for an exemption, resulting in the continuation of imports of Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline that runs through Ukraine.
Regarding the gas supply, even though the proportion of Russian pipeline gas in EU imports has fallen from over 40% in 2021 to currently 8% in the EU as a whole, the share in parts of Central Europe remains higher. Austria and Hungary are currently the most dependent on gas from Russia and have fought most intensively against possible EU sanctions. In Austria, the share of Russian gas in the total supply has not fallen significantly since the attack on Ukraine due to a non-transparent long-term supply contract that was extended in 2018 and to which, until recently, not even members of the government had access.
The response of these states to the energy supply crisis has been different. The four Visegrad states are primarily focusing on diversifying both their oil and gas suppliers in order to reduce their dependence on Russia without significantly reducing their consumption. Poland is using the Baltic Pipe as well as importing more from the USA, while increasing the capacity of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and pipeline infrastructure. Slovakia and Hungary are increasingly sourcing oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with security of supply being a priority – yet it is important to note that a certain amount of imports from these countries comes from Russia anyway. Czechia is also making efforts to diversify as well as focusing on energy efficiency measures.
In an example of minilateral cooperation, Austria has been investing in the LNG terminal on the Croatian island of Krk. This terminal has already existed for some time but is now being expanded far beyond the national requirements of Croatia in order serve as a regional hub. Poland has also been enlarging its LNG capabilities from 5 billion m³ a year via its Świnoujście terminal, aiming to double its capacity with the expansion and planned new construction in Gdańsk. The trend is clear: no reduction in gas, but the reduction of dependence on one single country. Yet a decrease in both would be possible with more intensive coordination and more coherent planning within the group – especially as investing in gas projects poses the danger of Central Europe tying itself further into a dependence on a resource that is ultimately a fossil fuel.
Nuclear power remains a contentious issue, with many convinced it is the way forward to reducing dependency on fossil fuels. In a further example of cross-border cooperation, Slovenia shares its nuclear power station with Croatia, which is in an earthquake zone and cannot build its own without compromising safety. Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia have also opted to invest in nuclear technologies: 59.7%, 44% and 36.6% of their respective electricity generation comes from nuclear. Hungary furthermore intends to increase this percentage with a new power plant that is to be built using Russian state funding. Poland currently has no domestic nuclear energy production but is developing plans to build its first nuclear power station.
However, others remain wary of a technology that has the potential to cause widespread harm. Austria is one of few outspoken opponents in Central Europe following the referendum of 1978 and subsequent law against generating nuclear power. Having set a goal to source 100% of its electricity from renewables by 2030, Austria moreover intends to show that the green transition is possible without nuclear energy.
Fast-growing markets
The renewable energy markets have been rapidly growing, especially the solar industry, with the demand for photovoltaic energy busting market expectations across Europe. There is also significant potential for energy generation from other renewable sources in Central Europe. Poland has begun to make use of the wind on its northern coast with its first offshore farm currently under construction, which is anticipated to generate 1.1GW. Nonetheless, there is still a lot of room for growth, with estimated potential for up to 33GW. Likewise, the Adriatic Sea offers considerable offshore wind power that is not being utilised. While it has been agreed that no wind farms will be built on Croatia’s islands, there is still an area of 29,000 km² that could be developed without encroaching on high-impact zones.
Furthermore, there are natural geothermal heat reservoirs across the region. Indeed, following the European Parliament’s recent call for an EU geothermal energy strategy, the European Committee of the Regions released an Opinion on the “great potential” of geothermal for both cities and regions. To give three examples from the region: in Poland, geothermal reservoirs have been found in around 50% of the country’s area, particularly in central and northwestern Poland. Hungary has already quadrupled its use of geothermal energy since 2010 and is now planning to double its use again by 2030, while Slovenia has been developing a pilot geothermal project that only requires one dry well for operation.
Prioritise the grid
With such promising potential of renewables, both large- and small-scale, what is preventing an exponential growth of the clean energy sector? The supply chain is currently not the limiting factor in terms of what is possible. While the manufacturing of solar panels is at present dominated by China, the EU has established initiatives such as the Net Zero Industry Act and the European Solar Charter, which aim to support solar manufacturing in Europe.
Instead, with a rapid expansion of the renewable energy sector, the grid is the main bottleneck. Energy systems are largely centralised through national grids, which currently do not have the capacity to integrate the rapidly expanding renewable sector. Sectors that were predominantly running on fossil fuels are now being converted to electricity. To further complicate the problem, the grid in Poland, for example, is concentrated on regions in the south of the country that produced energy from coal, whereas the up-and-coming renewable sector is focused on the north. Moreover, the grid does not offer sufficient capacity for large projects at sea.
Cooperation among the countries of Central Europe would allow a pooling of renewable resources, which is indispensable given the fluctuating nature of supply and demand inherent to renewable energy. Within this partnership, a priority must be the full synchronisation of the grid across the region as well as the expansion of cross-border grid interconnectors. In particular, the triangle between Austria, Hungary and Slovenia has been identified as critical.
Huge potential
The European Green Deal promises long-term potential for growth, but currently the transition requires significant financial investment, challenges the economies and could threaten established industries in this underperforming region. Among some governments and sections of the population in the Central European countries there are narratives that they are second-class countries within the EU. Many regulations are seen as originating from Western European countries and Brussels, which member states then have to implement regardless of economic feasibility, resulting in a sluggish implementation of individual EGD regulations. Nonetheless, renewable energy sources, even in the year of installation, are cheaper than fossil fuels. In 2022, the global average cost of solar energy was 29% lower than the cheapest fossil fuel option, while the cost of onshore wind energy was 50% lower. An integrated grid would also boost price competitiveness as cheaper, cleaner electricity from neighbouring countries in the region becomes available to consumers.
Central Europe has significant potential for a green energy transition, as well as for a more dynamic economy and policymaking than is often assumed. Cooperation is essential to accelerate progress – whether a pooling of financial, knowledge or human resources. With the rapid growth of renewables and increasing electrification of the energy sectors, the expansion and improved international interconnectivity of the grid must be a priority not only for the EU, but also on regional level.
Rebecca Thorne is a research associate at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) in Vienna. Her research focus is climate, energy and the environment in Central Europe and the EU candidate countries.
Michael Stellwag is a research associate at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Vienna. Having studied political science in Vienna and Tallinn, he now specialises in politics in Central and Eastern Europe and in EU foreign, security and defence policy. Professional projects have taken him to numerous countries in the region.
Both authors attended the expert workshop “Central Europe Plus – Bridge technologies with regard to a sustainable energy supply” organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Zagreb. The workshop series has existed since 2021 and focuses on the role of Central European States for the future of the EU. It aims to bring together decision-makers and researchers from the countries concerned and to present positions and demands from these countries in Brussels. In 2024, the project has been developed further to include other regions as well, hence the workshop title Central Europe Plus.
In the Hungarian-language edition of the Slovak daily newspaper “Denník N”; Péter Techet analyzed the new group “Patriots for Europe”, which was founded in the European Parliament with far-right parties, including those from Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Austria. Techet thinks that the new faction is essentially a rebranding of the former “Identity and Democracy” (ID) faction, as most member parties come from this group. However, the rebranding allows Viktor Orbán and Andrej Babiš, who were not part of ID, to present the new faction as their success. Techet interprets Marine Le Pen’s decision to remain in this group as a choice against the moderate path taken by Giorgia Meloni and her “European Conservatives and Reformists” (ERC) faction. Although the new “Patriots” faction will become the third strongest force in the new European Parliament, Techet does not expect it to significantly influence European politics, as the informal coalition between the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists (S&D), and the Liberals (Renew) still holds a majority. Additionally, the far-right parties are still divided on issues such as the war in Ukraine.
The article (in Hungarian) can be read here.
The political differences in the Visegrad Four (V4) countries that emerged as a result of the elections in Poland (15 October 2023) and Slovakia (30 September 2023) will not significantly impact the dynamics of cooperation among the group. The format remains in crisis due to Hungary’s pro-Russia foreign policy stance and its sceptical approach to the EU’s pro-Ukraine policy direction.
The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15, which will see key decisions made on EU enlargement, will once again highlight the lack of unity and cohesion among V4 group members, with Hungary being the outlier. As a result, the V4 will continue to serve as a platform for regional cooperation, but one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy as seen in response to the 2015 migration crisis or the “Nutella crisis” in 2017 when the V4 mobilised to fight against the “double standards” of imported food sold in their countries.
What is more, in the long run, the ideological differences are not likely to divide the countries that created the V4, regardless of the political preference of ruling governments. For example, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), co-managed by V4 countries and supporting regional cooperation projects in the region, or formats such as Think Visegrad—V4 Think Tank Platform, a hub of V4 joint analysis, remain an important aspect of cooperation. On the other hand, there is a threat that due to persisting political differences, the individual V4 countries will seek to engage in alternative formats of regional cooperation. For example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will most likely invest in the development of the Slavkov Triangle or Central Five Initiative (C5), involving Austria. Poland will focus on rebuilding relations within the Weimar Triangle and will remain active within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) until the end of President Andrzej Duda’s term in 2025.
What will change and what will not
Poland and the Czech Republic will not allow Hungary, and perhaps Slovakia, to appropriate the V4 as a Eurosceptic or even anti-Western platform. Furthermore, Slovakia will not replace Poland to the same extent as an important partner in activating the V4 format or advocating Slovakia’s own position on the international stage. After its initial declaration, Slovakia will most probably not stick to all its electoral promises related to withholding military aid to Ukraine or pursuing a more assertive European policy. This is because Slovakia does not have a tradition of conducting proactive foreign policy, so it is unlikely Bratislava would use its veto power in Brussels to back Hungary. As the V4’s only eurozone country, Slovakia traditionally advocates for a constructive European policy based on consensus. Robert Fico demonstrated such an approach during his previous term.
Polish-Hungarian relations will not improve, and Hungary will be isolated within the V4 over Russia. Prime Minister Orban deliberately plays the role of a disruptor in the EU and NATO decision-making process, openly challenging the model of liberal democracy and steering the country towards an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, soon-to-be new/old Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is known for his critical stance towards Viktor Orban. Bilateral disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (related to Orban’s controversial historical policies) further complicate the situation and isolate Hungary within the V4.
The V4 also faces an image problem in the EU, with a prevailing negative perception of its member countries. Therefore, Poland is not likely to heavily leverage the V4 in the coming years. In recent years, other formats such as the Bucharest Nine (B9), Three Seas Initiative (3SI), Slavkov Triangle, or Central Five Initiative (C5) have gained prominence, with V4 countries actively participating.
Finally, Poland is not necessarily seen by other Visegrad countries as a leader in the region. Poland’s reputation has also been damaged due to the deterioration of the rule of law (Slovakia, under the previous government, became more sceptical of Poland’s actions and pushed V4 activities aside) and the conflict with the Czech Republic over the Turow coal mine.
To sum up, looking back on 2023 and trying to foresee the developments on the international stage in 2024, we can be sure that the V4 will stay on the map of regional groupings in the EU in the years to come and will keep being used as a passive platform for regional cooperation. However, one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy among the V4 unless Hungary adjusts its stance on Russia to align with the European mainstream.
During the past almost two years, the war in Ukraine and its consequences unprecedentedly challenged Central Europe. Military aid, supplies of weapons and equipment, humanitarian support, integration of fleeing Ukrainians, and a fundamentally changed security and geopolitical climate. As other world events such as the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas unfold, and the war in Ukraine continues, however, the attention on Europe and the willingness to support the attacked Ukraine is starting to wane in some countries, facing rising apathy or denial among societies.
What challenges does Central Europe currently face in connection with the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the resulting security, military and energy transformation in the region? How can existing cross-border and regional cooperation formats support these transformations? What are the possibilities and limits of common, joint action of Central European states amid the ongoing war? Finally, is the perception of the European Union and its aid to Ukraine changing among the Central European populations? Experts on and from Central Europe examined the current political constellation and cooperation of states in the heart of Europe.
Der Text wurde in der Ausgabe 2/2023 von Info Europa veröffentlicht. Die vollständige Ausgabe ist hier zu lesen.
»Bagger kommen jeden Tag näher an unsere Häuser und die negativen Auswirkungen des Tagebaus werden immer schlimmer.« Das schreibt der Nachbarschaftsverein Uhelná in einem offenen Brief an die tschechische Regierung im Mai 2021. Die gleichnamige nordböhmische Gemeinde ist eine von vielen, die von den Umweltbelastungen des polnischen Kohlekraftwerks Turów betroffen ist. Im selben Monat ordnete der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) die Einstellung des Tagebaus an, der Kohle zum Kraftwerk fördert. Im Urteil heißt es, dass »drohende Schäden für die Gesundheit der tschechischen Bevölkerung und die Umwelt unumkehrbar sind, während es sich auf polnischer Seite um kompensierbare finanzielle Schäden handelt«. Sollte die Kohleförderung nicht umgehend eingestellt werden, falle eine Strafe an die EU-Kommission von einer halben Million Euro pro weiterem Betriebstag an.
Die Entscheidung des EuGH war ein Schock für Polen und spaltete die Gesellschaft. Die einen warfen der polnischen Regierung Ignoranz vor, die anderen meinten, die tschechische Regierung übertreibe mit der Klage und nutze das Thema für die anstehenden Parlamentswahlen aus. Polen setzte die Arbeiten im Tagebau ungeachtet des EuGH-Urteils fort. Zwar kamen Polen und Tschechien kurz darauf zu einer Einigung, vorerst merken die Einwohner*innen von Uhelná aber nichts davon. Polen zahlte Tschechien 45 Millionen Euro Entschädigung für den Rückzug der Klage. Perspektivisch werden Schritte eingeleitet, um die Grundwasserabsenkung auf tschechischer Seite sowie die Lärmbelästigung zu verringern. Bis diese Maßnahmen wirken, werden aber wohl noch Jahre vergehen und die Probleme für Anrainer*innen bleiben bestehen.
Die EU-Nachbarländer waren stets enge Partner in der Visegrád-Gruppe. Doch Turów ließ die Beziehungen deutlich abkühlen. Da für den Kohlegewinn der Boden entwässert wird, und das bis in mehrere hundert Meter Tiefe, sank der Grundwasserspiegel rund um den polnischen Tagebau bis zu 60m ab – auch auf tschechischer Seite.
Vom Freund zum Feind
»Sollen wir heute den Geschirrspüler oder die Waschmaschine einschalten?« Das ist eine Frage, die sich die tschechische Familie Kronus oft stellt. Ihr Brunnen reicht für den Wasserverbrauch der ganzen Familie nicht mehr aus. Michael Martin aus dem Nachbardorf Václavice muss zu seinem Nachbarn, um Trinkwasser für seine Familie zu besorgen. Es sind nur einzelne Geschichten, die die lokale grenzübergreifende Organisation Stop Turów sammelte. Doch in Zukunft kommen wohl noch weitere Geschichten dazu: Denn der Tagebau soll nach Plan des Eigentümers Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) weiter ausgebaut und künftig auf weniger als 100m zur tschechischen Grenze erweitert werden. Stop Turów zufolge könnte dadurch 30.000 tschechischen Einwohner*innen das Trinkwasser entzogen werden, aber auch das gesamte lokale Ökosystem steht vor beträchtlichen existenziellen Herausforderungen.
Die polnische Seite der Grenze gleicht einer Wüstenlandschaft: Das Gebiet des Tagebaus Turów verschlingt jedes bisschen Grün. Neben ihm liegt das fünftgrößte Kraftwerk Polens, wesentlich für die Energieversorgung der Region. Doch warum stören sich die Pol*innen nicht an den Umweltbelastungen des Tagebaus? Vorerst hat dies wirtschaftliche Gründe. PGE ist der größte Stromproduzent im Land und gleichzeitig der größte Arbeitgeber in der Umgebung, rund 5000 Menschen sind bei PGE und der dazugehörigen Industrie beschäftigt. Laut polnischen Behörden käme eine sofortige Einstellung des Kraftwerks einer Katastrophe gleich: steigende Arbeitslosigkeit, eingeschränkter Zugang zu Strom, Heizung und paradoxerweise auch zu Wasser. Das Kraftwerk reinigt nämlich die Abwässer aus der Stromproduktion und liefert das Wasser an benachbarte polnische Städte wie Bogatynia. 72% des dortigen Wasserbedarfs werden vom Kraftwerk gedeckt. Aus diesen Gründen sind die Gegenstimmen auf polnischer Seite leiser als auf der tschechischen, wo die lokale Bevölkerung kaum wirtschaftlich profitiert und gleichzeitig unter der fremdverursachten Wasserarmut leidet.
Dicke Luft im Dreiländereck
Der im Dreiländereck Deutschland-Polen-Tschechien gelegene Tagebau existiert bereits seit 1904. Dass er ausgerechnet jetzt zum internationalen Streitfall wird, liegt daran, dass Polen die ursprünglich in 2020 auslaufende Konzession ungeachtet der Einwände Deutschlands und Tschechiens bis 2044 verlängerte – und das zu einer Zeit, in der zunehmende Trockenheit die Wasserknappheit in der Region ohnehin schon verschlimmert und der Trend hin zu erneuerbaren Alternativen geht. Prag konnte die Bedenken der Tschech*innen nicht länger ignorieren und wandte sich 2021 an den EuGH. 2022 klagte auch die deutsche Gemeinde Zittau, allerdings vor einem polnischen Gericht. Die Rechtswege verschlechterten die Beziehungen zwischen den zwei Visegrád-Ländern immens. Dass die polnische Botschaft in Prag seit 2020 unbesetzt war, trug nicht zur Verbesserung der Situation bei. Nachdem der Botschafter im November 2021 endlich antrat, wurde er im Jänner 2022 von der polnischen Regierung wieder abberufen, weil er sich kritisch über die Vorgehensweise im Fall Turów äußerte. »Es mangelte an Empathie, Verständnis und Dialogbereitschaft – vor allem auf polnischer Seite«, sagte er in einem Interview mit Deutsche Welle. Verwerfungen gab es allerdings nicht nur auf Regierungsebene, auch die lokale Bevölkerung reproduzierte den Konflikt. Es kam sogar zu einem Zwischenfall, in dem ein Restaurant in Bogatynia Tschech*innen die Bedienung verwehrte – so hieß es zumindest auf einem Schild an dessen Eingangstür. Der EuGH wählte auch einen ungünstigen Zeitpunkt für sein Urteil. Zweimal binnen dieser Woche kam das größte Kraftwerk Polens, Bełchatów, wegen Pannen für mehrere Stunden zum fast kompletten Erliegen. In diesem Zusammenhang schien es für Polen außer Frage Turów sofort abzuschalten.
Kein Platz für Energie-Nationalismus
Mit der neuen tschechischen Regierung von Petr Fiala zog Prag die Klage gegen Warschau 2022 beim EuGH zurück und beide Länder schlossen ein Abkommen. Neben der Entschädigungssumme sollte dieses auch die Auswirkungen des Tagebaus auf die Umwelt eindämmen. Ein Erdwall soll gegen die Lärmbelästigung errichtet werden und eine unterirdische Dichtwand soll eine weitere Absenkung des Grundwasserspiegels verhindern. Die Dichtwand ist bereits seit Juni 2022 in Betrieb und bisherige Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich der Rückgang des Grundwassers auf dem tschechischen Gebiet verlangsamt.
Der Abschluss des Abkommens und die Beruhigung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen sind sicherlich auch auf die politisch-ideologische Nähe der polnischen Partei PiS und der tschechischen ODS zurückzuführen, die mehr als eine kritische Meinung zu den Transformationsbestrebungen der EU teilen, wie zum Beispiel zum Benzin- und Dieselfahrverbot oder zu den Emissionszertifikaten für Wohnen und Verkehr.
Dennoch sind die im Abkommen geplanten Maßnahmen sowohl im Hinblick auf das strategische Gesamtkonzept der sozial-ökologischen Transformation der Region als auch auf die EU-weite grüne Kohäsionspolitik völlig unzureichend. Laut Stop Turów bestätigen Energie-Expert*innen, auch aus Polen, dass das polnische Stromnetz nach 2030 auf Turów verzichten könne. Die Nutzung erneuerbarer Energiequellen wie Wind und Sonne könnte in Zukunft den Strom des Kohlekraftwerks Turów ersetzen. Ihrer Meinung nach ist das Festhalten der polnischen Regierung an Kohlekraftwerken eine klare Manifestation des sogenannten Energie-Nationalismus. So wird von vielen Vertreter*innen der PiS-Partei die Dekarbonisierung als ein von Deutschland inszenierter EU-Plan zur Zerstörung des polnischen Kohlesektors dargestellt.
Die hohe Schädlichkeit von Tagebauen für Grundwasserspiegel ist kein Geheimnis. Obwohl Turów zweifellos das berüchtigtste Kraftwerk im Dreiländereck ist, ist es keinesfalls das einzige in diesen Ländern. Bewohner*innen mehrerer tschechischen Regionen, wie zum Beispiel um die Kraftwerke Počerady oder Ledvice in Nordböhmen, sowie Karviná und Ostrava-Třebovice in der mährisch-schlesischen Region, leiden ebenso unter den negativen Folgen des Kohlebergbaus. In Deutschland schaffen es Protestaktionen von Umweltschützer*innen immer wieder in die internationalen Schlagzeilen. Und sowohl Polen als auch Tschechien stehen vor einer Wasserkrise – beide Länder haben die geringsten erneuerbaren Wasserressourcen pro Kopf im EU-Vergleich.
Grüne Evolution statt Revolution
Wie Polen steht daher auch Tschechien auf dem Transformationspfad zu einer technologisch modernen, klimasicheren und nachhaltigen Energieerzeugung vor vielen Herausforderungen. So müssen beide Länder noch Teile der Bevölkerung von der Notwendigkeit dieser Transformation überzeugen. Nationalkonservative Tendenzen sind dafür der falsche Weg. Fälle wie Turów stoßen allerdings Umdenkprozesse an. Tschechien plant bis 2038 alle Kohlekraftwerke vom Netz zu nehmen und sie durch Wind-, Solar- oder Kernkraftwerke zu ersetzen. Letztere wurden von der EU-Kommission zuletzt als grün eingestuft, nicht alle Expert*innen teilen diese Ansicht. Der schleppende Prozess bedeutet für Anrainer*innen von Kohlekraftwerken dennoch mindestens 15 weitere unsichere Jahre.
Polen zählt zu den zehn größten Kohleproduzenten der Welt. Ein Ausstieg aus der Industrie wird wirtschaftlich nicht einfach, die Anzahl der Beschäftigten in diesem Bereich sinkt aber allmählich. Die Mehrheit der Pol*innen betrachtet den Klimawandel als Gefahr und befürwortet die grüne Transformation. Mit steigendem Wohlstand kommt ein Bedürfnis nach einer sauberen Umwelt. Seit Jahren leidet das Land unter Luftverschmutzung, im Winter ist der Smog oft so schädlich, dass die Einwohner*innen betroffener Regionen eine Warn-SMS bekommen, das Haus nicht zu verlassen, wenn es nicht notwendig ist. Umweltkatastrophen wie das Fischsterben und die Vergiftung des Flusses Betschwa in Mähren 2020 und der Oder in Polen 2022 veranschaulichen den Tschech*innen und Pol*innen, was passiert, wenn Klimawandel auf Verschmutzung trifft. Die Stimmen nach nachhaltiger Veränderung werden also lauter.
Malwina Talik ist Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am IDM sowie freiberufliche Forscherin und Übersetzerin. Davor war sie als Expertin für wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit bei der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften/Wien und Referentin für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bei der Polnischen Botschaft in Wien tätig.
Daniel Martínek M.A. ist Doktorand an der Westböhmischen Universität in Pilsen, Tschechien, und arbeitet als Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am IDM.
President Joe Biden is coming to Poland this week, almost exactly one year after the Russian invasion in Ukraine started. On 21 February Biden was also in Kyiv on a surprise visit, for which he used Rzeszów in Poland to transfer to Ukraine. But the visit, despite being symbolic, has some domestic and regional implications.
According to the information available today, in Poland President Biden (POTUS) will hold bilateral talks with the leaders of the ruling camp (including the Polish President, Andrzej Duda), make a public address to the Poles (at the symbolic place near the Royal Castle in Warsaw), and take part in the meeting of the so-called Bucharest Nine, a group of nine NATO countries in Eastern Europe. Just as it happened on 26 March 2022, the upcoming visit will focus on security issues, and its underlying theme will be the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Biden will be the first US president to visit Poland again in less than a year after the previous one, although Barack Obama visited Poland three times: in 2011, 2014, and 2016. Poland was chosen as a destination for the POTUS visit because it has become a hub for international support for Ukraine. Nowadays Poland is a territory through which Western supplies are entering Ukraine, be they humanitarian or military. Moreover, the country is important as it received one of the biggest numbers of refugees (around 950 thousands so far) among EU countries and in the region. Apart from Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are hosting significant numbers of refugees, but they are significantly lower: 432 thousands and 147 thousands respectively.
Poland is also one of the most hawkish countries in Europe as regards Russia on the international stage. It has proposed far reaching sanctions and other measures that NATO/EU allies could implement (such as the transfer of MIG-29s). Along with the Baltic republics, Poland was also one of the biggest and most active proponents of the EU membership candidate status for Ukraine.
The visit is not free from certain controversies, however. Many Poles as well as commentators in the West do not like the fact that Biden will probably strategically turn a blind eye to the policies of Poland’s ruling government that deteriorate the rule of law and democracy at home. The visit will strengthen the image of PiS as a party that has a special relationship with the US, while the country positions itself on the margins of the EU. In fact, Mr Biden once criticised Poland, listing it alongside Belarus and Hungary as examples of “the rise of totalitarian regimes in the world.” By contrast, ahead of Mr Biden’s visit, White House spokesman John Kirby rightly applauded Warsaw for being “a strident ally and a tremendous supporter of Ukraine.”
In short, the PiS government will be able to present themselves as those who improved Poland’s position in the alliance, and this in turn would play in the government’s favour during the election year. It is important for the PiS government to present the relations with the US as better than ever before because the politicians of the Polish right want to be seen by the domestic audience as world leaders. President Biden’s second visit to Poland in less than a year will only strengthen this view.
In the region, Poland is already perceived as a country that has a leading role in supporting Ukraine. Moreover, while Poland perceives itself as a natural leader in Central Europe, this is not the view of countries like the Czech Republic or the Baltic States. The backsliding of democracy at home does not strengthen Warsaw’s role in the region.
One of the important platforms for regional cooperation – the Visegrad Group – is already struggling to speak with a coherent voice on a Ukraine policy as Hungarian policy has drifted away from Polish, Czech and Slovak approaches. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are also distancing themselves from Hungary and Poland at the EU level, and are more and more interested in engaging with Austria in the Slavkov/Austerliz format. Warsaw is also a supporter of the Three Seas Initiative, a platform of cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by the US, but which is not so popular, for example in Slovakia. The only platform through which Poland can showcase its leadership is the Bucharest Nine, which became the vehicle of regional governments to demonstrate their interest in helping Ukraine. We should not expect many changes in internal dynamics in this grouping given President Biden’s presence in Warsaw. But without Warsaw reversing the backsliding of the rule of law and democracy at home, Poland will not be seen by other countries in the region as a “leader” in Central Europe.
In a public speech, Biden intends to express his thanks to Polish society for the universal, direct support for refugees and humanitarian aid sent to Ukraine. This is, of course, a praiseworthy attitude, but it is rather the society itself that should be credited for extending a helping hand to Ukrainians. The Polish government’s record is more mixed in this respect. Recognition from the US president will allow the authorities to dismiss accusations of inhumane treatment of migrants on the border with Belarus.
When it comes to the region, President Biden’s visit to Warsaw underlines that fact that NATO’s eastern flank has finally found its voice as it proved to be right about Russia’s intention towards Ukraine in the past. However, as Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský told Politico, Western countries are still “much stronger” on the economic and military front” and they have the financial capacity to help Ukraine.
In short, this visit is important and symbolic but fraught with national and regional sensitivities.
The Czech Republic has elected a new president! A former general Petr Pavel won a landslide victory over former Czech prime minister Andrej Babis. In the newest Short Insight, shot in Prague, our colleague Daniel Martinek explains why this election brought many surprises and what it means to Czechia and the EU.
Die Tschech*innen wählen einen neuen Präsidenten. Daniel Martínek analysiert für Eastblog und DerStandard die Situation vor der Wahl und untersucht die aussichtsreichsten Kandidat*innen und ihre Chancen, das Präsidentenamt zu gewinnen.
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