IDM Short Insights 22: Controversies over the sanctioned Russian delegates visiting Vienna

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It has been nearly a year since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine inflicting immense suffering to the civilian population, violating international law and challenging international security architecture. Despite sanctions and a visa ban, the Russian delegation will attend the  Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on 23 and 24 February in Vienna. Sebastian Schäffer, IDM’s Managing Director, sums up the controversy around it in the newest Short Insight. 

 

This might be of inerest to you:  

Four Challenges Facing a Ukrainian-Russian Truce. Part I: The Constitutional Impasse, by Andreas Umland

Opinion: Burning bridges? by Sebastian Schäffer


Transcript of the Short Insight: 

One year ago, the world watched in horror as the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, causing a trail of destruction and countless lives lost. The invasion was a clear violation of international law and an affront to the principles of peace and sovereignty. The war has also taken a toll on the wider global community, heightening tensions and threatening international security.  

Peace in Europe is something that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should provide, yet has failed to do so. It is a very unfortunate coincidence that the winter conference of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is taking place on 23rd and 24th February and that the delegation from Moscow will be able to travel to Vienna despite the visa ban issued against the Russian parliamentarians. However, also in past years this conference was organized around these dates and there is an obligation to allow participation, as Vienna is the official seat of the OSCE. Otherwise, Austria would be violating international law, and this might have further ramifications, since the capital is home to other international organisations.   

Also, dialogue is a good thing, right? Well certainly, but already before the unjustified attack on Ukraine and all the heinous atrocities committed by the Russian regime, at the OSCE there was merely the statement of the different points of views rather than trying to work on common ground. It is also unclear how a negotiation between Kyiv and the Kremlin would look like given that the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine not only violates international law, but also creates a constitutional deadlock, as neither party could cease claims on these territories.

Therefore, the decision of the Ukrainian delegation to not participate in the meeting is understandable. What is incomprehensible, though, is the alleged invitation of the Russian delegation to attend a ball, something forbidden by their very limited visas, as Austrian authorities have stated. Clearly, some people are still willing to bow before a president who has not only destroyed the security architecture in Europe, but numerous lives on delusional claims.  

 

The Implications of President Joe Biden’s Visit to Warsaw: national and regional perspectives  

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President Joe Biden is coming to Poland this week, almost exactly one year after the Russian invasion in Ukraine started. On 21 February Biden was also in Kyiv on a surprise visit, for which he used Rzeszów in Poland to transfer to Ukraine. But the visit, despite being symbolic, has some domestic and regional implications. 

 

According to the information available today, in Poland President Biden (POTUS) will hold bilateral talks with the leaders of the ruling camp (including the Polish President, Andrzej Duda), make a public address to the Poles (at the symbolic place near the Royal Castle in Warsaw), and take part in the meeting of the so-called Bucharest Nine, a group of nine NATO countries in Eastern Europe. Just as it happened on 26 March 2022, the upcoming visit will focus on security issues, and its underlying theme will be the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

 

Biden will be the first US president to visit Poland again in less than a year after the previous one, although Barack Obama visited Poland three times: in 2011, 2014, and 2016. Poland was chosen as a destination for the POTUS visit because it has become a hub for international support for Ukraine. Nowadays Poland is a territory through which Western supplies are entering Ukraine, be they humanitarian or military. Moreover, the country is important as it received one of the biggest numbers of refugees (around 950 thousands so far) among EU countries and in the region. Apart from Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are hosting significant numbers of refugees, but they are significantly lower: 432 thousands and 147 thousands respectively. 

 

Poland is also one of the most hawkish countries in Europe as regards Russia on the international stage. It has proposed far reaching sanctions and other measures that NATO/EU allies could implement (such as the transfer of MIG-29s). Along with the Baltic republics, Poland was also one of the biggest and most active proponents of the EU membership candidate status for Ukraine.  

 

The visit is not free from certain controversies, however. Many Poles as well as commentators in the West do not like the fact that Biden will probably strategically turn a blind eye to the policies of Poland’s ruling government that deteriorate the rule of law and democracy at home. The visit will strengthen the image of PiS as a party that has a special relationship with the US, while the country positions itself on the margins of the EU. In fact, Mr Biden once criticised Poland, listing it alongside Belarus and Hungary as examples of “the rise of totalitarian regimes in the world.” By contrast, ahead of Mr Biden’s visit, White House spokesman John Kirby rightly applauded Warsaw for being “a strident ally and a tremendous supporter of Ukraine.”  

 

In short, the PiS government will be able to present themselves as those who improved Poland’s position in the alliance, and this in turn would play in the government’s favour during the election year. It is important for the PiS government to present the relations with the US as better than ever before because the politicians of the Polish right want to be seen by the domestic audience as world leaders. President Biden’s second visit to Poland in less than a year will only strengthen this view. 

 

In the region, Poland is already perceived as a country that has a leading role in supporting Ukraine. Moreover, while Poland perceives itself as a natural leader in Central Europe, this is not the view of countries like the Czech Republic or the Baltic States. The backsliding of democracy at home does not strengthen Warsaw’s role in the region.  

 

One of the important platforms for regional cooperation – the Visegrad Group – is already struggling to speak with a coherent voice on a Ukraine policy as Hungarian policy has drifted away from Polish, Czech and Slovak approaches. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are also distancing themselves from Hungary and Poland at the EU level, and are more and more interested in engaging with Austria in the Slavkov/Austerliz format. Warsaw is also a supporter of the Three Seas Initiative, a platform of cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by the US, but which is not so popular, for example in Slovakia. The only platform through which Poland can showcase its leadership is the Bucharest Nine, which became the vehicle of regional governments to demonstrate their interest in helping Ukraine. We should not expect many changes in internal dynamics in this grouping given President Biden’s presence in Warsaw. But without Warsaw reversing the backsliding of the rule of law and democracy at home, Poland will not be seen by other countries in the region as a “leader” in Central Europe. 

 

In a public speech, Biden intends to express his thanks to Polish society for the universal, direct support for refugees and humanitarian aid sent to Ukraine. This is, of course, a praiseworthy attitude, but it is rather the society itself that should be credited for extending a helping hand to Ukrainians. The Polish government’s record is more mixed in this respect. Recognition from the US president will allow the authorities to dismiss accusations of inhumane treatment of migrants on the border with Belarus.  

 

When it comes to the region, President Biden’s visit to Warsaw underlines that fact that NATO’s eastern flank has finally found its voice as it proved to be right about Russia’s intention towards Ukraine in the past. However, as Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský told Politico, Western countries are still “much stronger” on the economic and military front” and they have the financial capacity to help Ukraine.  

 

In short, this visit is important and symbolic but fraught with national and regional sensitivities. 

“Nuremberg II” – an International Tribunal for the Trial of Russian “Major War Criminals”

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In his guest contribution, Winfried Schneiders-Deters, an author living in Germany and Ukraine and former head of national and regional projects of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, explains what instruments would be available to prosecute the Russian war crimes, what steps for a “Nuremberg II” had to be made and whether Vladimir Putin could be brought to justice at all.

You can fins the complete contribution English (49 pages) here. A short version in German in available here.

Sebastian Schäffer on coup plot accusations against Russia for Deutsche Welle

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Moldova’s authorities claim that foreign saboteurs have planned to stage a coup in the country, Russia refute the allegations. Sebastian Schäffer commented on these growing tensions for Deutsche Welle: 

“What the Moldovan president, Maia Sandu, said, that the country and its citizens should have a maximum vigilance is the right call, because I don’t believe, even if it’s heavily denied by Lavrov and the likes, that there is nothing going on.” 

Watch the whole interview here.

A Trip Down Woodstock Road

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It’s very early and freezing cold when I start my trip to the Vienna Airport. I’m taking the first flight to London, so I can make it in time for the Russian and East European Studies Discussion Group at the University of Oxford. Anna J. Davis has invited me to talk about my latest book “Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe”, and also the IDM. From Gatwick I take a direct bus to Gloucester Green and have now three hours almost for myself. Spoilt by Austrian mobile internet, cross-country trips in other European states give you involuntary digital detox. Or is it maybe Brexit slowing down roaming for EU member networks? Anyway, I use the opportunity to also work on my pile of fiction books that I haven’t read yet. I’ve forgotten why I picked William Boyd’s “Waiting for Sunrise”, or how I came across it. Maybe because it is set in Vienna. But while I am on my way to Woodstock Road, where St. Antony’s College is located, I read this: 

While I walk past the mentioned place, my phone alerts me that the Moldovan government has just stepped down. I can’t really grasp it, too many things happening at the same time. A cabinet reshuffle had been rumoured, but why would the whole cabinet resign? A question we’re also debating during my input for the discussion. The room is located in the old part of St. Antonys’s – the church now functions as the library. A stark contrast to the “owl” standing on the table. The 360-degree camera offers the possibility to participate virtually and still see whoever speaks around the table. We discuss how the idea for the book was developed, the challenges during the compilation as well as how the full-scale invasion has changed the relevance of the content. Austrian neutrality, German hesitancy, and Hungarian reluctance towards supporting Ukraine are debated. We also talk about the IDM, the transition of its mission during the past 70 years, and the importance of a regional think tank. It is over far too quickly, and the diverse and knowledgeable group is a delight to exchange opinions with. I am still processing all the impressions while I am already back in the train towards Paddington Station.  

I meet with a friend in the evening for dinner in London. As a journalist, she writes a lot and we talk about the process. We both perceive it as painful, she gestures slitting her wrists open. Hemingway comes to mind. “There’s nothing to writing. All you do is sit down at a typewriter and bleed”. I would add that sweet release, when something is finished, when it is out there in the world. But it also never ends. Sitting in the Stansted Express, I type these words, thinking about all the things I still haven’t written. But also about how incredibly privileged it is to have the possibility to publish my own thoughts and opinions, as well getting to talk about them with all these interesting people in different settings and countries. For the rest of the journey, I try to finish Boyd. So the list of things I haven’t read gets a little shorter. 

 

Author: Sebastian Schäffer 

 

This event might also be of interest for you:

Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe, roundtable: Changes in Ukrainian foreign policy since February 2022 and perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe

 

“Europe (still) hesitant to provide democracy aid” Kinga Brudzińska for Encompass

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“On the EU level, the war was a catalyst for significant developments in several policy areas, foremost defence and energy. But its impact on democracy support has been so far rather limited.”

writes Kinga Brudzińska (IDM) in her op-ed for Encompass Europe. Read the whole comment and learn more on European support for democracy.

Montenegro at the crossroads to the EU

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In her blog article Darija Benić, IDM’s former trainee, explains the reasons for political instability in the context of approaching presidential elections in Montenegro.

The previous year has seen many unresolved issues in Montenegro, which have deepened its ongoing political crisis, attracting a lot of attention far beyond its borders and challenging its accession to the EU. Despite being one of the youngest countries in the world, Montenegro should not face major obstacles to becoming the next EU Member State. But is that really the case?  

Montenegro declared independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006. After applying for EU membership in 2008, the country started the accession process officially in June 2012. So far, Montenegro has started all 33 of her negotiation chapters and has tentatively finished 3 of the total number. With Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine, Montenegro has also shown that it is 100% aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including all sanctions against Russia. At the same time, however, various EU officials have realized that Montenegro’s accession appears to be stalling. What happened? 

One of the decisive moments that affected the political atmosphere and increased internal tensions was the signing of the “Fundamental Agreement” with the Serbian Orthodox Church in August 2022. It guarantees the Serbian Orthodox Church ownership of churches and monasteries on the territory of Montenegro, which, as the Democratic Party of Socialists stated, is violating the Constitution of Montenegro and will move the country further away from the EU. Relations with Serbia remain challenging but both sides are willing to work toward discussing open issues. Besides addressing the question of Serbian Orthodox Churches in Montenegro, some of the issues also include Montenegro’s accession to the Open Balkan regional initiative (a so-called mini Schengen zone in the Western Balkans), as well as the extradition of Svetozar Marović (the former president of Serbia and Montenegro charged on suspicion of being involved in corruption and smuggling), the ongoing economic crisis, and the attitude towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where Serbia still hasn’t imposed sanctions, although it has condemned the invasion. Another issue, which is closely related to the previous, is membership in the NATO alliance. Montenegro has been a member of the alliance since 2017, but not Serbia, which claims military neutrality. One of the main reasons for this is that the expansion of NATO is fiercely opposed by Russia, from which Serbia has support in the matter of Kosovo, as well as dependence on Russian gas supplies. Kosovo is another point of differing attitudes between Montenegro and Serbia; in 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, which Montenegro was among the first countries to recognize. 

Apart from its relations with Serbia, which had a major impact in the previous period, there are additional issues at the national level in Montenegro that are affecting its path to the EU. Polarization, a lack of productive dialogue between political parties, and a failure to forge consensus on crucial issues of national interest led to the resignation of two turbulent governments. This political unpredictability and instability has affected the proper functioning of Montenegrin institutions. Due to the Parliament’s failure to elect new members and the incomplete composition of the key judicial bodies, the Constitutional Court was unable to fulfill its role as of mid-September because there was no quorum. It has only three judges out of a total of seven, therefore it cannot make decisions on constitutional appeals, which also refer to election processes. Without the final decision of the Constitutional Court, it is not possible to constitute a new government after the election. 

Furthermore, the governments and the parliament have failed to demonstrate in practice their engagement as regards the EU-related reform agenda. In order to secure institutional and political stability, Western allies and the EU have been urging Montenegrin political leaders for months to come to an agreement on unblocking the constitutional court. If the judges are not chosen, the European Union has threatened the possibility of terminating accession negotiations with Montenegro. Given the current situation, this warning could have been anticipated and it is clear that, after 10 years of negotiations, the country has never been faced with such a blockade as it is now at the beginning of 2023. 

Hopes were high after the last election in 2020, where Đukanović and the ruling elite did not openly interfere. The collapse of Europe’s longest consecutive ruling government (the DPS had been in power since 1989) and the democratic change has raised hopes that prosperity is possible after all, but there’s a long way to go. Many believed that Montenegro had finally left behind the regime that did not reflect the reality in this multiethnic country and was only a manipulation particularly designed for the international public. 

 

The presidential elections in Montenegro 

 

The fourth presidential election, since the restoration of independence and the seventh since the introduction of the multiparty system will be held on 19 March. From either side, it is uncertain who exactly will be running for president. There isn’t even a distinct coalition in sight. The fact that there are only two months until the presidential elections and the public is unaware of a single trustworthy candidate on either side is striking. Moreover, it appears that everyone is in some way shocked that the elections are taking place right now. 

In a number of media appearances, the current Montenegrin president, Milo Đukanović, refused to say whether he would run for office again. It is also unknown whether, by the day of the election, Montenegro will have a functional constitutional court, which is necessary for the announcement of the election’s final results. The sixth round of judges’ elections is underway, as the previous five attempts failed due to the impossibility of reaching an agreement between the ruling majority and the opposition. 

Prime Minister Dritan Abazović assessed that the selection of constitutional court judges could be completed at the beginning of February. And the president of the parliament, Danijela Đurović, said that all political actors must show maximum responsibility and contribute in order for the country to emerge from the political and institutional crisis. 

Montenegro has been given the opportunity to once again attempt to stabilize the situation, but with very short deadlines and with everything moving dynamically, we have yet to see how the political elites respond in the upcoming months. What is the way out of this current situation? The priority should be to unblock the constitutional court in order to correct the country’s constant political instability, focus on its long-standing European ambitions, and form a government that can prioritize EU reforms. 

 

Darija Benić– a student in the Master’s program in Planning and Management of Tourist and Cultural Systems at the University of Bari Aldo Boro (Italy) and a former trainee at the IDM ( July to December 2022). She holds a BA degree in Languages and Cultures for Tourism and International Mediation from the same university.

The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Central and East European Support for Democracy in 2022 

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine distracted the Central and East European (CEE) governments from a clear and consistent focus on democracy support in 2022. CEE leaders, like in other parts of Europe, focused more on increasing their own defense budget and capabilities and military aid to Ukraine, rather than boosting their democracy commitments.  

However, the invasion did not alter all aspects of their democracy policy. Quite the opposite; in the Czech Republic, for example, the election of the new president General Petr Pavel and the new government led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala have pushed the country in a direction more supportive of democracy and human rights protection than in previous years. Lithuania was the most vocal European country on the Taiwan issue, opening a trade office in Taipei in November 2022. In protest of China’s “no-limits” friendship with Russia, Estonia and Latvia left the 16+1 initiative, a Beijing-backed forum aimed at boosting relations with East European countries. Finally, once elected, Slovenia’s first ever female president, Nataša Pirc Musar, reiterated her pledge to promote fundamental rights and democracy.  

While the country priorities have not changed for many CEE countries – for example Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova remained important for Poland and the Baltic states, and the Western Balkans for Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia – the war in Ukraine has shifted CEE focus and efforts. The most visible challenge for the democratic movement was observed in Belarus, which suffered from significantly less attention in 2022. Still, Lithuania continued to provide a safe haven for Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and Austria provided €50,000 to a training program for Belarusian civil society. 

Thematic approaches also remained unaffected in 2022. For example, Estonia’s priority was to strengthen democracy and empower local governments in Eastern Partnership countries. Latvia funded new projects on countering disinformation in Moldova; on inclusive human rights education in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; and on capacity building for judicial reform in Ukraine. Media freedom was another issue that received increasing attention, and Austria organized a conference on the safety of journalists. 

To sum up, the security aspects of the strategic landscape on the East European border were diluted but did not undermine CEE democracy commitments in 2022. Moreover, similarly to recent years, while Central and East European states generally increased their democracy funding and were better at quantifying democracy support, its prominence in CEE foreign policy priorities and the scale remains extremely modest. For example, while Poland, the biggest CEE country, allocates €7.5 million in 2022 for the Solidarity Fund PL, a state-funded entity whose activities are dedicated to democracy support, Denmark disburses €266 million to programs classified as “Government and Civil Society – General”. Finally, the illiberal political developments in Hungary and Poland keep sapping CEE’s credibility in providing democracy support and defending human rights abroad. Hungary and Bulgaria remain largely absent among Ukraine’ supporters and democracy promoters. 

These are only a few of the findings of the Annual Review of European Democracy Support in 2022, published by the European Democracy Hub, a joint initiative of Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy that aims to inform debates about policies geared toward upholding democracy internationally.  

To learn more about Central and East European Support for Democracy and about policies, strategies, and initiatives at the level of the European Union (EU) as well as those of its Member States and of non-EU European countries active in democracy support (Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), please visit here 

 

From the IDM, Research Associate Dr Kinga Brudzińska contributed to the report. 

IDM Short Insights 21: Czech Presidential Elections

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The Czech Republic has elected a new president! A former general Petr Pavel won a landslide victory over former Czech prime minister Andrej Babis. In the newest Short Insight, shot in Prague, our colleague Daniel Martinek explains why this election brought many surprises and what it means to Czechia and the EU.

Sebastian Schäffer quoted by Azerbajani media

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Sebastian Schäffer has been recently interviewed by several Azerbajani media. Below you can find quotes from and links to the selected ones: 

On challenges for energy transition:

“One can only imagine what would have been possible if the same ambition had been invested in real alternative sources a couple of years ago”

On the Russian invasion of Ukraine:

“The Kremlin feels very comfortable in its victimhood. According to them it is almost always the failure of everyone else and especially the West that is acting against them”