Chances and Challenges of Interethnic Dialogues in Kosovo

/in , , /von
Print

Topic

The nationalist narratives dominate the news about and from Kosovo, on the one hand obscuring other, national indifferent issues, and on the other hand, concealing the possibilities and realities of interethnic dialogues.

The Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM), celebrating its 70th anniversary this year, organised a panel discussion in collaboration with CASA and Integra at the Barabar Centre in Prishtina about the chances and challenges of interethnic dialogues.

The discussion focused on how inter-ethnic dialogues and collaborations can function and be possible beyond nationalizing tendencies. The role of civil society and culture was particularly addressed, as well as the conditions for interethnic coexistence (multilingualism, minority rights, etc.).

EU Summit 2023: Historic Decisions, Unity Challenges and a Path Forward

/in , /von
Print

On Friday 15 December, the EU summit was concluded, characterized by journalists and experts as “historic.” The agenda for the final meeting of 2023 covered several “divisive” issues, including the situation in the Gaza Strip, challenges of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe, the twelfth package of sanctions against Russia, and, notably, the initiation of negotiations for the EU’s enlargement, including talks with Ukraine. 

The last agenda emerged as the most significant test of European unity in the past year. While Europe ultimately succeeded in passing this test, affirming Kyiv’s European future, the symbolic decision came at a considerable cost for Brussels. It also failed to reach unity on a more pragmatic matter – the approval of the next financial assistance package for Ukraine. 

The EU summit on 14–15 December featured two focal points concerning Ukraine: the commencement of negotiations for the country’s EU accession and the allocation of a 50-billion-euro tranche for Kyiv over the next four years. Ukraine had attained candidate status for EU membership in the summer of 2022, and in early November 2023, the European Commission recommended initiating accession talks with Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This recommendation awaited approval from the European Council at the summit. Although this represented only the fourth of nine formal stages required for EU accession, the principled stance of EU member countries on Ukraine’s admission held considerable importance. 

Despite encountering challenges, the EU demonstrated unity on this critical issue, propelling Ukraine to the next stage in its journey towards EU membership. However, the path to this “historic decision” required Brussels to once again make concessions to Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister. Notably, voting on the Ukraine matter proceeded without Orbán, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suggested that he should “go for a coffee”, leading to unanimous approval by the remaining 26 participants. 

Nevertheless, Orbán wielded his veto power in the subsequent vote, focusing on the second Ukrainian issue – financial aid. The preparation and trajectory of this summit revealed that Hungary alone was not responsible for eroding EU unity in supporting Ukraine. Slovakia, under the leadership of right-wing conservative politician Robert Fico, and even Austria, attempting to navigate economic relations between Moscow and Brussels, also contributed to this trend. 

Hungary’s Defiance and EU Leverage Tactics 

Anticipations of challenges with Hungary’s stance were evident well before the “historic summit.” The ongoing conflict between Brussels and Budapest spans almost a decade, originating with Viktor Orbán’s establishment of an authoritarian regime in Hungary. EU leaders have expressed concern over the erosion of the rule of law, the diminishing press freedom, and pervasive corruption in the country. In an attempt to guide Hungary back to the democratic path, the EU has begun employing financial measures. 

Specifically, Brussels opted to freeze previously allocated funding from European funds to Hungary, employing a tactic frequently used in the past, such as in the case of Poland when Prawo i Sprawiedliwość  (Law and Justice) party held power and was steering the country on an authoritarian trajectory. 

However, these leverage tactics, successful in some instances, currently face resistance in Hungary. Ahead of the summit, Hungary enacted a new law on the “protection of national sovereignty.” Under its provisions, a dedicated service is being established to investigate “foreign interference” in Hungary’s political sphere. Further details about this legislation can be found in an episode of the IDM Short Insights series. 

Viktor Orbán himself has chosen to counter the EU using what Brussels perceives as blackmail, deploying leverage tactics to resist the union’s influence. Since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Budapest has consistently impeded various decisions that were averse to Kremlin interests, spanning from individual anti-Russian sanctions to the provision of military or financial assistance to Kyiv. 

Austrian and Slovak Dilemmas: Balkan Ambitions and Disputes with Kyiv 

A week preceding the summit, not only Hungary but also Slovakia and Austria jointly signalled their reluctance to endorse the opening of negotiations for Ukraine’s EU accession. While the support for Budapest’s veto on financial aid for Kyiv was expected from Bratislava, it came as more of a surprise coming from Vienna.  

In Slovakia, Robert Fico, representing the social conservative party SMER SSD (Direction – Social Democracy), assumed power in mid-autumn. During the election campaign, Fico gained support from voters disappointed by prolonged political instability, post-coronavirus economic challenges, and the energy crisis resulting from the conflict in Ukraine. Proposing to cease aid to Ukraine and positioning himself as a mediator in peace talks with Russia, Fico maintained a consistent stance by refusing to supply weapons to Ukraine and supporting Viktor Orbán at the summit. 

Austria, like Hungary, possesses its own negotiation points with both Brussels and Kyiv. Among Austria’s interests are the Balkans, where historical influence and geographical location have played a significant role. Austria has consistently advocated for the swift accession of Western Balkan countries, primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia to the EU. 

In November this year, the European Commission recommended initiating accession negotiations not only with Ukraine and Moldova but also with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The head of the Austrian Foreign Ministry cautioned against scrutinizing the Western Balkans too strictly while adopting a more optimistic view of Ukraine. Simultaneously, Brussels displayed a lack of urgency in commencing accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing a slow pace of necessary reforms for EU membership. 

Austria faced a disagreement with Kyiv, specifically concerning Raiffeisenbank. In the lead-up to the December summit, Vienna replicated Hungary’s actions by demanding the exclusion of Raiffeisenbank from Ukraine’s list of war sponsors. The bank’s inclusion into this list was based on its continued operations in Russia. Similarly, Hungary successfully secured the removal of its OTP bank from the list of war sponsors in exchange for supporting another sanctions package against Russia. 

Despite Austria’s approval of the 12th EU sanctions package against Russia, substantial progress at the summit on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession was elusive. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, the summit opted not to initiate negotiations with Sarajevo. Nevertheless, Vienna’s stance was considered, with the European Commission recommending to compile a report on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform progress by March 2024, paving the way for a subsequent decision. 

The EU’s Diplomatic Manoeuvres 

The EU was aware of the threat of two important decisions to help Ukraine being blocked and tried to stop a possible political crisis in advance. On the morning of the summit’s first day, a confidential meeting took place involving French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, European Council President Charles Michel, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. This gathering followed a late-evening meeting on the eve of the summit, featuring Michel, Macron, Scholz, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The goal for this meeting was to formulate a unified stance for negotiations with countries intending to impede decisions. 

Despite the EU’s extensive efforts to foster unity in the vote, including the unfreezing of 10.2 billion euros for Budapest just before the summit, Hungary persisted in vetoing the decision regarding financial assistance to Ukraine. 

Ukraine ultimately found itself as a “hostage” to the three Central European states, although it acquiesced to many of the EU’s demands. Notably, Kyiv amended the law on national minorities twice, substantially enhancing their rights – such as allowing national minorities to display banners in their own languages. This had been a longstanding demand from Budapest, given the significant Hungarian diaspora in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The latest amendments were enacted just before the summit. 

The EU’s Dilemma: Balancing Unity, Opposition, and Reform at the Historic Summit 

At first glance, the “historic summit” seemingly demonstrated Europe’s ability to push through pivotal decisions despite resistance from Hungary, Slovakia and Austria. Moreover, representatives of the general political community in Europe adopted a more assertive stance. The primary political groups in the European Parliament – the European People’s Party, the Social Democrats, Renew and the Greens – staunchly opposed offering new concessions to Orbán in exchange for support for Ukraine. Together with the Czech Republic, they advocated for exploring alternative support mechanisms to avoid succumbing to Orbán’s blackmail. 

However, this scenario does not suggest a systematic approach to the problem, as far-right forces and Eurosceptics in power across various EU countries retain the capacity to obstruct decision-making. With the backdrop of war and a challenging economic situation, this places the EU at a significant disadvantage compared to potential opponents. 

Nonetheless, the EU has an avenue for resolution. On the summit’s eve, the European Parliament initiated a comprehensive reform process, aiming to diminish, if not entirely eliminate, a country’s ability to exploit the veto as a tool of blackmail. Although this process is complicated and necessitates the involvement of numerous stakeholders, if enacted, it is unlikely to materialize in the immediate future. 

 

Kamila Bogdanova – a student in the Master’s program in International Relations at Masaryk University (Brno, Czechia) and a current trainee at the IDM (September to January 2024). She holds a BA degree in International Area Studies from Charles University (Prague, Czechia). 

A discussion with Sebastian Schäffer at the Institute for Western Affairs

/in /von

In a virtual seminar organized by The Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań, participants eagerly engaged in a thought-provoking discussion led by Sebastian Schäffer, the Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM). The seminar covered a wide range of topics, from IDM’s mission and vision to its unique approach towards Central Europe, as well as pressing geopolitical issues. 

Sebastian Schäffer commenced the discussion by providing a thorough overview of the IDM’s mission and vision, emphasizing the Institute’s dedication to fostering cooperation and dialogue in the Danube Region and Central Europe. A key aspect of the discussion revolved around the IDM’s perspective on the ongoing war in Ukraine. Schäffer highlighted the importance of addressing the conflict and its implications for the broader European context. Additionally, Schäffer shared the insights into the challenges faced by Ukraine and Moldova as they navigate their paths towards potential European Union membership. A significant part of the seminar focused on the Greater European Council for non-EU members, highlighting the potential for joint initiatives and shared governance structures to address common regional issues. The Austrian perspective on the Three Seas Initiative was another key point of the discussion. Participants gained an understanding of how the IDM perceives this regional cooperation framework, its potential impact on Central Europe, and the role Austria envisions in the initiative’s development. Closing the discussion, the Schengen issue and the Austrian veto against the accession of Romania and Bulgaria were addressed. Sebastian Schäffer navigated through the complexities of this matter, highlighting the potential solutions to address the concerns raised by Austria. 

Overall, the online seminar provided a platform for an engaging and informative discussion on the IDM’s role in Central Europe, its perspectives on regional challenges, and its vision for fostering cooperation and integration in the broader European context. We are looking forward to a further cooperation! 

 

Kamila Bogdanova 

IDM Short Insights 30: What does the new Hungarian law on sovereignty mean for the opposition?

/in , , /von
Print

Last week the Hungarian parliament passed the “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty”, which de facto targets opposition parties. Under the guise of protecting election campaigns from foreign influence, the newly established office can conduct investigations at any institution, copying and taking away documents without judicial permission and control. Our colleague Péter Techet explains the details of the bill and what consequences it may have for the Hungarian opposition.

Transcript:

On Tuesday evening, the Hungarian Parliament passed the “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty.” Representatives from the ruling parties Fidesz and KDNP, along with the small far-right opposition party “Our Homeland,” voted in favor of the law, while the other opposition parties opposed it. 

The justification for the new Bill makes it clear that its target is the opposition parties. They are accused of receiving funds from abroad, thereby violating even existing rules on party financing.  

Let me quote the legislative reasoning of the Bill: “Hungary’s sovereignty is increasingly under attack […]. For years, attempts to exert influence have been observed, where foreign organizations and individuals try to enforce their own interests in our country, contrary to Hungarian interests and rules. Already during the parliamentary election campaign in 2022, there were attempts to influence the elections with funds directly from abroad, as confirmed by the National Intelligence Service’s investigation into the united left-wing opposition.”  

Clear language, clear statement… 

The new “Bill on the Protection of Sovereignty” establishes the “Office for the Protection of Sovereignty,” which can conduct investigations at any institution, copying and taking away documents – even without judicial permission and control!  

The use of foreign funds in an election campaign is now considered a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment of up to 3 years. 

Is the entire law only a form of political rhetoric, or does it pose a real danger to independent institutions? 

The current law does not go so far as to label all institutions receiving foreign funds as “foreign agents” (following the Russian model). However, there is a risk that the new law represents the first step toward increased government control and restriction of independent organizations and media. 

Several independent media outlets protested in a joint letter against the new law, denouncing it as a gateway to “political arbitrariness.” 

Daniela Apaydin für PULS24 über den NATO-Beitritt von Schweden und die Beziehung zwischen Ungarn und Türkei

/in , /von

Historikerin Daniela Apaydin spricht im Interview mit Anchor René Ach über den NATO-Beitritt von Schweden und die Beziehung zwischen Ungarn und Türkei.

Sehen Sie sich das Interview hier an.

Hungary as a Trojan Horse of the EU?

/in , , /von

Sebastian Schäffer was interviewed by Eurasia Diary about the relation of Hungary with the EU. It is available in Azeri here.

Here are some excerpts in English:

„I don’t think that Viktor Oban is a Trojan horse of the Russian Federation inside the European Union. However, his actions and standpoint towards Ukraine, certainly serve the interest of Vladimir Putin. It is not the first time and it will unfortunately also not be the last time that the Hungarian Prime Minister is blackmailing Brussels. He needs the additional funds, and in order to unfreeze them he will not resort from using such despicable methods. It is politically, but also morally corrupt to try to gain a financial advantage on the backs of the Ukrainians who have been fighting for our freedom and our values and deserve not only the aid package, but also the opening of the negotiations that at least Orban didn’t veto, but he immediately after the decision has been taken (after he left the room as suggested by the German Chancellor) publicly denounced.“

Special Round Table: Ukraine and Croatia: Navigating (Post) – War Hopes and Challenges

/in , , , /von
Print

While current news about Ukraine is dominated by the war, it is essential to think about how Ukraine can shape its own future after the conflict and how it can address the political, economic, and societal aspects of dealing with the war experiences and traumas.
What similarities and common challenges existed in Croatia and Ukraine before the war, such as a transition to a different type of economy, national independence, minority issues, and different approaches to national history? How can a post-war situation be addressed from legal, political and social perspectives? How can divisive issues like minority rights and debates on memory politics be effectively resolved?
This online panel discussion we explored how Croatian politics, society, and economy had changed during and after the war, as well as how Croatia and other neighbouring countries had addressed the challenges of the post-war period, including addressing war crimes, dealing with EU integration, memory politics, and historical debates.
This event was organised in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Studies/Rijeka, which is celebrating its 70th anniversary this year.

Dynamics of the Visegrad Group. Navigating Political Shifts, Challenges and Prospects for EU Enlargement

/in , , , , , /von

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15 will see key decisions made on EU enlargement – will the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) stay (dis)united? Kinga Brudzinska explains what can be expected in her newest piece on the IDM blog. 

The political differences in the Visegrad Four (V4) countries that emerged as a result of the elections in Poland (15 October 2023) and Slovakia (30 September 2023) will not significantly impact the dynamics of cooperation among the group. The format remains in crisis due to Hungary’s pro-Russia foreign policy stance and its sceptical approach to the EU’s pro-Ukraine policy direction.

The upcoming European Council meeting on December 14–15, which will see key decisions made on EU enlargement, will once again highlight the lack of unity and cohesion among V4 group members, with Hungary being the outlier. As a result, the V4 will continue to serve as a platform for regional cooperation, but one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy as seen in response to the 2015 migration crisis or the “Nutella crisis” in 2017 when the V4 mobilised to fight against the “double standards” of imported food sold in their countries.

What is more, in the long run, the ideological differences are not likely to divide the countries that created the V4, regardless of the political preference of ruling governments. For example, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), co-managed by V4 countries and supporting regional cooperation projects in the region, or formats such as Think Visegrad—V4 Think Tank Platform, a hub of V4 joint analysis, remain an important aspect of cooperation. On the other hand, there is a threat that due to persisting political differences, the individual V4 countries will seek to engage in alternative formats of regional cooperation. For example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will most likely invest in the development of the Slavkov Triangle or Central Five Initiative (C5), involving Austria. Poland will focus on rebuilding relations within the Weimar Triangle and will remain active within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) until the end of President Andrzej Duda’s term in 2025.

What will change and what will not

Poland and the Czech Republic will not allow Hungary, and perhaps Slovakia, to appropriate the V4 as a Eurosceptic or even anti-Western platform. Furthermore, Slovakia will not replace Poland to the same extent as an important partner in activating the V4 format or advocating Slovakia’s own position on the international stage. After its initial declaration, Slovakia will most probably not stick to all its electoral promises related to withholding military aid to Ukraine or pursuing a more assertive European policy. This is because Slovakia does not have a tradition of conducting proactive foreign policy, so it is unlikely Bratislava would use its veto power in Brussels to back Hungary. As the V4’s only eurozone country, Slovakia traditionally advocates for a constructive European policy based on consensus. Robert Fico demonstrated such an approach during his previous term.

Polish-Hungarian relations will not improve, and Hungary will be isolated within the V4 over Russia. Prime Minister Orban deliberately plays the role of a disruptor in the EU and NATO decision-making process, openly challenging the model of liberal democracy and steering the country towards an authoritarian regime. On the other hand, soon-to-be new/old Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is known for his critical stance towards Viktor Orban. Bilateral disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (related to Orban’s controversial historical policies) further complicate the situation and isolate Hungary within the V4.

The V4 also faces an image problem in the EU, with a prevailing negative perception of its member countries. Therefore, Poland is not likely to heavily leverage the V4 in the coming years. In recent years, other formats such as the Bucharest Nine (B9), Three Seas Initiative (3SI), Slavkov Triangle, or Central Five Initiative (C5) have gained prominence, with V4 countries actively participating.

Finally, Poland is not necessarily seen by other Visegrad countries as a leader in the region. Poland’s reputation has also been damaged due to the deterioration of the rule of law (Slovakia, under the previous government, became more sceptical of Poland’s actions and pushed V4 activities aside) and the conflict with the Czech Republic over the Turow coal mine.

To sum up, looking back on 2023 and trying to foresee the developments on the international stage in 2024, we can be sure that the V4 will stay on the map of regional groupings in the EU in the years to come and will keep being used as a passive platform for regional cooperation. However, one should not expect a revival of coordinated foreign or European policy among the V4 unless Hungary adjusts its stance on Russia to align with the European mainstream.

Péter Techet über das Erstarken des Antisemitismus in Europa im Kontext des Nahostkonfliktes

/in , /von

Die ungarischsprachige Sendung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Slowakischen Rundfunks führte ein Interview mit Péter Techet über die Gründe für das Erstarken des Antisemitismus als Folge des Nahostkonflikts. Techet analysierte die pro-israelische Haltung vieler rechtspopulistischer Parteien, mit der sie ihre antimuslimischen Haltungen zu verbergen versuchen. Gleichzeitig sprach er über die antisemitischen Elemente des linken und muslimischen „Antizionismus“.

Das gesamte Gespräch (in ungarischer Sprache) ist hier zu hören.

The Russian war against Ukraine and the (un)changed Central Europe. Challenges and opportunities of regional cooperation

/in , , /von
Print

During the past almost two years, the war in Ukraine and its consequences unprecedentedly challenged Central Europe. Military aid, supplies of weapons and equipment, humanitarian support, integration of fleeing Ukrainians, and a fundamentally changed security and geopolitical climate. As other world events such as the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas unfold, and the war in Ukraine continues, however, the attention on Europe and the willingness to support the attacked Ukraine is starting to wane in some countries, facing rising apathy or denial among societies.

What challenges does Central Europe currently face in connection with the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the resulting security, military and energy transformation in the region? How can existing cross-border and regional cooperation formats support these transformations? What are the possibilities and limits of common, joint action of Central European states amid the ongoing war? Finally, is the perception of the European Union and its aid to Ukraine changing among the Central European populations? Experts on and from Central Europe examined the current political constellation and cooperation of states in the heart of Europe.