The Sticking Points: A Toxic Relationship with Fossil Fuels in the EU Candidate Countries?

By Rebecca Thorne (IDM)

At the beginning of February, the European Commission backed a plan for a 90% reduction in emissions by 2040. This is intended as a stepping stone towards the already existing goal of climate neutrality in Europe by 2050. The plan will affect not only the EU member states, but also the countries hoping to join the club in the future as they gradually align their policies with EU rules. These countries are among the most vulnerable in Europe to the effects of climate change, despite lower-than-average emissions and high rates of energy poverty. Yet economic development is too often related to fossil fuel consumption.  

In view of their geographical, economic, and political situations, the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine face specific challenges in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Except for Albania, the region has inherited energy infrastructure from its respective Yugoslav and Soviet legacies that favoured imports from Russia, with the energy sectors themselves remaining largely state-owned. Furthermore, the Western Balkans also face the specific challenge that much of their energy infrastructure was damaged during Yugoslavia’s wars. In Ukraine, this damage is today an ongoing reality. To accelerate the reforms that would ensure affordable, sustainable and secure energy, the region has subscribed to the Energy Community Treaty, which aims to establish an integrated regional energy market compatible with the EU. 

The first step in the transition is to phase out coal. Both the Western Balkans and Ukraine continue to mine and generate power from lignite, with Kosovo depending on coal for as much as 95% of its power generation. In addition to emitting carbon dioxide, coal power plants release sulphur dioxide: in the Western Balkans, these emissions breach Energy Community Treaty limits and are responsible for severe health problems and premature deaths. North Macedonia has now pledged to phase out coal by 2027, yet Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo have not made such a commitment. Moreover, in their draft updated national energy and climate plans (NECP), all three countries fail to adequately consider the steps required for a just transition, such as a re-skilling of the workforce and the creation of new green jobs. 

Crude oil, too, is still widely used in the EU neighbourhood, especially in the form of diesel and petrol for transport, but also in plastics, clothing, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. Oil’s share of the total energy supply ranged from 17% in Ukraine (2021) to almost half in Albania (2022). While there are oil terminals and/or refineries in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine, there is very limited oil extraction in the region, which means the reliance on imports makes the economies vulnerable to price fluctuation and geopolitical security issues. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only 3% of oil and oil products came from Russia. 

Gas is widely considered to be a transition fuel in the process of phasing out fossil fuels, with the effective labelling of “natural gas” encouraging the perception that it is not as harmful as other fossil fuels. While it emits less carbon on combustion compared to coal, its distribution nonetheless releases the potent greenhouse gas methane. The International Energy Agency recognizes the limited role that gas can play in the transition process, asserting in their latest Net Zero Roadmap that no new coal, oil or gas projects are needed. 

Yet the EU and the US are still backing new gas infrastructure projects in the EU neighbourhood. The motivation to build new pipelines stems in part from the geopolitical objective to reduce dependency on Russian imports and instead source fuel from elsewhere. As part of this strategy, the initiative REPowerEU has provided financial investment for new LNG terminals as well as oil and gas pipelines. Notably, Moldova is no longer receiving any gas from Russia due to the new Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which connects Romania and Moldova. The EU and the US are now encouraging the construction of a pipeline between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to diversify the latter’s gas supply, which is currently only receiving Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline in Serbia. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina, like most of the Western Balkans, already uses so little gas that it would be counter-productive to increase its dependency when Europe has simultaneously committed to do the exact opposite. Moreover, this infrastructure is designed to last decades, long beyond the point when Europe plans to be entirely carbon neutral.  

Critical to the persistence of the fossil fuel industry are the available finances, with many European banks as well as EU initiatives still funding new and existing oil and gas projects. As these international financial institutions are among the biggest lenders to energy companies, their continued monetary support for the extraction, processing, storage and distribution of fossil fuels is a major obstacle to the green transition. Moreover, the economies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Ukraine, which all have high-energy industries such as the production of aluminium, steel, and fertilizers are especially vulnerable to the temptation of maintaining market dynamics by continuing to use fossil fuels.  

To redirect the flow of investments, it is crucial that national governments in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine reduce financial uncertainty by fostering trust and setting clear climate policy signals. Likewise, allowing independent scientific research can guide climate change mitigation efforts. Yet corrupt and autocratic leaders are often reluctant to regulate the fossil fuel industry, reduce greenhouse gas emissions or invest in renewable energy because their pockets are being lined and their political careers bolstered by profits in the industry, as well as by foreign investors from countries such as China. With upcoming elections across the Danube region, voters must therefore use their democratic rights to push back against the rising trend of authoritarianism and urge governments to prioritise the climate. 

Likewise, policies and decisions made at EU level play a key role in the speed of the energy transition across Europe, meaning that poor decision-making at institutional level could take the EU candidate countries along the wrong trajectory and increase their dependency on fossil fuels rather than decreasing it. Yet high-level support for green policies that would reduce the consumption of fossil energy is wavering. While the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has been championing the green transition, she has been facing opposition from her party members, who oppose a ban on combustion engines and are wary of farmers’ discontent if CO2 emissions are taxed. Ahead of the EU elections in June 2024, European parties across the board are trying to win public favour by speaking out against climate-friendly policies that may initially cost the consumer more. Even von der Leyen is gradually giving in to electoral pressure, putting not only the Green Deal, but also her green legacy on the line for the sake of a second term. The next presidency will decide how seriously the EU institutions will take the fight against climate change.  

In Europe’s energy transition, it’s not just oil that is sticky. Transitioning away from coal and gas will be challenging, requiring clear policies at national and EU level, comprehensive legislation, and responsible investments. If Europe wants to achieve a 90% reduction in emissions by 2040, the money that is currently being invested in fossil fuels should be better invested in improving energy efficiency and developing renewable energy, with national and international oil and gas companies as well as financial institutions urged to join the race in speeding up the transition. In doing so, the economic development and integration of the EU’s candidate countries can be accompanied and supported by clean and sustainable energy. 

 

You may be also interested in

Is there a lesson to be learnt from Tucker Carlson’s interview with Vladimir Putin?

By Jack Gill

The geopolitical tectonic plates of Europe have shifted much over the last two years. Since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, relations between Russia and the rest of Europe have been nought. But a recent interview by Tucker Carlson, the American conservative media personality, has shed new light on the Russian dictator’s mindset and, contrary to what some believed would embolden the European and American right’s growing respect for Vladimir Putin, has instead exposed Putin’s ideology-driven and manipulative tactics, which he uses to obscure the fact that he has no viable exit strategy from the situation into which he has dragged himself and his 143 million fellow Russians. 

He began at the beginning. For nearly half an hour, Putin gave Carlson a lecture on Russian history, from the ninth century until 2022. With his narrative grounded in the common ancestor state of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Kievan Rus’, Putin believes that borders, in the traditional sense, do not apply in the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World). Instead, the East Slavic peoples, rather than existing as three independent sovereign states in the modern sense, supposedly belong to a civilizational spectrum that begins at the Polish border and ends at Vladivostok, in which everything should be controlled by the Kremlin in the name of the Russian nation. Troublingly similar to Adolf Hitler’s narrative on the unity of Germanic peoples under one ‘Reich’ ruled from Berlin, Putin’s ethnicity-based vision for a greater ‘Rus’ is a pipedream, which falls apart under deeper scrutiny.  

Putin’s narrative collapses when he explains his ‘denazification’ policy and uses it to justify the invasion of Ukraine. One can see in the interview that Putin himself does not seriously believe in this policy, and he struggles to describe it coherently. When Carlson asks Putin about Nazism in Ukraine, the only example Putin can give is the standing ovation given unwittingly by the Canadian Parliament, with Zelensky present, to an elderly Ukrainian man who had served in the Waffen SS during the Second World War. Of course, nobody knew during the event that he had served in the SS, and once it was revealed Canada was quick to repent for the embarrassing episode. Zelensky had certainly been unaware.  

But with such authoritarian manipulators, it’s just a plot point. Putin does not really believe that Ukraine is full of neo-Nazis, and nor, likely, does much of the rest of the Russian population. But as long as he keeps saying it, he can use it against Ukraine to delegitimise the existence of the state, justify its overthrow and glorify the Russian soldiers doing so as heroes, harking back to the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany.  

Putin’s greatest ally, and the West’s greatest challenge, is time. Like all of his conflicts over the last two decades, from Georgia in 2008 to Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022, Putin will ride out the storm as growing indifference replaces anger in public and political opinion in the West. He need only wait until Donald Trump enters the White House again in 2024, at which point the unconditional support for Ukraine will likely run out and pressure to negotiate will grow. Negotiations under such conditions would not be favourable for Ukraine. Ironically, Trump, the author of The Art of the Deal, may even volunteer to lead the negotiations himself.   

At that point, with the war over and Russia’s military resources significantly depleted, the dictator would likely focus his attention inwards, on ridding all political opponents and bringing on a societal ‘Russian Winter’. The recent murder of Alexei Navalny, Putin’s largest political opponent and critic within Russia, in an Arctic hellhole prison was as symbolic as it was terrifying. As a message to warn off anyone else inclined to challenge him, nothing could be more effective.   

Are there any lessons to be learnt from the interview? Yes, one. Based on the interview, we can see the huge strategic importance of narratives, and how they can be weaponised to justify the invasion of other countries. When Tucker asked Putin about his strategy towards the West, Putin stated that when he came to office in 2000, he asked then-US President Bill Clinton, hypothetically but seriously, what would happen if Russia wanted to join NATO. Clinton said he would speak to his advisers and get back to him. The answer was a firm ‘no’ as Russia failed to meet the fundamental entry requirements of NATO, such as “uphold[ing] democracy”, “making progress toward a market economy”, having military forces “under firm civilian control”, “be[ing] good neighbors and respecting sovereignty outside their borders”, and “working toward compatibility with NATO forces.”1 

Thenceforth Russia became a partner of NATO, but never with a membership perspective. And although a framework for cooperation was created over the following years, namely the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, this did not succeed in preventing Russia from becoming a revisionist power or channelling the country onto some kind of Western path.  

Putin uses his narrative of Russia’s victimisation by NATO, as well as Ukraine’s supposed ‘rule by neo-Nazis’ and rightful place in the ‘Russian World’ to justify his violent actions. The use of such a narrative by a major power must ultimately fail if the rules-based order of international sovereignty is to prevail. Western countries should thus be aware that their perceived ‘denial’ of some countries to enter the EU or NATO can be spun into victimisation narratives, which, however wrongfully, can be used as leverage in international politics. 

The opinions expressed in this article represent the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDM.

Steht Transnistrien vor einem „Russland-Anschluss“? Nicht wirklich. Ein Expertenkommentar.

Steht Transnistrien vor einem „Russland-Anschluss“? Nicht wirklich. Ein Expertenkommentar. 

Sebastian Schäffer

“Russland-Anschluss: Transnistrien plant laut Bericht Votum” titelt orf.at am 23. Februar 2024. Andere deutschsprachige Medien nutzen ähnliche Schlagzeilen. Diese basieren auf einer Warnung, die das US-amerikanische Institute for the Study of War (ISW) auf einem Social-Media-Kanal angesichts einer Einberufung des Abgeordnetenkongresses in Transnistrien veröffentlicht hat. Das ist zunächst schon aufgrund der aktuellen geopolitischen Lage in der Region durchaus eine Meldung wert, zumal es in Österreich sonst relativ selten Nachrichten zur Republik Moldau gibt. Transnistrien ist eine abtrünnige Provinz dieses Landes, das beharrlich insbesondere in den österreichischen Medien immer noch als Moldawien bezeichnet wird. Insgesamt wäre ein wenig mehr Kontext notwendig. Wenn man so will, sind sowohl die Bezeichnung, als auch die Meldung veraltet, Nachrichten von gestern sozusagen. Moldawien ist eine Übersetzung aus dem Russischen; die offizielle Bezeichnung ist Moldau, weil das aber verwirrend sein kann wegen des tschechischen Flusses, wird dem Namen Republik vorangestellt. Oder man nutzt eben die rumänische Bezeichnung Moldova.  

Zurück zum eigentlichen Thema: Die Einberufung eines Abgeordnetenkongresses durch Separatistenführer Wadim Krasnoselski in Tiraspol, der Hauptstadt der abtrünnigen Provinz Transnistrien, ist durchaus außergewöhnlich, denn der letzte dieser Art fand 2006 statt. Allerdings wurde bereits vor 18 Jahren ein Unabhängigkeitsreferendum beschlossen und anschließend sogar durchgeführt. Laut eigenen Angaben beteiligten sich damals 78 Prozent der stimmberechtigten Personen in der Region, von denen fast alle (angeblich mehr als 97 Prozent) für eine Eigenständigkeit sowie eine spätere Eingliederung in die Russische Föderation votierten 

Bis heute hat der Kreml Transnistrien nicht anerkannt, die zeitliche Nähe von Putins Rede zur Lage der Nation vor der Föderalen Versammlung am 29. Februar – der Abgeordnetenkongress findet einen Tag zuvor am 28. Februar statt – lädt jedoch zu Spekulationen ein. Es würde ja durchaus in das Playbook des russischen Präsidenten passen. Aber dann auch eben wieder nicht. Eigentlich sollten wir inzwischen gelernt haben, dabei nicht mitzuspielen. Ziemlich genau vor einem Jahr, zum ersten Jahrestag der vollständigen Invasion der Russischen Föderation in der Ukraine, kamen Gerüchte auf, ob Kyjiw (auch hier ist das im Deutschen immer noch häufig benutzte Kiew die Transliteration des russischen Namens für die Stadt) eventuell selbst plant in Transnistrien einzumarschieren.  

Ich erinnere mich noch gut daran, weil ich mit einer ukrainischen Kollegin nur ein paar Wochen zuvor über die völkerrechtlichen Implikationen gesprochen hatte, die eine hypothetische Einladung Chişinăus an die Ukraine hätte, Transnistrien von der dort noch mit rund 1500 Soldat*innen präsenten russische Armee zu befreien. Die aktuellen Meldungen bezüglich einer möglichen Annexion der abtrünnigen Provinz in der Republik Moldau durch Moskau erschienen mir vor ein paar Tagen bereits unrealistisch. Am 27. Februar veröffentlichte auch das ISW in Berufung auf transnistrische Quellen in einem unabhängigen russischen Onlinemedium, dass der Volkskongress nicht um eine Eingliederung in die Russische Föderation bitten wird 

Natürlich kann es nicht vollkommen ausgeschlossen werden, dass heute oder auch zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ein solcher Schritt unternommen werden wird. Allerdings gilt es hier eben abzuwägen, wie wahrscheinlich dies sein kann sowie welche Herausforderungen bestehen – politisch, wirtschaftlich aber hier und jetzt insbesondere logistisch. Die Desinformation aus dem Kreml ist und bleibt Teil der hybriden Kriegsführung. 

Sowohl die Regierung in Chişinău, als auch meine Kontakte in der Republik Moldau bleiben jedenfalls relativ gelassen den Gerüchten gegenüber. Das bedeutet nicht, dass man sich nicht auf mögliche Szenarien vorbereitet und sich der Gefahr nicht durchaus bewusst ist. Wie schon vor einem Jahr, als Gerüchte über einen Coup in der Republik Moldau aufkamen, gilt es, wachsam zu bleiben.   

Ich rechne jedenfalls nach der „Wiederwahl“ Putins im März und vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Republik Moldau im Herbst mit weitaus mehr Bemühungen von Seiten Moskaus das Land zu destabilisieren. Ein Einfluss auf ein mögliches Referendum zum EU-Beitritt und/oder auf die Parlamentswahl in Chişinău 2025 halte ich für wesentlich wahrscheinlicher und auch mit weniger Kosten verbunden – nicht nur finanzieller Art. Als Alternative zur amtierenden Präsidentin Maia Sandu bringt sich jedenfalls schon Irina Vlah in Stellung, die von 2015 bis 2023 Regierungschefin – genannt Başkan – im autonomen Gebiet Gagausien in der Republik Moldau war. Offiziell war sie auch damals schon als unabhängige Kandidatin angetreten, wurde aber durch die prorussische Sozialistische Partei unterstützt, deren Vorsitzender Igor Dodon ist, der Vorgänger von Sandu.  

Es ist spannend und erst recht kompliziert. Wir bleiben dran! 

IDM Short Insights 32: Dilemma of simultaneity 2.0

At the second edition of Cafe Kyiv organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, IDM Director Sebastian Schäffer presented his book „Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe“ and engaged in a panel discussion on the „dilemma of simultaneity 2.0“, the need to reform the enlargement process of the EU, the need to reform institutionally, and the need to fulfil the promise of a geopolitical union – all under the current geopolitical circumstances. Schäffer also argues that – apart from the necessary military support on the ground – there is also a need to foster the support of civil society in order to avoid letting populists divide us. This is going to be a crucial point for the upcoming European parliamentary elections, as it will not only decide the future of the European Union, it will also decide the future of Ukraine.

Transcript:

I am currently in Berlin at the second edition of Cafe Kyiv, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, where many different partners have the possibility to present their work in, on and with Ukraine.

I had the pleasure to speak at a book panel where I also talked about what I call the dilemma of Simultaneity 2.0, because other than after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the challenge that was there in Central and Eastern Europe to simultaneously develop not only politically but also societally up to state-building processes, all of which Ukraine has already mastered, this dilemma of simultaneity is rather referring to the European Union.

We need a reform of the enlargement process, we need an institutional reform and we need to finally get ready to fulfill the promise of a geopolitical union, all at the same time under the current geopolitical circumstances, which means we should no longer use the excuse that we need a reform before we can enlarge to prolong this process, because the promise that we’ve been given to the Western Balkan countries is now of legal drinking age in the United States, as it was given 21 years ago.

What we need to do, apart from the necessary military support on the ground, we also need to foster the support of the civil society and foster the understanding for the civil societies in the EU member countries, because we must not, populists, divide us and this is going to be a crucial point for the upcoming European parliamentary elections, because it does not only decide about the future of the European Union, it will also decide about the future of the country.

IDM Short Insights 31: Prioritising the Climate during EU Membership Negotiations

Going into 2024, there are now 6 candidate countries negotiating the terms of EU membership: Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Following the recent climate conference COP28, there are also new agreements to transition away from fossil fuels, increase energy efficiency and use more renewable energy. Our colleague Rebecca Thorne explains what these climate deals have to do with the upcoming EU accession negotiations.

Transcript:

In December, the EU opened accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine. Together with Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, there are now a total of 6 countries at this stage of EU accession.

In the same month, nearly 200 countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels, while 118 countries committed to the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, which was launched by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.

These are not separate topics. As part of the negotiations, the candidate countries must agree on when and how they will adopt all the current EU rules, known as the “acquis”. Two thematic clusters are dedicated to the environment, with policy fields including transport, energy, the climate, and agriculture, each of which will be negotiated separately.

The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to the subsequent weaponisation of gas supplies has shown that extensive progress is possible in a short space of time, as the EU was able to rapidly diversify its energy supply, increase gas storage to 90% of capacity, and reduce its demand. According to statistics from the European Commission’s initiative REPowerEU, a huge 80% of Russian pipeline gas was replaced in less than 8 months.

The EU must continue on this trajectory and mobilise citizens, businesses, industries and governments in the candidate countries to support the green transition. There is, for example, already significant potential for renewable energy to be developed in the region, with currently 23 gigawatts of prospective capacity in these 6 countries, which would almost double the present operating capacity. This type of power generation is not only cleaner, but also cheaper, and would additionally help to reduce energy poverty.

The EU and its Member States have identified a greener society as one of the 2 key objectives of the decade, while the Green Deal sets out the ambition for Europe to be the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. These membership negotiations provide the Union with an opportunity to push its agenda on climate mitigation and adaptation, while also giving the candidate countries the chance to set a strong and sustainable precedent for their future in the EU.

Stop Nagymaros!

Im neuesten Beitrag auf dem IDM-Blog erwartet Sie eine kleine Abweichung vom Gewohnten, denn wir präsentieren Ihnen dieses Mal Auszüge aus dem Buch unserer Kollegin Daniela Apaydin (dies geschieht selbstverständlich mit der freundlichen Genehmigung des Verlags Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). „Stop Nagymaros!“, das auf der gleichnamigen Doktorarbeit basiert, bietet neue Einblicke in die Protestbewegung gegen das kommunistische Wasserkraftprojekt Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros und beleuchtet die Transnationalisierung von Umweltprotesten in Mitteleuropa.

Das Buch wird auch am 18. Jänner an der Universität für Bodenkultur in Wien (Zentrum für Umweltgeschichte) präsentiert. Nähere Informationen finden Sie hier.

Abstract 

Zehntausende Menschen protestierten am 12. September 1988 vor dem ungarischen Parlament gegen das Wasserkraftprojekt Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. Was mit vereinzelten kritischen Stimmen in der Untergrundpresse begann, entwickelte sich innerhalb weniger Jahre zu einer schlagkräftigen Bewegung gegen den kommunistischen Megabau. Es war kein Zufall, dass sich unter den DemonstrantInnen zahlreiche ÖsterreicherInnen befanden. Die Donaubewegung bildete einen Kristallisationspunkt für Protest, der weit über die Grenzen Ungarns hinausreichte. Dies war die Leistung von einer Handvoll AktivistInnen, die es wagten, jenseits des Eisernen Vorhang nach Verbündeten zu suchen. Denn spätestens als bekannt wurde, dass sich Österreich am Kraftwerksbau beteiligen würde, geriet der lokale Protest zu einer mitteleuropäischen Angelegenheit. 

(…) 

Einleitung 

Grenzübergreifender Aktivismus gehört heute zum Repertoire jeder größeren Umweltbewegung. Die Selbstverständlichkeit dieses Ansatzes zeigte sich etwa bei der »Klimastreikbewegung«, die ab dem Frühjahr 2019 unter dem Leitspruch »Die Klimakrise kennt keine Grenzen – wir auch nicht!« zu ersten l.nderübergreifenden Streiks aufrief. Inspiriert von der Klimaaktivistin Greta Thunberg formierten sich ab 2018 zahlreiche junge zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen wie Fridays for Future und Extinction Rebellion zu einer globalen Bewegung für Klimagerechtigkeit (Climate Justice Movement). Die folgenden Protestwellen brachten nicht nur die Politik in Zugzwang, sondern ließen auch etablierte Umweltorganisationen angesichts der starken Resonanz staunen. Der Bewegung gelang es, einen Kristallisationspunkt für unterschiedlichste Formen des lokalen Aktivismus zu bieten und zugleich als transnational agierender Akteur aufzutreten. 

Die Anfänge grenzüberschreitender Umweltbewegungen reichen in eine Zeit zurück, die weitaus weniger Vernetzungsmöglichkeiten und Mobilitätschancen bot als heute. Schon vor dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhanges, als eine Zweiteilung Europas das Denken Vieler dominierte, waren AkteurInnen (1) lokaler Umweltbewegungen im kommunistischen Ungarn davon überzeugt, dass sie nur mit grenzübergreifenden Mitteln der Umweltzerstörung entgegentreten könnten. 1988 fanden zum ersten Mal seit der blutigen Niederschlagung des Volkaufstandes 1956 in der ungarischen Hauptstadt der Ungarischen Volksrepublik wieder Massenproteste statt. Am 12. September 1988 versammelten sich mehrere zehntausend Menschen vor dem Parlamentsgebäude, um gegen das bilaterale Staustufenprojekt an der Donau, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Vízlépcso˝ – GNV, zu demonstrieren. Der kostenintensive Megabau geriet in der zweiten Hälfte der 1980er Jahre zu einem starken Symbol sämtlicher Missstände im Land und bildete eines der zentralen Streitthemen am Vorabend des Systemwechsels in Ungarn. Dass sich am 12. September auch zahlreiche ÖsterreicherInnen unter den DemonstrantInnen befanden, war kein Zufall, sondern das Ergebnis jahrelanger Kooperation über die Systemgrenzen hinaus. Gemeinsam gelang es der »Donaubewegung « (2), internationale Aufmerksamkeit für die befürchteten Umweltschäden vonGNV zu erregen. 1989 zog sich Ungarn aus dem Projekt zurück. Der Fall GNV kann damit als ein zentrales Kapitel mitteleuropäischer Protestgeschichte betrachtet werden. Die Geschichte dieser Grenzüberschreitung steht im Zentrum dieses Buches. 

(…) 

Das Jahrzehnt der Ökologisierung 

Um die Hintergründe der Proteste gegen das Kraftwerksprojekt zu verstehen, müssen die damaligen Ereignisse mit den gesamtgesellschaftlichen Veränderungen jener Zeit, also den Europäisierungs- und Transnationalisierungstendenzen sowie der Ökologiebewegung in Bezug gesetzt werden. Ein Blick auf den Forschungsstand veranschaulicht, warum eine Synthese von Ansätzen aus der Protest- und Bewegungsforschung, der Umwelt- und Technologiegeschichte sowie der historischen und soziologischen Auseinandersetzung mit Umweltbewegungen in der Region nötig ist, um die historischen Grenzüberschreitungen strukturiert zu untersuchen und für künftige komparatistische Studien aufzubereiten. Eine Grundlage bilden die Transformationen der 1970er Jahre, die vom Umwelthistoriker Joachim Radkau eingängig beschrieben wurden. (4) Unter Berufung auf Max Nicholsons »Environmental Revolution« verortet Radkau in dem Jahrzehnt nicht nur einen demografischen Wendepunkt, sondern auch den Beginn einer »großen Kettenreaktion«. (5) Gesteigertes Bewusstsein für Umweltprobleme, Wachstumskritik und die Hinterfragung bisheriger Denkmuster (6) zeichneten die ökologische Wende jener Jahre aus. Ihre Eigenschaft der Prozesshaftigkeit hieltmit dem Begriff der Ökologisierung Eingang in den bundesdeutschen Diskurs. (7) Die Wurzeln dieser gesellschaftlichen Durchdringung von Umweltfragen reichten natürlich weiter zurück. Die Wende äußerte sich nun darin, dass »das neue Umweltengagement seine Adressaten bekam und nicht im leeren Raum verpuffte«. (8) Wurde die Öko-Szene oft mit Stereotypen behaftet, bezeugten die 1970er Jahre eine größere Vielfalt an AgitatorInnen, die nicht mehr zwangsläufig mit der neomarxistisch dominierten Studierendenbewegung des Jahres 1968 gleichgesetzt werden konnte. Die VertreterInnen der ökologischen Wende kamen nun aus unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen. (9) »Was sich vielerorts als Subkultur präsentierte, war inWahrheit ein Segment der neuen Hochkultur.« (10) 

Aktives Umweltengagement bildete sich in Europa vorwiegend als Reaktion auf die rapide Industrialisierung im 19. Jahrhundert. In Folge der Luft- und Wasserverschmutzung sowie der Urbanisierung gründete sich schon im Jahr 1865 die Commons Preservation Society (11) in Großbritannien, deren Nachfolgeorganisation bis heute aktiv ist. (12) Auch in Österreich lassen sich Praktiken des Naturschutzes auf das späte 19. und frühe 20. Jahrhundert zurückführen. Ein bekannter Vorläufer des offensivenUmweltprotestswar Josef Schöffel, der in den Jahren 1870–1892 Widerstand gegen die Zerstörung des Wienerwalds leistete. Assoziationen wie der Österreichische Naturschutzbund – ÖNB, gegründet 1913, »Die Naturfreunde in Österreich«, gegründet 1895, oder der »Alpenverein«, gegründet 1862, bildeten die ersten InteressensvertreterInnen für naturbewusste ArbeiterInnen und BürgerInnen. (13)

»Ging es den konservativen Naturschützern darum, Einzelobjekte, Arten und Denkmäler vor dem Menschen zu schützen und zu bewahren, so ging es den Sozialdemokraten um die Erschließung der Natur für die Arbeiter und um den damit assoziierten Erholungswert im Rahmen einer kulturellen Arbeiterbewegung. War diese Kulturbewegung Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts noch relativ stark, so verlor sie in den Kriegsjahren und in der anschließenden Phase der nachholenden Modernisierung weitgehend an Bedeutung in der Arbeiterbewegung, ohne gänzlich verloren zu gehen.« (14) 

Die unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen und Traditionen der NaturschützerInnen – Radkau nennt sie die verschiedenen Arten der Naturliebe – trugen auch in den später aufkommenden Umweltbewegungen der 1970er Jahre zur heterogenen Beschaffenheit und zu Abgrenzungsversuchen ihrer VertreterInnen bei. Diese äußerten sich etwa in Konfliktlinien hinsichtlich der Kompromissbereitschaft gegenüber politischen Lösungsvorschlägen, aber auch in den Selbst- und Fremdbildern der EinzelakteurInnen und Gruppen selbst. Schon nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg setzten sich in Europa erneut namhafte Autoren wie der amerikanische Historiker John W. Dower oder der britische Pflanzenökologe Arthur George Tansley für Fragen desUmwelt- und Naturschutzes ein. Zweifellos kennzeichnete die »ökologische Dekade« (15) der 1970er Jahre jedoch ein verändertes Selbstverständnis in den Mensch-Natur-Beziehungen. Gehörten ökologische Fragen bis dahin eher zu den gesellschaftlichen Randthemen (16), formten Publikationen wie Rachel Carsons »Silent Spring« (17) (1962) und »The Limits to Growth report« (18) (1972) zentrale »milestones of modern international environmentalism « (19). Gemeinsam mit Aktionen, wie dem ersten »Earth Day« 1970 oder der Stockholm-Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen 1972 in Helsinki, trugen sie zu einem global gesteigerten Bewusstsein für Umwelt und Ökologie bei. (20) Anstöße für diese neuen Sichtweisen bildeten die zunehmende Kritik an neoliberalen Dogmen innerhalb der kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaften und – in Bezug auf Osteuropa – steigende Unzufriedenheit mit den privilegierten Eliten kommunistischer Regimes. Die Ökologisierung reiht sich damit auch in die globalen Entwicklungstendenzen der 1970er Jahre ein – ein Jahrzehnt des Überganges, das Radkau auch als »Sattelzeit« bezeichnete. (21) Auch wenn die Naturschutzbewegungen des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts mit jenen der späteren Jahrzehnte die Absicht teilten, bestehende Werte und Logiken der Industriegesellschaft zu verändern, so unterschieden sie sich hinsichtlich ihrer Gesellschaftsvisionen und konkreten Zielsetzungen. (22) Standen bislang der Schutz vonArten oder der Erhalt vonbeeindruckenden Landschaften im Blickfeld der NaturschützerInnen, wurde die Debatte nun um den »Diskurs über komplexe Nutzungsansprüche und den damit verbundenen Konflikten und ihren Akteuren« erweitert. (23) ForscherInnen wiesen eindringlich auch die negativen Folgen eines ungebremsten technischen Fortschrittes hin und warnten unter dem Titel »Die Grenzen des Wachstums« vor dem zunehmenden durch Menschenhand verursachten Druck auf die Umwelt. (24) Vereinfacht gesagt argumentieren die AutorInnen dafür, dass der Mensch bzw. eine Gesellschaft sich eigene Grenzen setzen soll, anstatt so lange weiterzuwachsen bis eine neue natürliche Grenze erscheint, in der Hoffnung, bis dahin eine technologische Lösung zu ihrer Überwindung gefunden zu haben. (25) Durch ihr Ziel, gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu ermöglichen, wurden Umweltbewegungen zu einem Sammelbecken für AgitatorInnen des beschränkten Wachstums und der Technik-Kritik. Mit der Entstehung von Sozialen (Umwelt-) Bewegungen als »New Politics« (26) erhielt die Ökologie als rein naturwissenschaftlicher Begriff eine Kategorie, die fortan auch mit politischer Macht in Verbindung stand. Als eine Form von Sozialen Bewegungen zielen ihre AkteurInnen darauf ab, gesellschaftlichen Wandel hinsichtlich des Schutzes der Umwelt herbeizuführen. Sie setzten sich für die Reduktion oder Vermeidung von Umweltschäden ein und fordern eine nachhaltige Nutzung von natürlichen Ressourcen. (27) Im zweigeteilten Europa der 1970er und 1980er Jahre bedeuteten Umweltbewegungen zwangsläufig auch die Infragestellung bestehender Machtverhältnisse. Die Autoren Simo Juhani Laakkonen, Viktor Pál und Richard Tucker sehen folglich klare Wechselwirkungen zwischen ökologischen Fragen und Aspekten des Kalten Krieges (1946–1991). (28) 

»On the one hand, concerns over environmental contamination or destruction called into question the meaningfulness of the Cold War itself. A growing number of people across the globe realised that the Cold War endangered not only individual freedom, democracy, and the sovereignty of states, but also the state of the environment, the existence of the human race, and even the viability of Planet Earth. On the other hand, the specific socio-political structures of the Cold War deeply affected the physical and mental environment and emergence of related ideas, ideals, organisations and activities. […] Cold-War-dominated political discourse framed the agendas and set the parameters of policy that strongly affected the kind of environmental politics that emerged.« (29)

Die Beschäftigung mit Umweltbewegungen stellt daher nicht nur für die Umweltgeschichte ein wichtiges Feld dar, sondern führt auch VertreterInnen der Cold War history durch neues Terrain. Mit Blick auf Österreichs Rolle im Kalten Krieg weisen etwa Maximilian Graf und Agnes Meisinger auf Forschungsdesiderata zum »ökologischen Paradigmenwechsel« hin. (30) Forschungen, die bewusst nationalstaatliche Grenzen überblicken, zeigen das erstarkende Interesse von HistorikerInnen an Umweltprotesten. Die deutsche Historikerin und Kulturwissenschaftlerin Astrid Mignon Kirchhof und der US-amerikanische Umwelthistoriker John McNeill versammeln in ihrem 2019 erschienen Sammelband »Nature and the Iron Curtain« (31) mehrere Fallstudien aus kapitalistischen und kommunistischen Ländern und zeigen darin auf, wie unterschiedlich die jeweiligen lokalen Bedürfnisse, politischen Spielräume und Dynamiken von Umweltbewegungen waren. Zugleich weisen die HerausgeberInnen aber auch auf die Wichtigkeit transnationaler Perspektiven hin, indem sie die Durchlässigkeit des Eisernen Vorhanges hinsichtlich der AktivistInnen und ihrer Ideen hervorheben. (32)

»Despite the resonance of Churchill’s phrase, the Iron Curtain was never watertight. People, goods, and ideas seeped through. Ideas need mediators such as activists, politicians, experts, social organizations, and the media. All act as transmitting agents for relevant information, ideas, and values. But the successful transmission of ideas needs more than a mere placing of ideas into a different context. A willingness to accept new ideas and values, absorb them, and adjust them to the specific circumstances is also needed. One of the arenas in which ideas seeped, and eventually flowed, through cracks in the Iron Curtain was environmentalism and environmental policy.« (33)

Für die vorliegende Studie von besonderem Interesse sind dabei die entstehenden Spannungsverhältnisse zwischen Gesellschaft, politischer Macht und wirtschaftlichen Partikularinteressen sowie die Beschaffenheit der Protestarenen und die Durchlässigkeit (34) der jeweiligen (Teil-)Öffentlichkeiten in den letzten Jahren des zweigeteilten Europas. Denn, um die Worte Radkaus zu zitieren, »erst musste sich der Bann des Kalten Krieges lösen, damit die Stunde der Ökologie schlug.« (35) Angesichts des Facettenreichtums jener Spannungsverhältnisse überrascht es nicht, dass sich zahlreiche Forschungen mit der ökologischen Wende und ihren Folgen näher befassen.36 Im Bereich der Umweltgeschichte können hierbei wichtige wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Abhandlungen u. a. zur Energiegeschichte (37) genannt werden. Transnationalisierungstendenzen werden vorwiegend in juristischer Hinsicht (Schaffung vonUmweltgesetzen) sowie im Hinblick auf Europapolitik und Governance-Ansätze untersucht, (38) wobei zugleich oftmals der Fokus auf westeuropäische Entwicklungen gelegt wird. Gerade die Erforschung von historischen Umweltbewegungen, insbesondere in Bezug auf ihre grenzüberschreitenden Aktivitäten entlang des Eisernen Vorhanges, weist nach wie vor große Lücken auf. Trotz der bereits zu nationalen Mythen aufgestiegenen Protestereignisse (Hainburg und Zwentendorf) gehören Umweltbewegungen lediglich zu den Randnotizen in der Protest- und Umweltgeschichte. Umweltgeschichte ist auch in Österreich vorwiegend aus der Technik- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte entstanden. Folglich legt auch die Literatur ihren Schwerpunkt auf die wirtschaftlichen und technischen Aspekte der Mensch-Natur-Beziehungen. (39) Zu den wenigenWerken, die sich stärker auf kulturhistorischeAnsätze fokussieren, aber letztlich doch auf nationale Grenzen beschränkt bleiben, gehört Martin Schmid und Ortrun Veichtlbauers Studie zur Umweltpolitik in der Zweiten Republik, in der die AutorInnen den Weg »vom Naturschutz zur Ökologiebewegung « nachzuzeichnen versuchen. Ihre erstellte Zeittafel schließt auch Protestereignisse in diese Geschichte ein. (40)

 

1 Im Folgenden wird der Akteurs-Begriff mit einem Binnen-I versehen, wenn dieser als Sammelbegriff für Organisationen und Personen benutzt wird. Ist lediglich von Bewegungen bzw. Bewegungsorganisationen die Rede, so wird auf diese Kennzeichnung verzichtet.

2 An manchen Stellen ist gleichbedeutend auch von »Blue Danube Movement« die Rede. Vgl. u. a.: Szabina Kerényi/Máté Szabó, Transnational influences on patterns of mobilisation within environmental movements in Hungary, in: Environmental Politics, 15 (2006) 5, 803–820.

4 Vgl. Joachim Radkau, Die Ära der Ökologie. Eine Weltgeschichte, München 2011. 

5  Max Nicholson, The Environmental Revolution: A Guide for the New Masters of the World, London 1970. 

6 Siehe dazu u. a.: Erich Hörl, Die Ökologisierung des Denkens, in: Zeitschrift für Medienwissenschaft 8 (2016) 1, 33–45; Dieter Mersch, Ökologie und Ökologisierung, in: Internationales Jahrbuch für Medienphilosophie 4 (2018) 1, 187–220. 

7 Vgl. Radkau, Ära, 126 (ebook). 

8 Ebd., 134. 

9 Vgl. ebd., 131. 

10 Ebd. 

11 Großbritanniens älteste Naturschutzorganisation wurde 1865 als »Commons Preservation Society« gegründet. Heute heißt die Organisation »Open Spaces Society« und hat ihren Sitz in Henley-on-Thames, England. 

12 Vgl. Our History – Three Key People, URL: https://www.oss.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ (abgerufen 12. 1. 2021). 

13 Vgl. Dieter Pesendorfer, Paradigmenwechsel in der Umweltpolitik. Von den Anfängen der Umwelt- zu einer Nachhaltigkeitspolitik: Modellfall Österreich?, Wiesbaden 2007. 

14 Ebd., 49. 

15 Radkau, Ära, 27. 

16 Für einen genaueren Überblick siehe: Simo Laakkonen/Viktor Pál/Richard Tucker, The Cold War and environmental history: complementary fields, in: Cold War History 16 (2016) 4, 2. 

17 Vgl. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring. Encyclopedia of Toxicology,1.Aufl., Boston/New York 1962.

18 Vgl. Donella H. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows/Randers Jorgen/William W. III Behrens, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New York 1972. 

19 Vgl. Laakkonen/Pál/Tucker, Cold War, 2; vgl. ebenso: John McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 20th-Century World, New York 2000. 

20 Vgl. Laakkonen/Pál/Tucker, Cold War, 2. 

21 Radkau, Ära, 57; siehe ebenso: Niklas Perzi/Václav Sˇmidrkal, Die langen 1970er Jahre: Die Sattelzeit an der Systemgrenze zwischen »Ost« und »West«, in: Niklas Perzi/Hildegard Schmoller/Ota Konrád/Václav Sˇmidrkal (Hg.), Nachbarn. Ein Österreich-Tschechisches Geschichtsbuch, Weitra 2019, 265–290. 

22 Vgl. Fagan, Environment, 27. 

23 Pesendorfer, Paradigmenwechsel, 50. Siehe ebenso: Harald Payer, Der Nationale Umweltplan (NUP) für Österreich, in: Martin Jänicke/Alexander Carius/Harald Payer (Hg.), Nationale Umweltpläne in ausgewählten Industrieländern, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1997, 121–139; sowie: Fagan, Environment, 26. 

24 Vgl. Meadows/Meadows/Jorgen/Behrens, Limits to Growth (1972). 

25 Vgl. ebd., 152f. 

26 Zit.n. P. Koopmans, New Social Movements and Changes in Political Participation in Western Europe, in: West European Politics 19 (1996), 28–50. Zitiert in: Fagan, Environment, 38. 

27 Angelehnt an den Eintrag auf Oxford Reference: »Environmental movements«. URL: https:// www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095753651 (abgerufen 22. 2. 2021). 

28 Mehrere Fallstudien, nachzulesen bei: Astrid Mignon Kirchhof/John R. McNeill (Hg.), Nature and the Iron Curtain: Environmental Policy and Social Movements in Communist and Capitalist Countries, 1945–1990, Pittsburgh 2019. 

29 Laakkonen/Pál/Tucker, Cold War, 3. 

30 Maximilian Graf/Agnes Meisinger (Hg.), Österreich im Kalten Krieg. Neue Forschungen im internationalen Kontext, Wien 2016, 18. 

31 Kirchhof/McNeill (Hg.), Nature and the Iron Curtain: Environmental Policy and Social Movements in Communist and Capitalist Countries, 1945–1990 Pittsburgh 2019. 

32 Vgl. Astrid Mignon Kirchhof/John R. McNeill, Introduction: Environmentalism, Environmental Policy, Capitalism, and Communism, in: Astrid Mignon Kirchhof/John R. McNeill (Hg.), Nature and the Iron Curtain: Environmental Politcy and Social Movements in Communist and Capitalist Countries, 1945–1990, Pittsburgh 2019, 3–14, hier: 8.

33 Ebd. 

34  Mehr zum Thema Durchlässigkeit des Eisernen Vorhanges bei: Wlodzimierz Borodziej/Jerzy Kochanowski/Joachim Puttkamer (Hg.), »Schleichwege«, Köln 2010, doi:10.7788/boehlau. 9783412213060

35 Radkau, Ära, 118. 

36 Zu den 1970er Jahren siehe u. a.: Antonio Varsori/Guia Migani, Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. L’Europe sur la scène internationale dans les années 1970, Brüssel 2011; Aida Bosch/Helmut Fehr/Clemens Kroetsch/Gert Schmidt Hrsg/Aida Bosch/Helmut Fehr, Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Wiesbaden 1999; Duco Hellema, The Global 1970s: Radicalism, Reform, and Crisis, New York 2018. 

37 Vgl. u. a.: Christopher Fabre, La dimension environnementales des politiques énergétiques française et allemande de 1973 aux années 2000: de l’antagonisme à la convergence des modèles? [Die Umweltdimension der französischen und deutschen Energiepolitik von 1973 bis 2000], phil. Diss., Université Sorbonne Paris IV 2017. 

38 Vgl. u. a.: Jan-Henrik Meyer,Umweltpolitik, in: Éric Bussière/Piers Ludlow/Federico Romero/ Dieter Schlenker/Vincent Dujardin/Antonio Varsori (Hg.), Die Europäische Kommission 1986–2000: Geschichte und Erinnerungen einer Institution, Luxemburg 2019, 403–421; Anthony Zito, Environmental Policy and Governance: Bringing the State Back In (Again)?, in: Giliberto Capano/Michael Howlett/M. Ramesh (Hg.), Varieties of Governance: Dynamics, Strategies and Capacities, London 2015, 74–100. 

39 Siehe dazu u. a. Ernst Bruckmüller/Ernst Hanisch/Roman Sandgruber (Hg.), Geschichte der österreichischen Land- und Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert (2 Bände), Wien 2003. 

40 Martin Schmid/Ortrun Veichtlbauer/Hubert Christian Ehalt (Hg.), Vom Naturschutz zur Ökologiebewegung. Umweltgeschichte Österreichs in der Zweiten Republik. Österreich- Zweite Republik. Befund, Kritik, Perspektive, 19. Aufl., Wien 2007.

Air Schengen – progress or precedent?

Congratulations are in order for Romania and Bulgaria as they join the Schengen area, with the lifting of maritime and air border controls after years in the waiting room. However, there is a catch to this long-awaited moment. In their new entry on the IDM Blog, Sophia Beiter and Sebastian Schäffer explain what is problematic about this solution and why its gravity is not as substantial as announced.

Romania, Bulgaria and Austria have apparently made progress in their negotiations on the accession of the two Black Sea countries to the Schengen area. It has been reported that Austria may agree to the establishment of the so-called “Air Schengen” for Bulgaria and Romania as early as March 2024, which was proposed by the Federal Minister of the Interior Gerhard Karner earlier this month.

What is “Air Schengen”?

Partial Schengen entry by air would mean that passengers from Romania and Bulgaria would no longer have to fly to other Schengen countries via the international terminal. In terms of air (and sea) transport, Bulgaria and Romania would therefore be part of the Schengen area. However, border controls by land would continue.

In principle, opening the borders for air traffic represents progress in the protracted Schengen accession negotiations and is therefore to be welcomed. Nevertheless, “Air Schengen” does not replace full Schengen membership.

Why “Air Schengen” is not enough:

1. The agreement comes rather late, especially in view of the fact that the European Commission declared Bulgaria’s and Romania’s readiness to join the Schengen area back in 2011. A compromise like Schengen entry by air and/or sea could therefore have been struck over a decade ago and especially helped to avoid the diplomatic faux pas from last December, when Austria vetoed the accession. However, there is a strong possibility that the decision was ultimately not taken by Karner, but in the Federal Chancellery. In any case, such a compromise could potentially set a dangerous precedent. If additional barriers are added to the criteria that need to be fulfilled e.g. to join Schengen, this could ultimately be extended to other policy areas or enlargement in general. This compromise therefore not only creates an additional possibility to veto and thus extort countries but also contributes to a multi-layered, potentially two-class EU, which adds unnecessary complexity as well as frustration.

2. Border controls in air traffic affect far fewer people and are far less problematic in terms of waiting times, bureaucracy and CO2 emissions. Business travellers and tourists to and from Bulgaria and Romania may have less waiting time at the airport, but trucks will continue to get stuck at border controls for long periods of time. Even with the (mostly questionable) reintroduced border controls among Schengen members, the average waiting time between Upper Austria and Bavaria, for instance, is 20 minutes, compared to a mean six hours at the border to Romania and/or Bulgaria.

3. Austria has announced a number of conditions for the implementation of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s partial Schengen accession: an increase in the Frontex mission; more money, personnel and material for the protection of external borders; and that Romania and Bulgaria take in more asylum seekers, particularly from Afghanistan and Syria. While stricter border controls could be accepted by Romania and Bulgaria, the last demand is logistically and politically rather unrealistic. In mid-December, Prime Minister Denkov still vehemently rejected this “migrants for Schengen” offer. It also undermines to a certain extent the deal struck just over a week before on 20 December at the European Parliament, which commits the national governments of member states to show more solidarity and share responsibility regarding asylum and migration.

For more on the topic watch the discussion: The Future of the Schengen Area: Exploring its Enlargement.

Read the op-ed (in German) in Die Presse.

EU Summit 2023: Historic Decisions, Unity Challenges and a Path Forward

On Friday 15 December, the EU summit was concluded, characterized by journalists and experts as “historic.” The agenda for the final meeting of 2023 covered several “divisive” issues, including the situation in the Gaza Strip, challenges of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe, the twelfth package of sanctions against Russia, and, notably, the initiation of negotiations for the EU’s enlargement, including talks with Ukraine. 

The last agenda emerged as the most significant test of European unity in the past year. While Europe ultimately succeeded in passing this test, affirming Kyiv’s European future, the symbolic decision came at a considerable cost for Brussels. It also failed to reach unity on a more pragmatic matter – the approval of the next financial assistance package for Ukraine. 

The EU summit on 14–15 December featured two focal points concerning Ukraine: the commencement of negotiations for the country’s EU accession and the allocation of a 50-billion-euro tranche for Kyiv over the next four years. Ukraine had attained candidate status for EU membership in the summer of 2022, and in early November 2023, the European Commission recommended initiating accession talks with Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This recommendation awaited approval from the European Council at the summit. Although this represented only the fourth of nine formal stages required for EU accession, the principled stance of EU member countries on Ukraine’s admission held considerable importance. 

Despite encountering challenges, the EU demonstrated unity on this critical issue, propelling Ukraine to the next stage in its journey towards EU membership. However, the path to this “historic decision” required Brussels to once again make concessions to Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister. Notably, voting on the Ukraine matter proceeded without Orbán, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suggested that he should “go for a coffee”, leading to unanimous approval by the remaining 26 participants. 

Nevertheless, Orbán wielded his veto power in the subsequent vote, focusing on the second Ukrainian issue – financial aid. The preparation and trajectory of this summit revealed that Hungary alone was not responsible for eroding EU unity in supporting Ukraine. Slovakia, under the leadership of right-wing conservative politician Robert Fico, and even Austria, attempting to navigate economic relations between Moscow and Brussels, also contributed to this trend. 

Hungary’s Defiance and EU Leverage Tactics 

Anticipations of challenges with Hungary’s stance were evident well before the “historic summit.” The ongoing conflict between Brussels and Budapest spans almost a decade, originating with Viktor Orbán’s establishment of an authoritarian regime in Hungary. EU leaders have expressed concern over the erosion of the rule of law, the diminishing press freedom, and pervasive corruption in the country. In an attempt to guide Hungary back to the democratic path, the EU has begun employing financial measures. 

Specifically, Brussels opted to freeze previously allocated funding from European funds to Hungary, employing a tactic frequently used in the past, such as in the case of Poland when Prawo i Sprawiedliwość  (Law and Justice) party held power and was steering the country on an authoritarian trajectory. 

However, these leverage tactics, successful in some instances, currently face resistance in Hungary. Ahead of the summit, Hungary enacted a new law on the “protection of national sovereignty.” Under its provisions, a dedicated service is being established to investigate “foreign interference” in Hungary’s political sphere. Further details about this legislation can be found in an episode of the IDM Short Insights series. 

Viktor Orbán himself has chosen to counter the EU using what Brussels perceives as blackmail, deploying leverage tactics to resist the union’s influence. Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Budapest has consistently impeded various decisions that were averse to Kremlin interests, spanning from individual anti-Russian sanctions to the provision of military or financial assistance to Kyiv. 

Austrian and Slovak Dilemmas: Balkan Ambitions and Disputes with Kyiv 

A week preceding the summit, not only Hungary but also Slovakia and Austria jointly signalled their reluctance to endorse the opening of negotiations for Ukraine’s EU accession. While the support for Budapest’s veto on financial aid for Kyiv was expected from Bratislava, it came as more of a surprise coming from Vienna.  

In Slovakia, Robert Fico, representing the social conservative party SMER SSD (Direction – Social Democracy), assumed power in mid-autumn. During the election campaign, Fico gained support from voters disappointed by prolonged political instability, post-coronavirus economic challenges, and the energy crisis resulting from the conflict in Ukraine. Proposing to cease aid to Ukraine and positioning himself as a mediator in peace talks with Russia, Fico maintained a consistent stance by refusing to supply weapons to Ukraine and supporting Viktor Orbán at the summit. 

Austria, like Hungary, possesses its own negotiation points with both Brussels and Kyiv. Among Austria’s interests are the Balkans, where historical influence and geographical location have played a significant role. Austria has consistently advocated for the swift accession of Western Balkan countries, primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia to the EU. 

In November this year, the European Commission recommended initiating accession negotiations not only with Ukraine and Moldova but also with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The head of the Austrian Foreign Ministry cautioned against scrutinizing the Western Balkans too strictly while adopting a more optimistic view of Ukraine. Simultaneously, Brussels displayed a lack of urgency in commencing accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing a slow pace of necessary reforms for EU membership. 

Austria faced a disagreement with Kyiv, specifically concerning Raiffeisenbank. In the lead-up to the December summit, Vienna replicated Hungary’s actions by demanding the exclusion of Raiffeisenbank from Ukraine’s list of war sponsors. The bank’s inclusion into this list was based on its continued operations in Russia. Similarly, Hungary successfully secured the removal of its OTP bank from the list of war sponsors in exchange for supporting another sanctions package against Russia. 

Despite Austria’s approval of the 12th EU sanctions package against Russia, substantial progress at the summit on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession was elusive. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, the summit opted not to initiate negotiations with Sarajevo. Nevertheless, Vienna’s stance was considered, with the European Commission recommending to compile a report on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform progress by March 2024, paving the way for a subsequent decision. 

The EU’s Diplomatic Manoeuvres 

The EU was aware of the threat of two important decisions to help Ukraine being blocked and tried to stop a possible political crisis in advance. On the morning of the summit’s first day, a confidential meeting took place involving French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, European Council President Charles Michel, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. This gathering followed a late-evening meeting on the eve of the summit, featuring Michel, Macron, Scholz, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The goal for this meeting was to formulate a unified stance for negotiations with countries intending to impede decisions. 

Despite the EU’s extensive efforts to foster unity in the vote, including the unfreezing of 10.2 billion euros for Budapest just before the summit, Hungary persisted in vetoing the decision regarding financial assistance to Ukraine. 

Ukraine ultimately found itself as a “hostage” to the three Central European states, although it acquiesced to many of the EU’s demands. Notably, Kyiv amended the law on national minorities twice, substantially enhancing their rights – such as allowing national minorities to display banners in their own languages. This had been a longstanding demand from Budapest, given the significant Hungarian diaspora in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The latest amendments were enacted just before the summit. 

The EU’s Dilemma: Balancing Unity, Opposition, and Reform at the Historic Summit 

At first glance, the “historic summit” seemingly demonstrated Europe’s ability to push through pivotal decisions despite resistance from Hungary, Slovakia and Austria. Moreover, representatives of the general political community in Europe adopted a more assertive stance. The primary political groups in the European Parliament – the European People’s Party, the Social Democrats, Renew and the Greens – staunchly opposed offering new concessions to Orbán in exchange for support for Ukraine. Together with the Czech Republic, they advocated for exploring alternative support mechanisms to avoid succumbing to Orbán’s blackmail. 

However, this scenario does not suggest a systematic approach to the problem, as far-right forces and Eurosceptics in power across various EU countries retain the capacity to obstruct decision-making. With the backdrop of war and a challenging economic situation, this places the EU at a significant disadvantage compared to potential opponents. 

Nonetheless, the EU has an avenue for resolution. On the summit’s eve, the European Parliament initiated a comprehensive reform process, aiming to diminish, if not entirely eliminate, a country’s ability to exploit the veto as a tool of blackmail. Although this process is complicated and necessitates the involvement of numerous stakeholders, if enacted, it is unlikely to materialize in the immediate future. 

 

Kamila Bogdanova – a student in the Master’s program in International Relations at Masaryk University (Brno, Czechia) and a current trainee at the IDM (September to January 2024). She holds a BA degree in International Area Studies from Charles University (Prague, Czechia). 

IDM Short Insights 30: What does the new Hungarian law on sovereignty mean for the opposition?

Last week the Hungarian parliament passed the “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty”, which de facto targets opposition parties. Under the guise of protecting election campaigns from foreign influence, the newly established office can conduct investigations at any institution, copying and taking away documents without judicial permission and control. Our colleague Péter Techet explains the details of the bill and what consequences it may have for the Hungarian opposition.

Transcript:

On Tuesday evening, the Hungarian Parliament passed the “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty.” Representatives from the ruling parties Fidesz and KDNP, along with the small far-right opposition party “Our Homeland,” voted in favor of the law, while the other opposition parties opposed it. 

The justification for the new Bill makes it clear that its target is the opposition parties. They are accused of receiving funds from abroad, thereby violating even existing rules on party financing.  

Let me quote the legislative reasoning of the Bill: “Hungary’s sovereignty is increasingly under attack […]. For years, attempts to exert influence have been observed, where foreign organizations and individuals try to enforce their own interests in our country, contrary to Hungarian interests and rules. Already during the parliamentary election campaign in 2022, there were attempts to influence the elections with funds directly from abroad, as confirmed by the National Intelligence Service’s investigation into the united left-wing opposition.”  

Clear language, clear statement… 

The new “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty” establishes the “Office for the Protection of Sovereignty,” which can conduct investigations at any institution, copying and taking away documents – even without judicial permission and control!  

The use of foreign funds in an election campaign is now considered a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment of up to 3 years. 

Is the entire law only a form of political rhetoric, or does it pose a real danger to independent institutions? 

The current law does not go so far as to label all institutions receiving foreign funds as “foreign agents” (following the Russian model). However, there is a risk that the new law represents the first step toward increased government control and restriction of independent organizations and media. 

Several independent media outlets protested in a joint letter against the new law, denouncing it as a gateway to “political arbitrariness.” 

Dynamics of the Visegrad Group. Navigating Political Shifts, Challenges and Prospects for EU Enlargement

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15 will see key decisions made on EU enlargement – will the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) stay (dis)united? Kinga Brudzinska explains what can be expected in her newest piece on the IDM blog. 

The political differences in the Visegrad Four (V4) countries that emerged as a result of the elections in Poland (15 October 2023) and Slovakia (30 September 2023) will not significantly impact the dynamics of cooperation among the group. The format remains in crisis due to Hungary’s pro-Russia foreign policy stance and its sceptical approach to the EU’s pro-Ukraine policy direction.

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15, which will see key decisions made on EU enlargement, will once again highlight the lack of unity and cohesion among V4 group members, with Hungary being the outlier. As a result, the V4 will continue to serve as a platform for regional cooperation, but one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy as seen in response to the 2015 migration crisis or the “Nutella crisis” in 2017 when the V4 mobilised to fight against the “double standards” of imported food sold in their countries.

What is more, in the long run, the ideological differences are not likely to divide the countries that created the V4, regardless of the political preference of ruling governments. For example, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), co-managed by V4 countries and supporting regional cooperation projects in the region, or formats such as Think Visegrad—V4 Think Tank Platform, a hub of V4 joint analysis, remain an important aspect of cooperation. On the other hand, there is a threat that due to persisting political differences, the individual V4 countries will seek to engage in alternative formats of regional cooperation. For example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will most likely invest in the development of the Slavkov Triangle or Central Five Initiative (C5), involving Austria. Poland will focus on rebuilding relations within the Weimar Triangle and will remain active within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) until the end of President Andrzej Duda’s term in 2025.

What will change and what will not

Poland and the Czech Republic will not allow Hungary, and perhaps Slovakia, to appropriate the V4 as a Eurosceptic or even anti-Western platform. Furthermore, Slovakia will not replace Poland to the same extent as an important partner in activating the V4 format or advocating Slovakia’s own position on the international stage. After its initial declaration, Slovakia will most probably not stick to all its electoral promises related to withholding military aid to Ukraine or pursuing a more assertive European policy. This is because Slovakia does not have a tradition of conducting proactive foreign policy, so it is unlikely Bratislava would use its veto power in Brussels to back Hungary. As the V4’s only eurozone country, Slovakia traditionally advocates for a constructive European policy based on consensus. Robert Fico demonstrated such an approach during his previous term.

Polish-Hungarian relations will not improve, and Hungary will be isolated within the V4 over Russia. Prime Minister Orban deliberately plays the role of a disruptor in the EU and NATO decision-making process, openly challenging the model of liberal democracy and steering the country towards an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, soon-to-be new/old Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is known for his critical stance towards Viktor Orban. Bilateral disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (related to Orban’s controversial historical policies) further complicate the situation and isolate Hungary within the V4.

The V4 also faces an image problem in the EU, with a prevailing negative perception of its member countries. Therefore, Poland is not likely to heavily leverage the V4 in the coming years. In recent years, other formats such as the Bucharest Nine (B9), Three Seas Initiative (3SI), Slavkov Triangle, or Central Five Initiative (C5) have gained prominence, with V4 countries actively participating.

Finally, Poland is not necessarily seen by other Visegrad countries as a leader in the region. Poland’s reputation has also been damaged due to the deterioration of the rule of law (Slovakia, under the previous government, became more sceptical of Poland’s actions and pushed V4 activities aside) and the conflict with the Czech Republic over the Turow coal mine.

To sum up, looking back on 2023 and trying to foresee the developments on the international stage in 2024, we can be sure that the V4 will stay on the map of regional groupings in the EU in the years to come and will keep being used as a passive platform for regional cooperation. However, one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy among the V4 unless Hungary adjusts its stance on Russia to align with the European mainstream.