Peter Techet on Trend FM about youth protests in Europe

On the Hungarian private radio station Trend FM, Peter Techet discussed the similarities between youth protests in Western and Southeastern European countries.

You can listen to the interview here: Miért robbannak ki újabb és újabb tüntetések Nyugat-Európában?

Peter Techet on STVR Pátria Rádió about youth protests in Europe

The Hungarian-language programme of Slovakia’s public-service broadcaster STVR interviewed Peter Techet about the reasons behind youth protests in both Western and Southeastern Europe.

You can listen to the interview here

Podiumsdiskussion mit Peter Techet am Bruno Kreisky Forum über Regimewechsel und Protestbewegungen in Südosteuropa

Gemeinsam mit Florian Bieber, Noljan Lole und Tanja Topić diskutierte Peter Techet am 15. Oktober am Bruno Kreisky Forum darüber, welche Entwicklungen und Protestbewegungen autoritäre Machthaber in Südosteuropa herausfordern können und welche Lehren sich aus dem politischen Systemwechsel in Ungarn für Serbien und Albanien ziehen lassen.

Foto: Bruno Kreisky Forum

Péter Techet for 24.hu on EU Enlargement after Iceland’s Rejection

Péter Techet wrote an op-ed for the Hungarian news portal 24.hu. The article examines the Icelandic referendum: why the EU is not attractive to developed countries, and whether there is any prospect of a “social Europe” in the context of further enlargement to the east.

The article can be read here: Techet Péter: Európai egység – túl sok bürokrácia vagy túl kevés jóléti állam? | 24.hu

Energiegemeinschaften im Westbalkan

In einem Gastbeitrag für die österreichische Tageszeitung Der Standard beleuchtet Rebecca Thorne erfolgreiche Energiegemeinschaftsprojekte in Albanien, Nordmazedonien und Serbien. Zudem werden die politischen Rahmenbedingungen sowie die Hürden auf dem Weg zu einer nachhaltigen Energiezukunft im Westbalkan analysiert. Der Beitrag erschien gleichzeitig auch auf dem Blog der Forschungsgruppe Osteuropa am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Wien.

Lesen Sie den ganzen Artikel hier.

IDM Short Insights 47: The Western Balkans, France and the EPC – A Turning Point in Tirana

On May 2025, the European Political Community (EPC) met for the first time in the Western Balkans, with Tirana hosting the sixth summit.  Gwendoline Faucon (Trainee at the IDM) explains how France, a key driver of the EPC, used the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to regional cooperation and EU enlargement. President Macron called for stronger investment in Albania and suggested the country could join the EU within two years, if given a clear mandate. However, challenges like corruption, rules of law issues and youth emigration continue to slow EU accession. 

Transcript: 

In May 2025, the European Political Community Summit took place in Tirana, marking the first time the meeting was held in the Western Balkans. This meeting brought renewed focus on the European future of the region, with France playing a central role.

What is the EPC and its role?

Launched by French President Macron in May 2022, the EPC strengthen political dialogue and cooperation across the European continent in both EU and non-EU countries. The Tirana Summit focused on key topics such as security and democratic resilience, economic competitiveness, migration and mobility challenges, and youth empowerment.

What message did President Macron deliver during his visit to Tirana?

In Tirana, Macron stressed the importance of a stronger, more resilient Europe through cooperation, while during the « Invest into a connected Europe » Economic Forum, he encouraged investment in Albania, stating his belief that the country could join the European Union within two years if given a clear mandate. This underlines Macron’s dual approach: maintaining cooperation and his commitment to EU enlargement.

How is France reshaping its engagement with the Western Balkans?

France’s engagement with the Western Balkans has accelerated since 2019, providing support through bilateral cooperation. For example, through the French Development Agency, France supports EU alignment focusing on sectors like sustainability, energy and gender equality projects. It has also co-established the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre to strengthen digital resilience. France complements and supports the EU work with an active participation in formats like the Berlin Process. Its assistance is crucial for addressing the changes necessary for the Western Balkans path to EU accession.

What remaining obstacles stand in the way of Western Balkan EU accession?

Several EU members, including France, continue to express concerns, particularly around rule-of-law issues and high levels of corruption. Bilateral disputes, organized crime and economic disparities continue to slow the region’s progress, while youth emigration remains a prominent issue with young people seeking for opportunities abroad. The next EPC Summit scheduled for October 2025 in Denmark will provide another opportunity to assess progress and reaffirm the countries commitment to cooperation.

Parlamentswahlen in Albanien 2025

Lesen Sie hier das Briefing von Péter Techet:

Conference “NextGEN VOICES FOR EUROPE – An Intergenerational Dialogue on the Future” in Tirana

Photos copyright: Rei Bengu

From 7 to 9 March, Sophia Beiter participated in the conference “NextGEN VOICES FOR EUROPE – An Intergenerational Dialogue on the Future” in Tirana and was a speaker during the panel discussion “From Fragmentation to Strength: Complementing Europe’s Economic and Security Puzzle”. The conference was organised by Internationaler Karlspreis zu Aachen, the Albanian Ministry of Public Administration and Anti-corruption, the Albanian Ministry of Youth and Children and the National Youth Agency Albania.  

Amid geopolitical shifts, the conference explored the question: What kind of Europe will the next generation inherit, and how can they shape it? It provided young changemakers with a platform to engage in discussions on leadership, innovation, and democracy. A key focus was also Albania’s path to EU accession, along with that of the other candidate countries, and the crucial role of youth in EU decision-making. 

Parallel Protests? Corruption in Albania and Serbia

Albania and Serbia have been experiencing a wave of protests sparked by growing frustration over corruption scandals. While sharing a common catalyst, the developments in each country have been shaped by structural differences and distinct leadership. In her article on the IDM Blog, Antonie Blumberg compares the protest movements and the fight against corruption in both countries. 

Despite efforts towards EU integration, corruption remains a defining challenge in the Western Balkans. In 2024, mass protests erupted in Serbia and Albania, each exposing the different forms of corruption in these countries. While both movements reflect growing frustration, their distinct trajectories reveal how political structures shape anti-corruption efforts. Why did protests in Serbia take a grassroots form, while Albania’s were closely tied to opposition parties? And what do these differences tell us about corruption in the region? 

Albanians and Serbians rising against corruption  

In November 2024, the collapse of the Novi Sad train station canopy killed 15 people and injured two others, sparking a wave of anger across Serbia. Whistleblowers revealed that corruption and nepotism were responsible for the shoddy reconstruction work, part of a broader trend of non-transparent infrastructure projects tied to Chinese state companies. Students led the charge, mobilising in over 150 municipalities, including Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, and Niš. Opposition leaders and civil society groups joined the protests, demanding the release of full documentation on the train station renovation and criminal accountability for those responsible. Despite violent attacks against protestors, the movement has grown into the largest student protest in Serbia since 1968.   

In Albania, protests erupted in October 2024 following a corruption scandal involving Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist Party (PS). Opposition parties accused the government of electoral fraud and judicial manipulation, demanding justice. Led by the conservative Democratic Party (DP) and its allies, demonstrators blocked roads in six towns, calling for a technocratic caretaker government until the 2025 parliamentary elections. In February 2025, protests flared up again following the arrest of Tirana’s mayor Erion Veliaj on corruption charges. Veliaj’s supporters gathered outside the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK), denouncing what they saw as a politically motivated arrest. SPAK is an independent judicial institution responsible for investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption and organized crime cases. 

Although both protest movements were sparked by frustration with widespread corruption, they have evolved in different directions. In Serbia, protests have been predominantly led by students and grassroots movements, making them independent of direct political influence. This lack of leadership entails both advantages and drawbacks: it prevents the government from easily targeting a specific opposition figure, but it also makes it difficult to translate the movement into concrete political change. In contrast, Albania’s demonstrations have been largely driven by opposition forces, making them inherently politicised. This association with opposition parties has led to reduced public mobilisation compared to Serbia, where protests have maintained broader societal support.  

Serbia held hostage by corruption 

The different trajectories of the protests can be attributed to the structural differences in corruption itself. While the Western Balkans are often viewed as a single entity, corruption manifests in distinct ways across the region, highlighting that not all corruption is the same. 

Serbia represents a consolidated form of state capture, where corruption is highly centralised under the dominant Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The SNS has solidified control over key state institutions, transforming corruption into a tool for political dominance rather than just personal enrichment. State institutions, including the judiciary, law enforcement, and regulatory bodies, function under the firm grip of the ruling party. Prosecutorial independence remains weak, with judicial appointments and promotions being influenced by political considerations. High-profile corruption cases involving government figures rarely see legal consequences, while opposition leaders and critics often face selective prosecution. The telecommunications sector is particularly vulnerable to monopolisation as state actors exert influence over licensing to benefit politically connected firms. Serbia’s public procurement law on linear infrastructure projects further enables corruption. The government can classify projects as being of “special importance”, exempting them from standard procurement rules and bypassing competitive bidding, increasing the risk of favouritism.  

The means of fighting corruption are also limited. Asset confiscation mechanisms, a key tool in fighting corruption, remain ineffective, allowing illicit wealth to remain untouched. Serbia’s political leadership also tends to ignore the Anti-Corruption Council, displaying that anticorruption efforts remain largely symbolic.  

External actors like Russia and China further cement corruption by providing political and financial backing to the ruling elite. Infrastructure projects funded by Chinese companies, often labelled as FDIs, are in reality loans binding Serbia to hire Chinese firms, technology and materials. These deals bypass procurement laws through interstate agreements, limiting oversight while creating environmental and economic risks that deepen state capture.  

The incident in Novi Sad epitomises Serbia’s systemic corruption issues. As a Chinese-backed project, it was marked by opaque documentation, favouritism, and a judiciary too weak to ensure proper prosecution. Surprisingly, Radio Television Serbia, known for its close ties to President Vučić, began reporting on the protests without denouncing them, signalling the growing public pressure. The question remains whether telecommunications will remain under Vučić’s control, as the reach of corruption may continue to limit institutional change. 

Albania’s corruption battle 

In contrast to Serbia’s centralised state capture, corruption in Albania is more fragmented. The ruling PS under Prime Minister Edi Rama has been implicated in various corruption scandals, particularly regarding public procurement and the misuse of state resources. However, opposition figures like Sali Berisha also face corruption charges. While this has led to greater scrutiny, enforcement remains inconsistent.   

Albania has seen a larger number of corruption investigations than Serbia, primarily due to SPAK, which has led to several high-profile arrests. However, convictions remain low due to political interference and operational limitations. Despite some progress made in judicial reforms through vetting processes, enforcement against powerful figures is inconsistent. The political polarisation further weakens institutional accountability, with ruling and opposition elites engaging in mutual accusations rather than pursuing systemic reforms. It remains to be seen whether the increase in convictions becomes a wider trend in Albania.  

Unlike Serbia, where geopolitical alliances reinforce corruption, Albania faces challenges from regional and criminal influences. The country’s role as a transit point for illicit trade has allowed corruption and organised crime to become deeply intertwined. Bribery within law enforcement allows drug trafficking networks to operate with impunity, further eroding public trust in state institutions.  

In Albania, the politicisation of corruption prosecutions is mirrored in the politicisation of protests. Independent bodies like SPAK are accused of bias, as corruption cases are often perceived as tools for political battles rather than impartial justice. This dynamic fuels distrust against legitimate anti-corruption bodies and limits broad-based mobilisation. Protests become closely tied to party affiliations rather than unifying in the fight against corruption. 

Can democracy emerge in Southeastern Europe? 

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index further highlights these contrasting realities: public perception of corruption in Serbia is worsening as the government’s deep control over state institutions has effectively closed off avenues for meaningful anti-corruption reforms, fostering widespread disillusionment. Albania, on the other hand, despite current protests, has shown slight improvement, which can be attributed to the efforts of SPAK and the fact that each political side is seeing corruption-related arrests on the countering side. However, this progress remains fragile. The public’s perception of corruption in Albania is deeply polarised, with many viewing anti-corruption efforts through a partisan lens.  

Ultimately, the protests offer a counter-narrative to the widespread portrayal of Southeastern Europe as a region plagued by illiberalism and democratic backsliding. They show that even in environments where corruption runs deep, there is the potential for democracy to emerge from below. Whether this will lead to lasting reform is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the pace of EU integration for both Serbia and Albania hinges on the continued effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Progress in the accession negotiations will depend on whether these countries can establish genuine, independent institutions capable of tackling corruption at all levels.

Antonie Blumberg is currently completing her Master’s in Eastern European Studies at the University of Hamburg. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts and Sciences from University College Maastricht and spent two months as a trainee at the IDM. 

Edited by Malwina Talik and Rebecca Thorne.

The opinions expressed in this article represent the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDM. 

IDM Short Insights 43: Serbia and Albania: Protests and the EU

 

5 things you need to know about the protests in Serbia and Albania!

In November 2024, large-scale protests erupted in Serbia and Albania, exposig deep-seated corruption and raising critical questions about democracy in Southeastern Europe. In Serbia, students led mass protests after a deadly infrastructure failure linked to government corruption, while in Albania, demonstrations targeted both ruling and opposition figures involved in corruption scandals. The EU’s response has been tepid. As democracy rises from below, the key question remains: Will the EU support genuine democratic reform, or continue prioritising regional stability over accountability?

Our trainee, Antonie Blumberg, answers five key questions about the protests.

Transcript:

Southeastern Europe – a region that is often portrayed as being plagued by illiberalism and democratic backsliding. But guess what? People are fighting back offering a counter-narrative to this!  In November 2024 protests erupted in Serbia and Albania exposing corruption in a very deep-rooted manner. You haven’t heard about it? Here’s all you need to know:  

Why did the protests start?

In Serbia, in the city of Novi Sad, a train station collapsed and killed 15 people last November. Whistleblowers then revealed that corruption and nepotism were responsible for the shoddy construction work. This is part of a larger trend of non-transparent infrastructure projects tied to Chinese state companies. In Albania, different corruption scandals involving Edi Rama of the ruling Socialist Party but also different figures of opposition Democratic Party sparked corruption protests. It started in October 2024 and flared up again and again until now   

How are the Protests now developing?

Despite both protests being sparked by corruption, they developed in very different directions. In Serbia, protests are predominantly led by students, making them independent of direct political influence. In Albania, they are led by opposition forces, making them inherently politicised. 

Corruption – how bad is it?

In Serbia, we have a highly centralised form of state capture. Everything is controlled by Vučić’s ruling party, from courts to media. However, Radio Television Serbia, known for its close ties to President Vučić, now started to report on the protests without denouncing them. In Albania, corruption is way more fragmented. Both government and opposition figures are accused, making accountability a very messy political game. 

And the EU? 

The EU should back democracy as it’s emphasising democratic reforms and rule of law as the pivotal issue for the countries’ European integration… but does it? In Albania, the EU is stating: „Please, no violence, just keep talking. We do not want any rapid changes.“ And for Serbia, there is silence. Meanwhile, Vučić is closing economic deals with the EU and the protestors are not even mentioned at all.  

Is it about corruption?  

The protests aren’t just about corruption—they’re about democracy itself emerging from below. And while Western media and western politicians are not talking about them a lot, especially the protests in Serbia are historic. They are the biggest student protests since 1968. Now the question is: Will the EU step up and push for real democratic change, or will it continue to support leaders that are supposedly “stabilising” the region?