Wahlen in Rumänien 2024
Lesen Sie hier das Briefing:
Air Schengen – progress or precedent?
Congratulations are in order for Romania and Bulgaria as they join the Schengen area, with the lifting of maritime and air border controls after years in the waiting room. However, there is a catch to this long-awaited moment. In their new entry on the IDM Blog, Sophia Beiter and Sebastian Schäffer explain what is problematic about this solution and why its gravity is not as substantial as announced.
Romania, Bulgaria and Austria have apparently made progress in their negotiations on the accession of the two Black Sea countries to the Schengen area. It has been reported that Austria may agree to the establishment of the so-called “Air Schengen” for Bulgaria and Romania as early as March 2024, which was proposed by the Federal Minister of the Interior Gerhard Karner earlier this month.
What is “Air Schengen”?
Partial Schengen entry by air would mean that passengers from Romania and Bulgaria would no longer have to fly to other Schengen countries via the international terminal. In terms of air (and sea) transport, Bulgaria and Romania would therefore be part of the Schengen area. However, border controls by land would continue.
In principle, opening the borders for air traffic represents progress in the protracted Schengen accession negotiations and is therefore to be welcomed. Nevertheless, “Air Schengen” does not replace full Schengen membership.
Why “Air Schengen” is not enough:
1. The agreement comes rather late, especially in view of the fact that the European Commission declared Bulgaria’s and Romania’s readiness to join the Schengen area back in 2011. A compromise like Schengen entry by air and/or sea could therefore have been struck over a decade ago and especially helped to avoid the diplomatic faux pas from last December, when Austria vetoed the accession. However, there is a strong possibility that the decision was ultimately not taken by Karner, but in the Federal Chancellery. In any case, such a compromise could potentially set a dangerous precedent. If additional barriers are added to the criteria that need to be fulfilled e.g. to join Schengen, this could ultimately be extended to other policy areas or enlargement in general. This compromise therefore not only creates an additional possibility to veto and thus extort countries but also contributes to a multi-layered, potentially two-class EU, which adds unnecessary complexity as well as frustration.
2. Border controls in air traffic affect far fewer people and are far less problematic in terms of waiting times, bureaucracy and CO2 emissions. Business travellers and tourists to and from Bulgaria and Romania may have less waiting time at the airport, but trucks will continue to get stuck at border controls for long periods of time. Even with the (mostly questionable) reintroduced border controls among Schengen members, the average waiting time between Upper Austria and Bavaria, for instance, is 20 minutes, compared to a mean six hours at the border to Romania and/or Bulgaria.
3. Austria has announced a number of conditions for the implementation of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s partial Schengen accession: an increase in the Frontex mission; more money, personnel and material for the protection of external borders; and that Romania and Bulgaria take in more asylum seekers, particularly from Afghanistan and Syria. While stricter border controls could be accepted by Romania and Bulgaria, the last demand is logistically and politically rather unrealistic. In mid-December, Prime Minister Denkov still vehemently rejected this “migrants for Schengen” offer. It also undermines to a certain extent the deal struck just over a week before on 20 December at the European Parliament, which commits the national governments of member states to show more solidarity and share responsibility regarding asylum and migration.
For more on the topic watch the discussion: The Future of the Schengen Area: Exploring its Enlargement.
Read the op-ed (in German) in Die Presse.
Eines der drängendsten Themen unserer Zeit
Warum das österreichische Veto gegen den Schengen-Beitritt von Bulgarien und Rumänien aus vielen Gründen kurzsichtig ist, erklären Sophia Beiter und Sebastian Schäffer im Gastkommentar in DiePresse.
Lesen Sie es hier.
Der Gastkommentar wurde in internationalen Medien rezipiert:
Special Round Table: Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM) after 70 years
A special Round Table in the framework of
The annivaersary event series “70 Years of the IDM – Locating the Future”
and the Annual Conference of the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies:
“20 Months After the Russian Invasion in Ukraine. What Has Been Done, What Needs to Be Done. Where Is the End?”
(9-11 November 2023, Bucharest)
Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe
(Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa – IDM Vienna)
after 70 years.
Chair: Sebastian Schäffer
Discussants: Prof. Dr. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, Dr. Anatoliy Kruglashov, Prof. Dr. Aleksander Etkind (online), Dr. Iver B. Neumann, Dr. Armand Goșu, Prof. Dr. Radu Carp.
Main topics: the EU enlargement and integration, conditions for a good neighbourhood relationship, and the development of democracy and multilateralism, all of them within the broader context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Further Information:
IDM at the youth event “Young Danube Bridges”
On 19 September, Sophia Beiter attended the event “Young Danube Bridges” at the Collegium Hungaricum in Vienna. Organized by the regional cultural advisor from the Danube Swabian Central Musuem in Ulm, the seminar was part of the project “International Youth Encounters in the Danube Region” and aimed to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and ideas on key issues concerning the area.
Participants from Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova came together to learn about the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. The young people, who are all learning German, presented their countries, brought some typical food from their region and gathered knowledge about the Danube region during creative games and interactive activities. Alongside the IDM, several cultural institutes and embassies of the respective countries were present at the event.
IDM Short Insights 27: Russian attacks on Ukrainian Danube ports
The Danube Region is facing increased Russian missile strikes, posing a threat to the area’s stability, especially near the Romanian border. NATO has been briefed on the situation but found no evidence of deliberate Russian aggression against allied territories. Romania can invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty for consultations. Romania’s Ministry of Defense is prepared to respond to an attack on its soil, but invoking Article 5 is not automatic. Rather than blaming Romania for its proximity to targets, the focus should be on condemning Russia’s attacks and understanding their broader implications, including the weaponization of food.
Transcript:
The Danube Region has come under direct attack. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal, Russian missile strikes targeting Ukrainian ports along the Danube River have significantly increased over the past weeks. The Kremlin is once again threatening the civilian population and risking the region’s safety and stability, as the attacks are happening close to the Romanian border, an EU and NATO member state.
Dylan White, the acting spokesperson for NATO, disclosed this week that Romania’s ambassador has briefed the alliance about the drone fragments that have been found. He emphasized that there is no evidence suggesting any deliberate aggression by Russia against allied territories. However, Romania retains the option to invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which calls for collective consultations among member states to safeguard political independence, territorial integrity, and overall security.
The Ministry of Defense of Romania has asserted that should an attack occur on Romanian soil, the country’s armed forces are fully prepared to respond appropriately. This doesn’t necessarily mean further escalation, as some observers are suggesting. Invoking Article 5, the core of the alliance’s collective defense, is no automatism. Following an attack, the NATO state first has to decide whether or not to ask for support and the response taken is then determined by all members.
Rather than fearing an Article 5 scenario – so effectively blaming Romania for their border being too close to militarily irrelevant targets – we should ultimately be much more concerned about the Russian Federation’s continued heinous attacks, deliberately causing civilian casualties. We need to understand that Putin is taking all of these factors into account, including the further weaponizing of food against the weakest parts of global society.
Call for Papers – The Annual Conference of the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies
The Romanian Centre for Russian Studies (University of Bucharest)
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Oslo)
The Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (Vienna)
are pleased to invite you to
The Annual Conference of the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies:
20 Months After the Russian Invasion in Ukraine.
What Has Been Done, What Needs to Be Done in the Near Future, What Can Be Learned from the Past?
November, 9th-11th 2023
University of Bucharest, Romania
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24th 2022, triggered a consistent humanitarian, financial, and military response from the EU and the NATO members, as well as from other countries around the world.
The international assistance has played an important role in the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, even though the received aid did not always meet expectations. A consistent aid for Ukraine, be it humanitarian, financial, or military will also be needed after this long conflict. The outlook and conditions for further integration of Ukraine in the EU and NATO is already on the international agenda.
The first conference organised by the Romanian Center for Russian Studies of the University of Bucharest and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo on November, 3rd-5th 2022, gathered more than 42 scholars from 11 countries who engaged in an in-depth discussion about the geopolitical challenges of Russian aggression in Ukraine.
The second conference scheduled on November, 9th-11th 2023, aims at providing a platform for qualitative and quantitative analyses of the assistance and support given to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion and also to discuss the outlook and conditions for further integration of Ukraine in the EU and NATO based on the experience from integration of other East European countries and former Soviet republics. The conference will bring together senior specialists as well as emerging scholars. The format will be a combination of paper presentations and discussion panels.
The Conference Committee welcomes papers, theoretical or empirical contributions, related to the following topics:
- Promises, constraints, and deliveries in military aid to Ukraine after the Russian invasion
- International mobilisation towards Ukraine’s economic and humanitarian aid: qualitative and quantitative analyses
- The enlargement of the EU from 1994 onwards: Lessons for Ukraine
- Integration of new members in NATO: Lessons learned
- EU and NATO cooperation: what has been done, what needs to be done
- Changes in the Northern European mindset about Russia and European order
- New challenges and strategic projects in the Black Sea Region
- Russian energy exports to Europe: political significance and outlook
- The Republic of Moldova: a potential target of Russia?
- Strategies, tools, and agents of Russian propaganda in Western countries
- Ukraine`s refugees – integration policies and public perceptions
- The war in Ukraine: specific strategic challenges and possible opportunities for East European countries
- Rethinking the history of Eastern Europe: past and present approaches
- Peace in Ukraine – any horizon?
Special Session
On the 5th of December 2023, our partner, the Institute for The Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM Vienna) celebrates 70 years. To mark the anniversary, we will organise a special round-table discussion on the following topics: the EU enlargement and integration, conditions for a good neighborhoud relationship, and the development of democracy and multilateralism, all of them within the broader context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Financial Conditions
As part of our endeavour to encourage and promote young researchers in the field of Russian studies, we offer those accepted the financial support needed to cover travel costs (up to 300 Euros). Selection is based on the academic quality of the abstracts; the motivation letter, submitted alongside the abstract, is important.
The conference organizers encourage Ukraine-based and displaced Ukrainian scholars to participate in the event and may cover all costs for them, by competition.
For all other participants, three days accommodation and meals are covered by organisers.
There is no participation fee.
The conference is organised with the support of 2014-2021 EEA Financial Mechanism 2014-2021 through EEA grants for Collaborative Research, Grant No. 35/2021.
Format
The Conference is held in a hybrid format: in-person participation in Bucharest, Romania, and virtual meetings on a specialised platform. In-person participation is encouraged.
Application
Please complete the attached application form, including:
- Paper abstract (up to 300 words),
- Short biography (up to 150 words)
- Motivation letter (up to 300 words) for participants needing travel financial assistance
The ditto documents have to be sent via email to mariusdiaconescu@istorie.unibuc.ro by July 15th, 2023, in English.
Successful applicants will be notified via email by September 1st, 2023.
Conference language: English.
Academic Committee:
Prof. Dr. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (University of Bucharest)
Prof. Dr. Arild Moe (Fridtjof Nansen Institute)
Prof. Dr. Iver Neumann (Fridtjof Nansen Institute)
Mag. Sebastian Schäffer (Institute for Danube Region and Central Europe)
Prof. Dr. Armand Goșu (University of Bucharest)
Prof. Dr. Radu Carp (University of Bucharest)
Organising Committee:
Dr. Marius Diaconescu (University of Bucharest)
Dr. Anne-Kristin Jørgensen (Fridtjof Nansen Institute)
Dr. Iulia Mustățea (University of Bucharest)
Dr. Tatiana Cojocari (University of Bucharest)
Contact: office@russianstudiesromania.eu
Please contact us, should there be any questions.
Important dates:
Deadline for submitting applications: July 15th, 2023.
Notification of acceptance: September 1st, 2023.
Conference: November 9th-11th, 2023.
Romanian Centre for Russian Studies – Insights
International Conference, November 2022, program and media coverage:
Geopolitical challenges of the Russo-Ukrainian War from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean
Pushbacks, vetoes, boycotts… What will the Schengen dispute mean for CEE?
On December 8th, Austria blocked EU members Romania and Bulgaria from joining the Schengen area, quoting fears of uncontrolled irregular migration as a main explanation. In response, in both countries, calls for a boycott of Austrian companies followed. What lies behind Austria’s veto and what consequences will it have for the EU and the region? Why can individual states block decisions of that magnitude for other EU members? Do we witness another face of Euroscepticism, in which “vetoism” is a tool of countering supranationalism? Finally, what measures should be taken to improve the decision-making processes at the EU-level?
We discussed these and other questions together with:
Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, former Prime Minister of Romania
Vladislava Gubalova, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Global Europe, GLOBSEC Policy Institute
Daniela Apaydin, Research Associate, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe
Sebastian Schäffer, Managing Director, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe
Moderation:
Malwina Talik, Research Associate, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.
Watch the discussion here:
Wo finden Sie uns
