The Sticking Points: A Toxic Relationship with Fossil Fuels in the EU Candidate Countries?

By Rebecca Thorne (IDM)

At the beginning of February, the European Commission backed a plan for a 90% reduction in emissions by 2040. This is intended as a stepping stone towards the already existing goal of climate neutrality in Europe by 2050. The plan will affect not only the EU member states, but also the countries hoping to join the club in the future as they gradually align their policies with EU rules. These countries are among the most vulnerable in Europe to the effects of climate change, despite lower-than-average emissions and high rates of energy poverty. Yet economic development is too often related to fossil fuel consumption.  

In view of their geographical, economic, and political situations, the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine face specific challenges in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Except for Albania, the region has inherited energy infrastructure from its respective Yugoslav and Soviet legacies that favoured imports from Russia, with the energy sectors themselves remaining largely state-owned. Furthermore, the Western Balkans also face the specific challenge that much of their energy infrastructure was damaged during Yugoslavia’s wars. In Ukraine, this damage is today an ongoing reality. To accelerate the reforms that would ensure affordable, sustainable and secure energy, the region has subscribed to the Energy Community Treaty, which aims to establish an integrated regional energy market compatible with the EU. 

The first step in the transition is to phase out coal. Both the Western Balkans and Ukraine continue to mine and generate power from lignite, with Kosovo depending on coal for as much as 95% of its power generation. In addition to emitting carbon dioxide, coal power plants release sulphur dioxide: in the Western Balkans, these emissions breach Energy Community Treaty limits and are responsible for severe health problems and premature deaths. North Macedonia has now pledged to phase out coal by 2027, yet Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo have not made such a commitment. Moreover, in their draft updated national energy and climate plans (NECP), all three countries fail to adequately consider the steps required for a just transition, such as a re-skilling of the workforce and the creation of new green jobs. 

Crude oil, too, is still widely used in the EU neighbourhood, especially in the form of diesel and petrol for transport, but also in plastics, clothing, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. Oil’s share of the total energy supply ranged from 17% in Ukraine (2021) to almost half in Albania (2022). While there are oil terminals and/or refineries in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine, there is very limited oil extraction in the region, which means the reliance on imports makes the economies vulnerable to price fluctuation and geopolitical security issues. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only 3% of oil and oil products came from Russia. 

Gas is widely considered to be a transition fuel in the process of phasing out fossil fuels, with the effective labelling of “natural gas” encouraging the perception that it is not as harmful as other fossil fuels. While it emits less carbon on combustion compared to coal, its distribution nonetheless releases the potent greenhouse gas methane. The International Energy Agency recognizes the limited role that gas can play in the transition process, asserting in their latest Net Zero Roadmap that no new coal, oil or gas projects are needed. 

Yet the EU and the US are still backing new gas infrastructure projects in the EU neighbourhood. The motivation to build new pipelines stems in part from the geopolitical objective to reduce dependency on Russian imports and instead source fuel from elsewhere. As part of this strategy, the initiative REPowerEU has provided financial investment for new LNG terminals as well as oil and gas pipelines. Notably, Moldova is no longer receiving any gas from Russia due to the new Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which connects Romania and Moldova. The EU and the US are now encouraging the construction of a pipeline between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to diversify the latter’s gas supply, which is currently only receiving Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline in Serbia. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina, like most of the Western Balkans, already uses so little gas that it would be counter-productive to increase its dependency when Europe has simultaneously committed to do the exact opposite. Moreover, this infrastructure is designed to last decades, long beyond the point when Europe plans to be entirely carbon neutral.  

Critical to the persistence of the fossil fuel industry are the available finances, with many European banks as well as EU initiatives still funding new and existing oil and gas projects. As these international financial institutions are among the biggest lenders to energy companies, their continued monetary support for the extraction, processing, storage and distribution of fossil fuels is a major obstacle to the green transition. Moreover, the economies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Ukraine, which all have high-energy industries such as the production of aluminium, steel, and fertilizers are especially vulnerable to the temptation of maintaining market dynamics by continuing to use fossil fuels.  

To redirect the flow of investments, it is crucial that national governments in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine reduce financial uncertainty by fostering trust and setting clear climate policy signals. Likewise, allowing independent scientific research can guide climate change mitigation efforts. Yet corrupt and autocratic leaders are often reluctant to regulate the fossil fuel industry, reduce greenhouse gas emissions or invest in renewable energy because their pockets are being lined and their political careers bolstered by profits in the industry, as well as by foreign investors from countries such as China. With upcoming elections across the Danube region, voters must therefore use their democratic rights to push back against the rising trend of authoritarianism and urge governments to prioritise the climate. 

Likewise, policies and decisions made at EU level play a key role in the speed of the energy transition across Europe, meaning that poor decision-making at institutional level could take the EU candidate countries along the wrong trajectory and increase their dependency on fossil fuels rather than decreasing it. Yet high-level support for green policies that would reduce the consumption of fossil energy is wavering. While the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has been championing the green transition, she has been facing opposition from her party members, who oppose a ban on combustion engines and are wary of farmers’ discontent if CO2 emissions are taxed. Ahead of the EU elections in June 2024, European parties across the board are trying to win public favour by speaking out against climate-friendly policies that may initially cost the consumer more. Even von der Leyen is gradually giving in to electoral pressure, putting not only the Green Deal, but also her green legacy on the line for the sake of a second term. The next presidency will decide how seriously the EU institutions will take the fight against climate change.  

In Europe’s energy transition, it’s not just oil that is sticky. Transitioning away from coal and gas will be challenging, requiring clear policies at national and EU level, comprehensive legislation, and responsible investments. If Europe wants to achieve a 90% reduction in emissions by 2040, the money that is currently being invested in fossil fuels should be better invested in improving energy efficiency and developing renewable energy, with national and international oil and gas companies as well as financial institutions urged to join the race in speeding up the transition. In doing so, the economic development and integration of the EU’s candidate countries can be accompanied and supported by clean and sustainable energy. 

 

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How likely is Armenia to join the EU?

Experts comment for ED News on a possible membership application from Yerevan, among them IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer.

You can read the whole article here.

The article is also available in Azerbaijani.

Call For Papers – Material Turn and European War Experience in XX / XXI Century

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

States (and other institutional and non-institutional actors) utilize various methods to commemorate their involvement in past armed conflicts. These can include constructing monuments, establishing war cemeteries, naming streets and squares, organizing national holidays, and controlling the portrayal of such events in school textbooks, films, and other media. In some cases, non-democratic governments (or other agents) may seek to shape the collective memory of such conflicts to align with their political agenda, potentially undermining the voices of civil society and grassroots initiatives that seek to present alternative perspectives on war and experiences of violence. Russia is a notable example of a country frequently accused of manipulating the memory of past conflicts. Additionally, over time, the collective memory of war is bound to evolve as new generations emerge, new findings come to light, and new stories about the past are woven.

The conference aims to provide a fresh perspective on war research and European experiences within the context of the development of memory policies, with a particular focus on materiality. For obvious reasons, we would like to devote much attention to the wars in Ukraine. Distinguished researchers from various disciplines, including history, art, anthropology, sociology, literary and cultural studies, will delve into the constructs and practices of memory policies that have undergone significant changes in recent years. We encourage contributions that touch upon the following streams:

“Memory and Materiality”, including:

  • the reconstruction of memory spaces (practice and theory),
  • new definitions of material space in memory studies and memory politics,
  • the role of the material in places of memory, such as exhibitions, cemeteries, and others,
  • boundaries between the material and the spiritual, thinking and action in memory studies,

“Memory transformation/evolution”, including:

  • transformation of memory, memory practices and memory policies, not only in academia and politics but also in art and literature,
  • images/accounts of conflicts and violence in textbooks or their visualization in art and cinematography,

“Memory production: Top-down or bottom-up?”, including:

  • grassroots/societal war memory in totalitarian countries,
  • alternative narratives about civil wars in multinational states,
  • techniques of manipulating war memory and related events.

Memory in art and culture, including:

  • visual representation of war experiences,
  • artistic engagement with war experiences,
  • art during War,
  • art as a form of protest,
  • art as a tool of memory politics / as an alternative to official memory politics

TIMELINE AND SUBMISSIONS

All are invited to submit a paper abstract (maximum 1000 words) by the 30th of April 2024. Selected speakers will be contacted by the 15th of May and will need to confirm their participation by the 20th of May 2024.

Please send your abstract via email to office@vienna.pan.pl and include your name and affiliation in the email. Selected speakers will need to submit a short bio.

ACCOMODATION AND TRAVEL

The organisers look forward to the upcoming event in Vienna and hope all the speakers can attend in person. However, depending on the circumstances, some presentations could be delivered online.

Please note that invited speakers will be responsible for their transport to and from Vienna. If needed, invited speakers will have their travel expenses reimbursed up to a sum of 150 EUR, and modest, free of charge accommodation will be provided by the Polish Academy of Sciences – Scientific Centre in Vienna (Boerhaavegasse 25, 1030 Vienna, Austria). Please let us know in advanced, if you will require travel cost reimbursment and accomodation to participate.

Inquiries can be made by e-mail to marcin.kaim@vienna.pan.pl

 

Download the Call For Papers – Material Turn as PDF

Neue Auslandsschule in Moldau nach Erhard Busek genannt

Als IDM freuen wir uns darüber, dass eine „Österreichische Schule Moldau“ nach Dr. Erhard Busek, dem ehemaligen Vizekanzler und bis zu seinem Todestag Vorsitzenden des IDM, benannt wurde.

Wie aus der APA-Meldung hervorgeht:

„Es ist mir eine Freude zu verkünden, dass wir sie nach Erhard Busek, einem ehemaligen Vizekanzler und Bundesminister für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung sowie begeisterten und überzeugten Europäer benennen werden,“

so Bildungsminister Martin Polaschek.

Mehr Informationen.

Vor 100 Jahren in der Zukunft von Sebastian Schäffer

Eine Sirene schrillt plötzlich und ein Banner erscheint auf dem Handydisplay: „Air alert! There is air alert in Kyiv. Proceed to shelter!“ Es ist nicht der erste Alarm an diesem Tag. Zwei Personen sitzen im April 2023 in einer Mikrobrauerei am Andreassteig in Kyjiw und fragen sich, was sie jetzt machen sollen. „Bier bestellen?“ – „Ok.“ So beginnt der Bericht, den Sebastian Schäffer, Direktor des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM), in einer interaktiven Story Map veröffentlicht hat. Anlässlich der regionalen Initiativen im Rahmen des 70-jährigen Jubiläums des IDM war er in die Ukraine gereist. „Vor 100 Jahren in der Zukunft“ erscheint nun in adaptierter und textlich erweiterter Form als Buch.

Story.one

Is there a lesson to be learnt from Tucker Carlson’s interview with Vladimir Putin?

By Jack Gill

The geopolitical tectonic plates of Europe have shifted much over the last two years. Since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, relations between Russia and the rest of Europe have been nought. But a recent interview by Tucker Carlson, the American conservative media personality, has shed new light on the Russian dictator’s mindset and, contrary to what some believed would embolden the European and American right’s growing respect for Vladimir Putin, has instead exposed Putin’s ideology-driven and manipulative tactics, which he uses to obscure the fact that he has no viable exit strategy from the situation into which he has dragged himself and his 143 million fellow Russians. 

He began at the beginning. For nearly half an hour, Putin gave Carlson a lecture on Russian history, from the ninth century until 2022. With his narrative grounded in the common ancestor state of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Kievan Rus’, Putin believes that borders, in the traditional sense, do not apply in the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World). Instead, the East Slavic peoples, rather than existing as three independent sovereign states in the modern sense, supposedly belong to a civilizational spectrum that begins at the Polish border and ends at Vladivostok, in which everything should be controlled by the Kremlin in the name of the Russian nation. Troublingly similar to Adolf Hitler’s narrative on the unity of Germanic peoples under one ‘Reich’ ruled from Berlin, Putin’s ethnicity-based vision for a greater ‘Rus’ is a pipedream, which falls apart under deeper scrutiny.  

Putin’s narrative collapses when he explains his ‘denazification’ policy and uses it to justify the invasion of Ukraine. One can see in the interview that Putin himself does not seriously believe in this policy, and he struggles to describe it coherently. When Carlson asks Putin about Nazism in Ukraine, the only example Putin can give is the standing ovation given unwittingly by the Canadian Parliament, with Zelensky present, to an elderly Ukrainian man who had served in the Waffen SS during the Second World War. Of course, nobody knew during the event that he had served in the SS, and once it was revealed Canada was quick to repent for the embarrassing episode. Zelensky had certainly been unaware.  

But with such authoritarian manipulators, it’s just a plot point. Putin does not really believe that Ukraine is full of neo-Nazis, and nor, likely, does much of the rest of the Russian population. But as long as he keeps saying it, he can use it against Ukraine to delegitimise the existence of the state, justify its overthrow and glorify the Russian soldiers doing so as heroes, harking back to the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany.  

Putin’s greatest ally, and the West’s greatest challenge, is time. Like all of his conflicts over the last two decades, from Georgia in 2008 to Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022, Putin will ride out the storm as growing indifference replaces anger in public and political opinion in the West. He need only wait until Donald Trump enters the White House again in 2024, at which point the unconditional support for Ukraine will likely run out and pressure to negotiate will grow. Negotiations under such conditions would not be favourable for Ukraine. Ironically, Trump, the author of The Art of the Deal, may even volunteer to lead the negotiations himself.   

At that point, with the war over and Russia’s military resources significantly depleted, the dictator would likely focus his attention inwards, on ridding all political opponents and bringing on a societal ‘Russian Winter’. The recent murder of Alexei Navalny, Putin’s largest political opponent and critic within Russia, in an Arctic hellhole prison was as symbolic as it was terrifying. As a message to warn off anyone else inclined to challenge him, nothing could be more effective.   

Are there any lessons to be learnt from the interview? Yes, one. Based on the interview, we can see the huge strategic importance of narratives, and how they can be weaponised to justify the invasion of other countries. When Tucker asked Putin about his strategy towards the West, Putin stated that when he came to office in 2000, he asked then-US President Bill Clinton, hypothetically but seriously, what would happen if Russia wanted to join NATO. Clinton said he would speak to his advisers and get back to him. The answer was a firm ‘no’ as Russia failed to meet the fundamental entry requirements of NATO, such as “uphold[ing] democracy”, “making progress toward a market economy”, having military forces “under firm civilian control”, “be[ing] good neighbors and respecting sovereignty outside their borders”, and “working toward compatibility with NATO forces.”1 

Thenceforth Russia became a partner of NATO, but never with a membership perspective. And although a framework for cooperation was created over the following years, namely the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, this did not succeed in preventing Russia from becoming a revisionist power or channelling the country onto some kind of Western path.  

Putin uses his narrative of Russia’s victimisation by NATO, as well as Ukraine’s supposed ‘rule by neo-Nazis’ and rightful place in the ‘Russian World’ to justify his violent actions. The use of such a narrative by a major power must ultimately fail if the rules-based order of international sovereignty is to prevail. Western countries should thus be aware that their perceived ‘denial’ of some countries to enter the EU or NATO can be spun into victimisation narratives, which, however wrongfully, can be used as leverage in international politics. 

The opinions expressed in this article represent the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDM.

Erfolgreiche Teilnahme am BGF Projekt: IDM erhält 2024-2026 Gütesiegel

Das IDM hat von April 2022 – Mai 2023 am BGF Projekt (Betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung) teilgenommen. Hierbei konnten einige Ideen, welche die Gesundheit und das soziale Miteinander unserer Mitarbeiter*innen fördern, erfolgreich umgesetzt werden. Am 28. Februar 2024 wurde dem IDM bei einem feierlichen Festakt das BGF Gütesiegel 2024 – 2026 verliehen und von unserer Kollegin Astrid Strahodinsky entgegen genommen. Insgesamt wurden 49 Betriebe mit dem BGF Gütesiegel ausgezeichnet.

IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer at DW News on the situation in Transnistria

On 28 February 2024, a congress in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria asked Moscow for support. A day later, the Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses the Federal Assembly, fuelling speculations over a response or even recognition from the Kremlin. Before the speech, IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer spoke with DW News and stated that he is not very concerned about a possible development on the ground, as this would currently be impossible from a logistical point of view. As the Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated during an interview at a summit held in Albania yesterday, “Moldova is safe today, thanks to the bravery of the Ukrainian soldiers”. If the overall situation changes, this could also have implications for Chișinău. Nevertheless, despite the historic sentiment in Transnistria towards the Soviet Union as well as the Russian language, economic factors should also be taken into account, Schäffer stated. Over the past decade, more goods are exported to the EU than to the Russian Federation. In the medium term, dependency on gas and electricity supply – which is still vital for Moldova coming mainly through the Transnistrian region – will also be alleviated due to countermeasures imposed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Vigilance is required, but fear of an escalation is still premature according to the IDM Director.

Steht Transnistrien vor einem „Russland-Anschluss“? Nicht wirklich. Ein Expertenkommentar.

Steht Transnistrien vor einem „Russland-Anschluss“? Nicht wirklich. Ein Expertenkommentar. 

Sebastian Schäffer

“Russland-Anschluss: Transnistrien plant laut Bericht Votum” titelt orf.at am 23. Februar 2024. Andere deutschsprachige Medien nutzen ähnliche Schlagzeilen. Diese basieren auf einer Warnung, die das US-amerikanische Institute for the Study of War (ISW) auf einem Social-Media-Kanal angesichts einer Einberufung des Abgeordnetenkongresses in Transnistrien veröffentlicht hat. Das ist zunächst schon aufgrund der aktuellen geopolitischen Lage in der Region durchaus eine Meldung wert, zumal es in Österreich sonst relativ selten Nachrichten zur Republik Moldau gibt. Transnistrien ist eine abtrünnige Provinz dieses Landes, das beharrlich insbesondere in den österreichischen Medien immer noch als Moldawien bezeichnet wird. Insgesamt wäre ein wenig mehr Kontext notwendig. Wenn man so will, sind sowohl die Bezeichnung, als auch die Meldung veraltet, Nachrichten von gestern sozusagen. Moldawien ist eine Übersetzung aus dem Russischen; die offizielle Bezeichnung ist Moldau, weil das aber verwirrend sein kann wegen des tschechischen Flusses, wird dem Namen Republik vorangestellt. Oder man nutzt eben die rumänische Bezeichnung Moldova.  

Zurück zum eigentlichen Thema: Die Einberufung eines Abgeordnetenkongresses durch Separatistenführer Wadim Krasnoselski in Tiraspol, der Hauptstadt der abtrünnigen Provinz Transnistrien, ist durchaus außergewöhnlich, denn der letzte dieser Art fand 2006 statt. Allerdings wurde bereits vor 18 Jahren ein Unabhängigkeitsreferendum beschlossen und anschließend sogar durchgeführt. Laut eigenen Angaben beteiligten sich damals 78 Prozent der stimmberechtigten Personen in der Region, von denen fast alle (angeblich mehr als 97 Prozent) für eine Eigenständigkeit sowie eine spätere Eingliederung in die Russische Föderation votierten 

Bis heute hat der Kreml Transnistrien nicht anerkannt, die zeitliche Nähe von Putins Rede zur Lage der Nation vor der Föderalen Versammlung am 29. Februar – der Abgeordnetenkongress findet einen Tag zuvor am 28. Februar statt – lädt jedoch zu Spekulationen ein. Es würde ja durchaus in das Playbook des russischen Präsidenten passen. Aber dann auch eben wieder nicht. Eigentlich sollten wir inzwischen gelernt haben, dabei nicht mitzuspielen. Ziemlich genau vor einem Jahr, zum ersten Jahrestag der vollständigen Invasion der Russischen Föderation in der Ukraine, kamen Gerüchte auf, ob Kyjiw (auch hier ist das im Deutschen immer noch häufig benutzte Kiew die Transliteration des russischen Namens für die Stadt) eventuell selbst plant in Transnistrien einzumarschieren.  

Ich erinnere mich noch gut daran, weil ich mit einer ukrainischen Kollegin nur ein paar Wochen zuvor über die völkerrechtlichen Implikationen gesprochen hatte, die eine hypothetische Einladung Chişinăus an die Ukraine hätte, Transnistrien von der dort noch mit rund 1500 Soldat*innen präsenten russische Armee zu befreien. Die aktuellen Meldungen bezüglich einer möglichen Annexion der abtrünnigen Provinz in der Republik Moldau durch Moskau erschienen mir vor ein paar Tagen bereits unrealistisch. Am 27. Februar veröffentlichte auch das ISW in Berufung auf transnistrische Quellen in einem unabhängigen russischen Onlinemedium, dass der Volkskongress nicht um eine Eingliederung in die Russische Föderation bitten wird 

Natürlich kann es nicht vollkommen ausgeschlossen werden, dass heute oder auch zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ein solcher Schritt unternommen werden wird. Allerdings gilt es hier eben abzuwägen, wie wahrscheinlich dies sein kann sowie welche Herausforderungen bestehen – politisch, wirtschaftlich aber hier und jetzt insbesondere logistisch. Die Desinformation aus dem Kreml ist und bleibt Teil der hybriden Kriegsführung. 

Sowohl die Regierung in Chişinău, als auch meine Kontakte in der Republik Moldau bleiben jedenfalls relativ gelassen den Gerüchten gegenüber. Das bedeutet nicht, dass man sich nicht auf mögliche Szenarien vorbereitet und sich der Gefahr nicht durchaus bewusst ist. Wie schon vor einem Jahr, als Gerüchte über einen Coup in der Republik Moldau aufkamen, gilt es, wachsam zu bleiben.   

Ich rechne jedenfalls nach der „Wiederwahl“ Putins im März und vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Republik Moldau im Herbst mit weitaus mehr Bemühungen von Seiten Moskaus das Land zu destabilisieren. Ein Einfluss auf ein mögliches Referendum zum EU-Beitritt und/oder auf die Parlamentswahl in Chişinău 2025 halte ich für wesentlich wahrscheinlicher und auch mit weniger Kosten verbunden – nicht nur finanzieller Art. Als Alternative zur amtierenden Präsidentin Maia Sandu bringt sich jedenfalls schon Irina Vlah in Stellung, die von 2015 bis 2023 Regierungschefin – genannt Başkan – im autonomen Gebiet Gagausien in der Republik Moldau war. Offiziell war sie auch damals schon als unabhängige Kandidatin angetreten, wurde aber durch die prorussische Sozialistische Partei unterstützt, deren Vorsitzender Igor Dodon ist, der Vorgänger von Sandu.  

Es ist spannend und erst recht kompliziert. Wir bleiben dran! 

IDM Short Insights 32: Dilemma of simultaneity 2.0

At the second edition of Cafe Kyiv organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer presented his book „Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe“ and engaged in a panel discussion on the „dilemma of simultaneity 2.0“, the need to reform the enlargement process of the EU, the need to reform institutionally, and the need to fulfil the promise of a geopolitical union – all under the current geopolitical circumstances. Schäffer also argues that – apart from the necessary military support on the ground – there is also a need to foster the support of civil society in order to avoid letting populists divide us. This is going to be a crucial point for the upcoming European parliamentary elections, as it will not only decide the future of the European Union, it will also decide the future of Ukraine.

Transcript:

I am currently in Berlin at the second edition of Cafe Kyiv, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, where many different partners have the possibility to present their work in, on and with Ukraine.

I had the pleasure to speak at a book panel where I also talked about what I call the dilemma of Simultaneity 2.0, because other than after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the challenge that was there in Central and Eastern Europe to simultaneously develop not only politically but also societally up to state-building processes, all of which Ukraine has already mastered, this dilemma of simultaneity is rather referring to the European Union.

We need a reform of the enlargement process, we need an institutional reform and we need to finally get ready to fulfill the promise of a geopolitical union, all at the same time under the current geopolitical circumstances, which means we should no longer use the excuse that we need a reform before we can enlarge to prolong this process, because the promise that we’ve been given to the Western Balkan countries is now of legal drinking age in the United States, as it was given 21 years ago.

What we need to do, apart from the necessary military support on the ground, we also need to foster the support of the civil society and foster the understanding for the civil societies in the EU member countries, because we must not, populists, divide us and this is going to be a crucial point for the upcoming European parliamentary elections, because it does not only decide about the future of the European Union, it will also decide about the future of the country.