Malwina Talik on Austria for “Brzmienie świata”

Our colleague Malwina Talik discussed Austrian politics, society, and existing stereotypes on the Polish podcast “Brzmienie świata z lotu Drozda”. The series is produced by Polish journalist Paweł Drozd and covers international topics.

The full episode (in Polish) is available here:

Malwina Talik für Ö1 Mittagsjournal

Im Ö1 Mittagsjournal am 14. September wurde unsere Kollegin Malwina Talik unter der Expert*innen, die beim Thema “Wirtschaftswunder Polen” interviewed wurden.
Weitere Informationen:

Energizing Cross-Border Cooperation in Central Europe

How can Central Europe cooperate most effectively on the energy transition? Michael Stellwag and Rebecca Thorne put the spotlight on CES7 (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). 

In the lead up to the European elections, the continent witnessed a backlash against green policies. The European Green Deal, which was introduced four years ago and outlines the continent’s path to climate neutrality by 2050, came under particular scrutiny. Integral to the Green Deal is the energy transition, including issues such as where the energy resources come from, how power is generated and who can access the final products. 

While the Greens did indeed lose influence in Germany, France and Belgium, they retained their seats in Austria and even gained their first seats in Croatia and Slovenia. Indeed, the seven Central European states of the EU – Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (CES7) – are faced with the tangible effects of climate change, geopolitical instability and economic challenges, which necessarily provokes discussion about the decarbonisation of the energy sectors in the region along with questions of security and affordability. Effective cross-border cooperation is key to solving this conundrum. 

In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the knock-on effects on the prices and supply of energy across Europe, it may appear worthwhile pursuing the goal of self-sufficiency at national level to reduce dependency and the corresponding risk of vulnerability. However, not every country has the capacity to meet all their energy needs through domestic power generation. While some countries possess an abundance of natural energy resources such as wind, water and sun, others run the risk of continuing the detrimental resource exploitation of coal mining. Power generation from coal still dominates the energy landscape of countries with a history of mining, accounting for 44% of the total electricity generation in Czechia and 70% in Poland. Instead of maintaining or even exacerbating this trend, regional cooperation provides alternatives, some of which remain controversial, while others offer clear benefits. 

Diversification and bridge technologies: different approaches 

First of all, cooperation should not come at the cost of security. The region’s historical energy partnership with Russia has highlighted its vulnerability: reducing this dependence is crucial. The EU attempted to enforce immediate diversification by introducing an oil embargo against Russia in 2022. However, the Central European states without a sea border – Austria, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia pushed for an exemption, resulting in the continuation of imports of Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline that runs through Ukraine 

Regarding the gas supply, even though the proportion of Russian pipeline gas in EU imports has fallen from over 40% in 2021 to currently 8% in the EU as a whole, the share in parts of Central Europe remains higher. Austria and Hungary are currently the most dependent on gas from Russia and have fought most intensively against possible EU sanctions. In Austria, the share of Russian gas in the total supply has not fallen significantly since the attack on Ukraine due to a non-transparent long-term supply contract that was extended in 2018 and to which, until recently, not even members of the government had access.  

The response of these states to the energy supply crisis has been different. The four Visegrad states are primarily focusing on diversifying both their oil and gas suppliers in order to reduce their dependence on Russia without significantly reducing their consumption. Poland is using the Baltic Pipe as well as importing more from the USA, while increasing the capacity of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and pipeline infrastructure. Slovakia and Hungary are increasingly sourcing oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with security of supply being a priority – yet it is important to note that a certain amount of imports from these countries comes from Russia anyway. Czechia is also making efforts to diversify as well as focusing on energy efficiency measures. 

In an example of minilateral cooperation, Austria has been investing in the LNG terminal on the Croatian island of Krk. This terminal has already existed for some time but is now being expanded far beyond the national requirements of Croatia in order serve as a regional hub. Poland has also been enlarging its LNG capabilities from 5 billion m³ a year via its Świnoujście terminal, aiming to double its capacity with the expansion and planned new construction in Gdańsk. The trend is clear: no reduction in gas, but the reduction of dependence on one single country. Yet a decrease in both would be possible with more intensive coordination and more coherent planning within the group – especially as investing in gas projects poses the danger of Central Europe tying itself further into a dependence on a resource that is ultimately a fossil fuel. 

Nuclear power remains a contentious issue, with many convinced it is the way forward to reducing dependency on fossil fuels. In a further example of cross-border cooperation, Slovenia shares its nuclear power station with Croatia, which is in an earthquake zone and cannot build its own without compromising safety. Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia have also opted to invest in nuclear technologies: 59.7%, 44% and 36.6% of their respective electricity generation comes from nuclear. Hungary furthermore intends to increase this percentage with a new power plant that is to be built using Russian state funding. Poland currently has no domestic nuclear energy production but is developing plans to build its first nuclear power station. 

However, others remain wary of a technology that has the potential to cause widespread harm. Austria is one of few outspoken opponents in Central Europe following the referendum of 1978 and subsequent law against generating nuclear power. Having set a goal to source 100% of its electricity from renewables by 2030, Austria moreover intends to show that the green transition is possible without nuclear energy. 

Fast-growing markets 

The renewable energy markets have been rapidly growing, especially the solar industry, with the demand for photovoltaic energy busting market expectations across Europe. There is also significant potential for energy generation from other renewable sources in Central Europe. Poland has begun to make use of the wind on its northern coast with its first offshore farm currently under construction, which is anticipated to generate 1.1GW. Nonetheless, there is still a lot of room for growth, with estimated potential for up to 33GW. Likewise, the Adriatic Sea offers considerable offshore wind power that is not being utilised. While it has been agreed that no wind farms will be built on Croatia’s islands, there is still an area of 29,000 km² that could be developed without encroaching on high-impact zones 

Furthermore, there are natural geothermal heat reservoirs across the region. Indeed, following the European Parliament’s recent call for an EU geothermal energy strategy, the European Committee of the Regions released an Opinion on the “great potential” of geothermal for both cities and regions. To give three examples from the region: in Poland, geothermal reservoirs have been found in around 50% of the country’s area, particularly in central and northwestern Poland. Hungary has already quadrupled its use of geothermal energy since 2010 and is now planning to double its use again by 2030, while Slovenia has been developing a pilot geothermal project that only requires one dry well for operation. 

Prioritise the grid 

With such promising potential of renewables, both large- and small-scale, what is preventing an exponential growth of the clean energy sector? The supply chain is currently not the limiting factor in terms of what is possible. While the manufacturing of solar panels is at present dominated by China, the EU has established initiatives such as the Net Zero Industry Act and the European Solar Charter, which aim to support solar manufacturing in Europe.  

Instead, with a rapid expansion of the renewable energy sector, the grid is the main bottleneck. Energy systems are largely centralised through national grids, which currently do not have the capacity to integrate the rapidly expanding renewable sector. Sectors that were predominantly running on fossil fuels are now being converted to electricity. To further complicate the problem, the grid in Poland, for example, is concentrated on regions in the south of the country that produced energy from coal, whereas the up-and-coming renewable sector is focused on the north. Moreover, the grid does not offer sufficient capacity for large projects at sea. 

Cooperation among the countries of Central Europe would allow a pooling of renewable resources, which is indispensable given the fluctuating nature of supply and demand inherent to renewable energy. Within this partnership, a priority must be the full synchronisation of the grid across the region as well as the expansion of cross-border grid interconnectors. In particular, the triangle between Austria, Hungary and Slovenia has been identified as critical 

Huge potential 

The European Green Deal promises long-term potential for growth, but currently the transition requires significant financial investment, challenges the economies and could threaten established industries in this underperforming region. Among some governments and sections of the population in the Central European countries there are narratives that they are second-class countries within the EU. Many regulations are seen as originating from Western European countries and Brussels, which member states then have to implement regardless of economic feasibility, resulting in a sluggish implementation of individual EGD regulations. Nonetheless, renewable energy sources, even in the year of installation, are cheaper than fossil fuels. In 2022, the global average cost of solar energy was 29% lower than the cheapest fossil fuel option, while the cost of onshore wind energy was 50% lower. An integrated grid would also boost price competitiveness as cheaper, cleaner electricity from neighbouring countries in the region becomes available to consumers. 

Central Europe has significant potential for a green energy transition, as well as for a more dynamic economy and policymaking than is often assumed. Cooperation is essential to accelerate progress – whether a pooling of financial, knowledge or human resources. With the rapid growth of renewables and increasing electrification of the energy sectors, the expansion and improved international interconnectivity of the grid must be a priority not only for the EU, but also on regional level. 

Rebecca Thorne is a research associate at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) in Vienna. Her research focus is climate, energy and the environment in Central Europe and the EU candidate countries. 

Michael Stellwag is a research associate at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Vienna. Having studied political science in Vienna and Tallinn, he now specialises in politics in Central and Eastern Europe and in EU foreign, security and defence policy. Professional projects have taken him to numerous countries in the region. 

 

Both authors attended the expert workshopCentral Europe Plus – Bridge technologies with regard to a sustainable energy supply organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Zagreb. The workshop series has existed since 2021 and focuses on the role of Central European States for the future of the EU. It aims to bring together decision-makers and researchers from the countries concerned and to present positions and demands from these countries in Brussels. In 2024, the project has been developed further to include other regions as well, hence the workshop title Central Europe Plus. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vergangenheit ohne Wiedererkennungswert

Die sozialen Räume der Nostalgie sind in Polen entweder selektiv oder übertrieben kitschig. KAROLINA GOLINOWSKA findet die authentischsten Formen der Nostalgie im polnischen Kultursektor.

Wer durch die Warschauer Innenstadt schlendert, kann sie heute kaum übersehen: Weiß-rote Flaggen zieren das Straßenbild, es findet ein großer Umzug statt. An diesem 3. Mai begehen die Pol*innen den „Tag der Verfassung“. Sie gedenken der ersten modernen Verfassung Europas, die 1791 in der polnischen Hauptstadt unterzeichnet wurde. Nur wenige Straßen weiter können Besucher*innen des Museums „Leben in der Volksrepublik Polen“ auf einem nachgebildeten kommunistischen Kinderspielplatz Himmel und Hölle spielen. Weniger Aktive nehmen auf den muffigen roten Klappsesseln in einem nachgeahmten Kinosaal Platz. Die Formen der Nostalgie in Polen sind vielfältig und schaffen eine Simultanität verschiedener historischen Zeiträume. 

Nostalgie ist eine der möglichen Annäherungen an die gemeinsame Vergangenheit. Durch Wiederholung gewinnen nostalgische Praktiken an Bedeutung und festigen sich im sozialen Gedächtnis. Doch nicht immer beinhaltet Nostalgie ein politisches Element, wie Marketingstrategien – zugeschnitten auf Konsumbedürfnisse – beweisen. Aus diesem Grund möchte ich drei verschiedene Arten von Nostalgie unterscheiden, die sich auf die zeitgenössische Kultur in Polen beziehen. 

Wie viel Staat braucht der Kultursektor? 

Die Sehnsucht nach der Volksrepublik wird oft direkt von älteren Generationen geäußert. Sie sind unzufrieden mit den kulturellen Aktivitäten junger Menschen, denn die sogenannten „klassischen“ Formen der kulturellen Teilhabe werden immer unbeliebter. Vorbei scheint die Zeit, in der Musiksäle, Opernhäuser und Theater ein junges Publikum begeisterten. Zu Zeiten der Volksrepublik hingegen sahen es die „kultivierten“ Schichten als ihre persönliche Pflicht, diese Angebote in Anspruch zu nehmen – schließlich demonstrierten sie damit soziales Ansehen. Die heutigen kulturellen Praktiken haben sich nicht zuletzt durch die technologischen Entwicklungen verändert, klassische Kulturformen verlieren scheinbar an Attraktivität. 

Seit den 2000er Jahren wächst allerdings die Zahl der Angebote, die auf kulturelle Teilhabe, Bildung und kulturelles Engagement abzielen. Kultureinrichtungen führen Projekte ein, um Chancengleichheit herzustellen, indem sie versuchen, Bildungs- und Sozialdefizite abzubauen. Diese Projekte werden in der Regel von staatlichen Institutionen finanziert. Schlagworte wie „Einbeziehung sozialer Randgruppen“ finden sich in solchen Programmen zuhauf. Sie betonen die Notwendigkeit, Kinder für zeitgenössische Kultur zu sensibilisieren. Dabei gehen sie davon aus, dass Investitionen in die jüngste Generation einen bedeutenden Einfluss auf ihre spätere Teilhabe an Kultureinrichtungen haben wird. In vielen dieser Leitsätze schwingen Grundgedanken aus der Volksrepublik mit. So beschäftigte sich der polnische Soziologe Aleksander Wallis bereits 1981 mit dem Problem der Zentralisierung des kulturellen Lebens, besonders in den Bereichen Kunsterziehung und kulturelle Infrastruktur. Ein besonderes Anliegen war ihm die Stärkung von Kultureinrichtungen im ländlichen Raum. Auch heute, Jahrzehnte nach der Wende, ist klar, dass dies nur mit staatlicher Unterstützung gelingen kann. 

Selektive Nostalgie als verbindendes Element 

Eine weitere soziale Praxis, die als nostalgisch bezeichnet werden kann, finden wir im öffentlichen Raum. Staatliche Feiertage aus der Zeit der Volksrepublik werden heute als totalitäre Propaganda wahrgenommen, obwohl sich viele von ihnen auch auf prä-kommunistische Ereignisse bezogen. Jegliches Gedenken an Lenin oder Stalin wurde aus dem Staatskalender radiert und durch neue Anlässe zum Feiern ersetzt. Der Soziologe Przemysław Sadura schrieb im Jahr 2013 dazu: „Die Lehrer*innen, die uns damals auf die Maiparade mitgenommen hatten, nahmen uns nun zu den Messen zu Ehren des Vaterlandes am 3. Mai mit.“ 

Auch andere öffentliche Zeremonien zu Ehren kommunistischer Führer oder deren Gedankengutes wurden durch historische Jahrestage ersetzt, an denen oft siegreiche Schlachten rekonstruiert werden, wie die Gorlice-Offensive von 1915 (als österreichisch-ungarische und deutsche Armeen die russische besiegten), die Schlacht von Mława 1920 (Sieg im polnisch-sowjetischen Krieg) und die Radłowska-Offensive von 1939 (Rekonstruktion einer polnisch-deutschen Schlacht). Solche Shows bedienen die Sehnsucht nach einer „Erfahrung der Zusammengehörigkeit“, die als nostalgisch bezeichnet werden kann. Denn das Gefühl, Teil einer Gemeinschaft zu sein, ging im Laufe der Transformation zunehmend verloren. Darüber hinaus unterstützen solche Veranstaltungen die Schaffung einer selektiven polnischen Geschichte, um das „richtige“ kollektive Gedächtnis zu stärken. 

Einmal Nostalgie light, bitte! 

Schließlich ist Nostalgie durch Produkte und deren Konsum als dritte soziale Praxis zu nennen. Die Nostalgieindustrie wächst in den meisten Ländern des Ostblocks als scheinbar natürliche Reaktion auf die zunehmende zeitliche Entfernung zu diesem historischen Abschnitt. Nostalgie wird amüsant und ideal für die Bedürfnisse des zeitgenössischen Konsumverhaltens präsentiert. Hier besteht das Grundprinzip darin, ein Gefühl der Verbundenheit mit der farbenfrohen und „exotischen“ Vergangenheit zu schaffen, insbesondere bei den jüngeren Generationen, die sie nicht miterlebten. Das Gefühl, etwas verloren zu haben, wird in vielen Facebook-Profilen wie „Born in the PRL“ oder „Pewex“ (ehemalige polnische Ladenkette für vorrangig westliche Waren) deutlich. 

Am greifbarsten wird diese Sehnsucht nach scheinbarer Authentizität wohl im Museum „Leben in der Volksrepublik Polen“. Hier können Besucher*innen durch verschiedene Zimmer mit für die damalige Zeit typischen Wohnungsinterieurs spazieren, oder eine bunte Sammlung aus alten kommunistischen Geräten und Waren bestaunen. Das Privatmuseum präsentiert eine Geschichte, die einfach, unterhaltsam und unpolitisch erscheint. Dasselbe gilt für Bars, deren Design direkt von Einrichtungen der Kneipen in der Volksrepublik inspiriert ist. Die meisten von ihnen heißen Pub PRL oder Pijalnia Wódki i Piwa (Wodka- und Biertrinkraum), was die ursprüngliche Bezeichnung für Kneipen im kommunistischen Polen war. Einige von ihnen versuchen authentischer zu wirken, indem sie jedes noch so kitschige kommunistische Souvenir ausstellen. Diese Übertreibung verfälscht allerdings die Geschichte, und lässt sie zu einer leicht konsumierbaren, sanften, aus dem soziopolitischen Kontext herausgelösten Vergangenheit verkommen. 

Im Umgang mit der polnischen Vergangenheit wird jede positive Äußerung über die kommunistische Zeit als moralisch verwerflich gehandelt. Nostalgie ist offenbar nur legitim, wenn die Vergangenheit übertrieben, humoristisch oder kitschig dargestellt wird. Und so zeigt sich die authentischste Form der Nostalgie heute wohl in den Bestrebungen von Kultureinrichtungen, marginalisierte Menschen einzubeziehen. 

 

Karolina Golinowska ist Dozentin am Institut für Kulturwissenschaften der Kazimierz Wielki Universität in Bydgoszcz, Polen. Sie ist spezialisiert auf kulturtheoretische Studien mit Schwerpunkt auf kulturellem Gedächtnis, kulturellem Erbe und den Praktiken seiner Institutionalisierung. 

Revival of the Weimar Triangle?

As Polish society voted out the nationalistic PiS party and the new government of Donald Tusk is re-shifting priorities of its foreign policy, a discussion about the revival of the Weimar Triangle has re-emerged. Not for the first time, voices advocating for tightening minilatertal cooperation among Germany, France, and Poland are to be heard. However, for the first time in years, a window of opportunity for such a format has opened. While minilateral formats are on the rise in general but specifically with participation of EU member countries, the overall added value might sometimes not be visible at the first glance. There is per se nothing wrong with this development. Smaller groups of countries working together might even contribute to a smoother decision-making process in an hopefully again enlarging EU.

Minilateral formats have existed before (see Benelux) or directly served European Integration (see Visegrad Four). However, during the last years, the number has drastically increased (Three Seas Initiative, Central Europe Five, Slavkov Format to name just a few). The Weimar Triangle has the unique potential to actually advance integration and contribute to the future of the EU as they do not only represent bigger member countries in terms of population but also GDP, bridging West and Central Europe. They might also contribute to alleviating the imbalance regarding EU top jobs and geographical representation and coincidentally the French President, German Chancellor, and the Polish Prime Minister represent the currently three biggest fractions in the European Parliament (EPP – Tusk, S&D Scholz, Renew – Macron).

Romain Le Quiniou from the French think tank Euro Creative met with Malwina Talik and Sebastian Schäffer to discuss how feasible such a scenario is and what potential lies in such a cooperation, so to say a mini(lateral) Weimar Triangle at IDM! More to come—stay tuned!

Malwina Talik im ZiB2-Gespräch über die Liberalisierung des Abtreibungsgesetzes in Polen

Malwina Talik (IDM) war am 25. Jänner in der ZiB2 bei Margit Laufer zu Gast. Dort hat sie die Pläne zur Liberalisierung des Abtreibungsgesetzes in Polen analysiert und mögliche Hürden besprochen.

Sehen Sie sich das Interview hier an.

How to Beat Authoritarian Parties, Polish-Style

Malwina Talik (IDM) gives her opinion for Fair Observer about what can democratic oppositions contesting elections this year learn from Poland after last year, when Poland’s opposition successfully defeated the illiberal ruling party Law and Justice. They did so not by forming a big tent coalition, but by each party speaking to the concerns of each voter. Poland’s success can be an example as an unusually high number of elections take place worldwide this year.

Read the whole article here.

Dynamics of the Visegrad Group. Navigating Political Shifts, Challenges and Prospects for EU Enlargement

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15 will see key decisions made on EU enlargement – will the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) stay (dis)united? Kinga Brudzinska explains what can be expected in her newest piece on the IDM blog. 

The political differences in the Visegrad Four (V4) countries that emerged as a result of the elections in Poland (15 October 2023) and Slovakia (30 September 2023) will not significantly impact the dynamics of cooperation among the group. The format remains in crisis due to Hungary’s pro-Russia foreign policy stance and its sceptical approach to the EU’s pro-Ukraine policy direction.

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15, which will see key decisions made on EU enlargement, will once again highlight the lack of unity and cohesion among V4 group members, with Hungary being the outlier. As a result, the V4 will continue to serve as a platform for regional cooperation, but one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy as seen in response to the 2015 migration crisis or the “Nutella crisis” in 2017 when the V4 mobilised to fight against the “double standards” of imported food sold in their countries.

What is more, in the long run, the ideological differences are not likely to divide the countries that created the V4, regardless of the political preference of ruling governments. For example, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), co-managed by V4 countries and supporting regional cooperation projects in the region, or formats such as Think Visegrad—V4 Think Tank Platform, a hub of V4 joint analysis, remain an important aspect of cooperation. On the other hand, there is a threat that due to persisting political differences, the individual V4 countries will seek to engage in alternative formats of regional cooperation. For example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will most likely invest in the development of the Slavkov Triangle or Central Five Initiative (C5), involving Austria. Poland will focus on rebuilding relations within the Weimar Triangle and will remain active within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) until the end of President Andrzej Duda’s term in 2025.

What will change and what will not

Poland and the Czech Republic will not allow Hungary, and perhaps Slovakia, to appropriate the V4 as a Eurosceptic or even anti-Western platform. Furthermore, Slovakia will not replace Poland to the same extent as an important partner in activating the V4 format or advocating Slovakia’s own position on the international stage. After its initial declaration, Slovakia will most probably not stick to all its electoral promises related to withholding military aid to Ukraine or pursuing a more assertive European policy. This is because Slovakia does not have a tradition of conducting proactive foreign policy, so it is unlikely Bratislava would use its veto power in Brussels to back Hungary. As the V4’s only eurozone country, Slovakia traditionally advocates for a constructive European policy based on consensus. Robert Fico demonstrated such an approach during his previous term.

Polish-Hungarian relations will not improve, and Hungary will be isolated within the V4 over Russia. Prime Minister Orban deliberately plays the role of a disruptor in the EU and NATO decision-making process, openly challenging the model of liberal democracy and steering the country towards an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, soon-to-be new/old Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is known for his critical stance towards Viktor Orban. Bilateral disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (related to Orban’s controversial historical policies) further complicate the situation and isolate Hungary within the V4.

The V4 also faces an image problem in the EU, with a prevailing negative perception of its member countries. Therefore, Poland is not likely to heavily leverage the V4 in the coming years. In recent years, other formats such as the Bucharest Nine (B9), Three Seas Initiative (3SI), Slavkov Triangle, or Central Five Initiative (C5) have gained prominence, with V4 countries actively participating.

Finally, Poland is not necessarily seen by other Visegrad countries as a leader in the region. Poland’s reputation has also been damaged due to the deterioration of the rule of law (Slovakia, under the previous government, became more sceptical of Poland’s actions and pushed V4 activities aside) and the conflict with the Czech Republic over the Turow coal mine.

To sum up, looking back on 2023 and trying to foresee the developments on the international stage in 2024, we can be sure that the V4 will stay on the map of regional groupings in the EU in the years to come and will keep being used as a passive platform for regional cooperation. However, one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy among the V4 unless Hungary adjusts its stance on Russia to align with the European mainstream.

How political parties used TikTok to target young voters in Poland’s general elections

Malwina Talik was interviewed by Gezim Hilaj/Interhackitives about the role of social media, especially TikTok in targeting young voters in Poland`s general elections.
You can read (and watch) it here.

Poland after Elections: Malwina Talik at the Discussion of the IIP (Vienna)

International Institute for Peace (Vienna) organized a panel discussion about the outcomes of the parliamentary in Poland and their impact on the regional, especially its relations with Ukraine and Belarus.

Our colleague Malwina Talik was among the speakers together with Maciej Kisilowski, Associate Professor of Law and Strategy, Central European University, Artyom Shraibman, Belarusian Political Analyst; Contributor to Carnegie Politika and Olena Khylko, Researcher at the Comenius University in Bratislava. The event was moderated by Marylia Hushcha, Researcher at the IIP.

More information here.

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