Hungary since 2010, Poland between 2015 and 2023, and Slovakia since 2023 have experienced, or are experiencing, democratic backsliding. A project at the Institute for Danube Region and Central Europe, funded by the Felczak Institute for Polish-Hungarian Studies, examines, through the examples of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, what an illiberal system means for the rule of law, the media, culture and academia, and corruption – and how liberal democracy in these areas can be strengthened following a change of government. 

Malwina Talik and Dr Péter Techet authored a policy paper on the central questions of the project and the possible pathways in Poland and Hungary, which provided the foundation for a subsequent workshop on the subject. 

Topics and outcomes of the workshop 

As part of this project, an international workshop was held at the IDM on 18–19 November, bringing together experts from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria. The workshop comprised four panels, focusing on the rule of law, the media, identity politics, and corruption. The emphasis was not on a purely academic analysis, but on sharing practical experiences and exploring options and strategies to reverse illiberal trends. 

Firstly, experts from each country outlined how illiberal systems were established as well as how illiberal damage – particularly in Poland after 2023 – might be undone. This was followed by discussions on the causes of illiberalism and potential routes back to liberal democracy. Across all panels, a key focus was what Poland has achieved since 2023 in dismantling illiberal structures and policies, and whether these experiences could be applied to Hungary after 2026 or Slovakia after 2027, should there be a change of government. The presentations and discussions revealed how far illiberalism has advanced in each country, depending on whether governments were able to amend the constitution, and on the priorities they pursued.  

A common thread across all three cases is that illiberalism emerges in polarised societies, where populist rhetoric and antagonistic ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narratives weaken social consensus around liberal democracy, turning domestic politics into a struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of democracy, each using constitutional mechanisms to different ends. Another shared feature in all illiberal democracies is the weakening of constitutional oversight, civil society, and pluralism, including attacks on dissenting voices and on both public and private media. In terms of corruption, however, there are notable differences: in Poland, corruption is largely individual; in Slovakia, it is tolerated and facilitated by state actors; and in Hungary, it has evolved into a centralised, state-run ‘mafia’ structure. 

The restoration of liberal democracy in all three countries depends on the ability to reform the constitution and legal framework, which is a particularly difficult task in Hungary, where the illiberal regime has maintained a constitution-amending (two-third) majority almost continuously since 2010. More broadly, a sustainable return to liberal democracy requires social consensus, potentially achieved through compromise between political ‘camps’. 

Building on the workshop’s insights and further research, Malwina Talik and Dr Péter Techet are preparing a report, by the end of the year, on the successes and strategies for undoing illiberal damage. 

(Dr Péter Techet)